March 14, 2023

Aydin Mirzaee, Founder of Fluidware (Bootstrapped to ~$100M exit) | How to Find Product Market Fit

Aydin Mirzaee, Founder of Fluidware (Bootstrapped to ~$100M exit) | How to Find Product Market Fit

There's nothing quite like going from 0 to an 8-figure+ acquisition, especially on your first startup. And 100% bootstrapped! Aydin, the founder of Fluidware and now founder of Fellow, shares the story of his humble beginnings as a Jr Engineer, to launching a startup that would compete with SurveyMonkey and ultimately join their ranks. Notably, Aydin never raised money at Fluidware. While it had its downside, it enabled him and his team to solve customer problems without worrying abou...

There's nothing quite like going from 0 to an 8-figure+ acquisition, especially on your first startup. And 100% bootstrapped!

Aydin, the founder of Fluidware and now founder of Fellow, shares the story of his humble beginnings as a Jr Engineer, to launching a startup that would compete with SurveyMonkey and ultimately join their ranks.

 Notably, Aydin never raised money at Fluidware. While it had its downside, it enabled him and his team to solve customer problems without worrying about the market size or the big picture. Each step helped them discover new insights and led them closer to product-market fit. 

Want to get a feel for what it takes to bootstrap to PMF? Check this episode out.

Send me a message to let me know what you think!

00:32 - Intro

02:00 - Early days of FluidWare

07:52 - The Fluid Survey Prototype

10:56 - Serendipity is key

13:47 - The First Big Pitch

17:06 - That First Contract

28:17 - Competing with SurveyMonkey

32:31 - Product Market Fit Life Cycle

38:46 - Raising Destroys Optionality

42:47 - Recap

WEBVTT

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Ray Dalio's thing is all like, people think it's all about forecasting, knowing what's going to happen.

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It's really just about reading what's going on today.

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You don't need to know what's going to happen tomorrow.

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It's just if you recognize you're in a really good environment, well, you might as well get some liquidity now.

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Whatever happens, if it's going to be even better i n six months, t hen so be it.

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If it's already really good, j ust capitalize.

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Welcome to the Product Market Fit Show, brought to you by M istrial, a seed-stage firm based in Canada.

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I'm Pablo; I'm a founder turned VC.

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My goal is to help early s tage founders like you find product market fit.

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Today we have Aydin, the founder, and CEO of Fellow, a meeting management platform.

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Fellow is based in Ottawa.

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They have about 65 employees and have raised over$30 million.

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Before Fellow, Aydin was a founder of Fluidware, an online survey tool, which was acquired by a SurveyMonkey for high eight figures.

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That's actually the company we're going to be digging in today.

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So first and foremost, welcome, Aydin to the show.

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It's a pleasure having here.

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Yeah, I'm excited.

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I've watched a lot of your previous episodes and you've had a lot of great people on this show.

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So excited to do this.

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Awesome.

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I think it's going to be a really insightful episode.

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Today the topic is a pretty broad topic, how to find product market fit.

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We'll be going through the story of Fluidware and, and the changes that you made throughout to kind of get more and more fit over time.

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I think one of the lessons that'll be apparent today is we tend to think of product market fit as a single point in time, your pre-product market fit, and then your post-product market fit, and you're done.

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The reality is in talking to many guests through the show is that that process really never ends.

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The market is constantly evolving, and so your product has to constantly evolve to keep up with it as you open new channels, as the competitive landscape changes and so on.

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That's, I think, what will come out through this story.

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Maybe just for starters, if you could take us all the way back to the early days of Fluidware how did you come up with the idea and what was kind of the-- what did the landscape look like at that point in time?

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Yeah, I mean, I think that was a long time ago, but I think that we did a lot of things that I would never do again.

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I mean, it's a long story.

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So we had a lot of pivots before we narrowed in on working on online surveys.

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To save you a lot of the back and forth that went there, what I will say is that when we decided that we wanted to work on an online survey product and once we figured out that that's the thing that we wanted to do, I didn't so much as search on Google to see how many other online survey tools there were, because had I searched on Google to see how many other survey tools there were, I would've told my other co-founders hey, we probably shouldn't do this because there's 10 pages worth of search results of other online survey tools.

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It's so common that as a matter of fact, when you first learn how to program or you become a developer, one of the first things that people often learn how to do is to make an online poll.

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This is one of the most commonplace things that exist, one of the most commoditized areas of software.

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Here we were.

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We were going to do-- build the same thing.

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I think notionally, we had heard of the-- we had heard of SurveyMonkey, but this is kind of how naive we were.

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We didn't so much as just look to see if there are other tools that basically do this and how many there are.

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We basically had an idea and we wanted to build a much easier online survey creation process.

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We started to do that.

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We thought that there would be-- there was a lot of new changes that were going on and now a lot of things were moving to SaaS.

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SaaS was still new back then, so it's not like everything had become SaaS software.

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So we had this idea of we're going to take survey software and we're going to build a SaaS-based survey tool, but what we're going to do is we're going to make it super easy to use and create.

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Very specifically back then, I mean, we're talking about the year 2008 now, so it was a long time ago.

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To have basic authoring tools-- a drag-and-drop editor was super novel.

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So if you saw something like that, whoa, you can build a survey by dragging in question types, moving them around, editing them, and then seeing the changes live as you're making those changes, that would've been novel.

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Even to the extent that you were building an online-- that you had used an online survey tool, to do anything would've been multiple clicks.

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It would've been like, click to add, click here, click here.

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There'd be nine clicks before you could do anything.

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So there was a lot to be developed just on making it an easy to use way to do things.

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Was that something that you-- I get it.

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At first you didn't really even look into it, but I'm sure pretty quickly you realized there were other players.

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That's something that you dissected and started looking at the other products and said, oh, we can improve in this and that, or how did that even come about that you decided to do this kind of easy to use drag-and-rop editor and the other ones were a bit more complicated

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Yeah, I mean the story's pretty long one, but I think we-- the original idea of the company was something else.

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We were going to build this other-- yeah, we were going to build this other product.

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The original company was actually called-- this other tool called-- we originally called it Chidet.

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It was supposed to be the world's first anti-social network.

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It was about creating a place where people could post ideas and have other people criticize it and offer feedback, right?

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So that was the first thing that we wanted to do, the very first idea.

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As we started to research into that and start building the first versions of it and started showing it to users and to customers, everyone hated it, right?

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What they didn't like was the word-- they didn't like the word criticism.

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They didn't like the idea of, hey, we're going to post stuff on this website and other people would criticize it.

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So we quickly moved away from criticism and said, okay, well, what if we called it feedback?

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Would people be more interested in a feedback platform?

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As we started talking about a feedback platform, people would say things like, well, I don't know if feedback is the right thing.

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We do surveys.

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Is that what you can help with?

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We do this type of survey and that type of survey.

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That was something that they were definitely interested in.

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Again, this was a long time ago, so a lot of the surveys would still be done.

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There was a lot of pen and paper surveys.

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It wasn't like-- online surveys weren't as prevalent as they are today.

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We just saw that there was an opportunity.

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As we were talking to customers or potential customers, there was appetite for an online survey tool.

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We said, okay, well, this thing that we're working on right now is failing, so let's try to build an online survey tool.

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As we were thinking about it, we said, well, there is this other online survey tool.

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There was a couple that were more well-known back then.

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One was obviously SurveyMonkey.

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The other one was Zoomerang.

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When we looked at those tools, we just thought-- saw that in the state of where web development was at that time, there was the new frontier where you could build these very dynamic interfaces.

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By the way, building a dynamic interface was really hard, too, because you had old browsers like Internet Explorer 6 that most people were still using.

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To do a lot of these things, you really had to think about cross-browser compatibility.

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You had the different browser types.

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We thought that the value that we would be able to add in order to differentiate was to build a much easier, a much better survey creation environment.

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So it would just be a lot easier to build surveys on our product, which was called FluidSurveys, versus any other product.

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That's how we thought about it.

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Got it.

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Okay, perfect.

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What did-- what kind of market-- I mean, you talked to a few customers.

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You had identified there was this pain point.

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What's your first idea of who you're even selling this survey tool to?

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Yeah, so again, when we first started, I don't know that we had really good ideas around all of this stuff.

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We just started talking to everybody that we could, right?

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As we were starting to talk to people, once we had the first prototype available-- again, the very first prototypes were quite modest.

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I think we had three or four question types.

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W had an interface and you can drag questions in from the left onto the right and move them around and you could change the fields dynamically and publish the survey.

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We built this thing that looked really good.

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It looked like something that was easy to use.

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As we started to show this to other people, they would say, oh, that looks really interesting.

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Yeah, I've never seen people do that in the browser where you could drag and drop questions.

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That seems pretty novel, right?

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Then we would ask them the question of okay, so you say that this is easy to use and what are you using today?

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They'd say, oh, we're using SurveyMonkey as an example.

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We'd say, okay, since ours is way easier to use, would you be willing to switch away from your current product.

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They say, well no.

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We'd say, why?

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They'd say, well, I know yours is easier to use, but the truth is we're already using this tool and we know how to use it and we've got our data in it and we've got all these things.

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It's just not enough.

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It's not enough of a differentiator for us to switch off our current platform.

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Maybe if we were looking from scratch and we were looking for something, then maybe we'd consider FluidSurveys, but since we're already on this platform, this is not a thing that we want to do.

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Of course this was pretty disappointing.

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Again, not knowing very much about business at all, we spent a bunch of time building this thing and then going to customers after the fact and all on the hypothesis, not really talking to very many people and then being shut down.

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To be honest, it was very depressing.

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Those very, very early days.

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I remember I used to-- just the backstory of this, I used to work at Nortel, and so I remember leaving Nortel and having probably, I would say, 10 to 12 months of savings.

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I could live off of that for that amount of time.

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As the months passed by, you're looking at this and you're like, oh, my savings, they're less and less and less.

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It's your personal runway, yeah.

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Yeah, it's your personal runway.

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We never raised money for this company.

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It's very stressful.

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What happened was-- it was a very lucky series of events, but we were working at-- Algonquin College had this program, the applied research program, and they let us work out of their classrooms.

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So we were effectively getting free office space.

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It was summertime.

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There weren't as many students who were working out of there.

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We met this one professor who was a professor School of Business and he had this contact at the federal government and he said,"Oh, you're working on surveys.

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I can introduce you to this guy at the federal government who is-- who does stuff with surveys.

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He into public opinion research." We didn't-- at that point we would've met with anyone.

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Anyone you would've introduced us to, we would've met with.

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So we meet with this guy and we do our standard demo and there's not that much to show, but it's hey, you can drag and drop things and it's easy.

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It's easier than anything else out there.

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He looked at that and he's like,"Okay, that's coo, but more importantly, where do you host your data?" We said,"Well, I mean, we host our data in this server at our house." I mean, we said we hosted on a server.

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He's like,"But is it in Canada?" And we said,"Yeah, yeah, it's in Canada." We didn't have AWS or cloud computing.

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It's very early on.

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Then he asked us another question which was,"Okay, when you create a survey using this tool, is it accessible?" We were like,"What do you mean?

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What's that?" He's like,"Well, there's these accessibility guidelines.

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They're new.

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The federal government recently implemented these rules so that Canadian citizens, when they visit websites of the government of Canada, they can access these things.

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So if you're visually impaired and you're using the screen reader, then you will be be able to see and read the content." He said,"Well, are your surveys accessible?" We said,"Well, no, but I mean, that's easy.

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We can make that happen, no problem." Of course, we didn't necessarily know that much, but he's like,"Oh, really?""If your surveys are accessible, then I need to introduce you to some more people." We said, okay, sure, introduce us to more people.

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At some point, I hope one of these people actually buys the software.

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That'd be really nice.

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We went away and we started to work on some of this accessibility guidelines and it turned out there was a series of things.

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The government called those things common look and feel.

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We had to make some other changes.

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It's really-- I don't know that it's the type of work that developers are super excited to do, but it was-- didn't have that much runway, so this was our best shot, and so we did that.

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Then we get invited to this meeting.

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We get a calendar invite and we don't know what we're walking into.

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This is the most random thing, but we get invited into this room and there's like 20 or 25 people.

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It happens to be the heads of public opinion research at each and every one of the federal government departments in Canada.

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All of the decision-makers that buy survey software across the federal government of Canada, we're all in one room.

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Then they're like, okay, show us this demo.

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He starts off by saying,"This tool is hosted in Canada and it's accessible and meet your common look and feel guidelines." That was maybe stretching the truth a little bit at the time.

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Then we start to do a demo.

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Again, this is very begin-- we had four question types.

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There's not that much to demo.

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We have an hour-long meeting and we hadn't built the other things.

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When you create a survey, then you deploy it.

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There's some deployment settings and then there are things like you have to analyze the data; you have to send it out.

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There's all this stuff, and we had built none of those things.

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We had the authoring and then you could see the survey and there wasn't much else.

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I spent so much time talking about the very little-- those four or five question types and just-- I don't know.

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We took up that time so that there was very little time for them to ask us about the other things.

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Then when they asked, they were like,"Okay, well, you haven't showed us any of the analysis yet." I said,"Well, if you like what you see here, when we show you the other stuff, you're going to love that." It was-- anyway, so the demo went really well, but then someone asked the question about pricing, like tell us about your pricing.

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Up until now, believe it or not, we had not thought about pricing.

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My co-founder Ellie Fati-- Ellie was-- he's 33 years older than I am.

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He's a been there, done that guy.

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I turned to him and I said,"Pricing," and I looked to him and then I got worried because he also hadn't thought about pricing We were all caught off guard.

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Then the person asked us the question,"Is it less than$25,000?" We paused and we're like, 25, 000?

00:16:01.600 --> 00:16:04.000
That's like so much money.

00:16:04.070 --> 00:16:04.960
What do you mean?

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Then he is like,"Oh, yeah, because that's the threshold after which you have to get this other type of approval." We're like, oh, yeah, it's no problem, under 25,000.

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So anyway, that was our first thing.

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I think we walked out, Ellie and I started high fiving.

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We thought we'd made it.

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We started doing the math.

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There's 25 people in the room, 25,000 each.

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This is the greatest day.

00:16:29.070 --> 00:16:32.279
This startup stuff is so easy.

00:16:32.480 --> 00:16:33.639
Is that all we had to do?

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Everything is going so great.

00:16:38.681 --> 00:16:40.159
It turned out it was a lot more complicated.

00:16:42.081 --> 00:16:50.080
What I think was not communicated during that meeting was, oh, everybody was used to getting software and installing it on their own servers.

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This is, again, 2008, so SaaS was not really a thing that the government subscribed to.

00:16:57.129 --> 00:17:06.079
To say that we're going to take Canadian citizen private data and store it on someone else's server that's not in our own firewall was a crazy concept.

00:17:06.730 --> 00:17:13.480
I want to say that we met each one of those departments five times and nobody wanted to take the first step.

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Nobody wanted to take the risk of giving us that first contract.

00:17:18.721 --> 00:17:26.640
I think, Pablo, if I were to say-- there was this one lady at Health Canada and I think she just felt sorry for us.

00:17:26.641 --> 00:17:34.279
She's like-- and she had come from private sector and she was like,"If I don't give these guys a contract, literally they're going to shut down.

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It's going to be over, so I'm going to like take the risk." Then, by the way, this process took a year and a half somehow.

00:17:39.881 --> 00:17:42.599
Remember, I only had one year of runway.

00:17:43.560 --> 00:17:43.799
Stretch that one, yeah.

00:17:43.560 --> 00:17:44.559
Yeah, it had to be stretched.

00:17:44.829 --> 00:17:46.400
Yeah, it was really rough.

00:17:46.760 --> 00:17:52.319
Once we got the first one, then everybody else was more comfortable and we started getting other ones.

00:17:52.319 --> 00:17:59.400
Very soon we had this basis of revenue from the government, from the federal government.

00:18:00.201 --> 00:18:02.319
That's what I would call stage one of the company.

00:18:02.320 --> 00:18:16.480
It was like we had product market fit as a survey tool built for the federal government, not because our software was so great, but because it meant these accessibility guidelines that nobody else met at the time.

00:18:18.040 --> 00:18:20.720
That's what it took for us to get to that first stage.

00:18:21.289 --> 00:18:30.720
Because we had no venture financing, we had nothing, it was like whatever gets us to any form of revenue so that we can survive is good, and so we will do that.

00:18:30.900 --> 00:18:41.680
Let me ask about that because that's exactly the question I had, which is you had product market fit in a niche market and you got it by meeting that niche market specs, which is accessibility and whatnot.

00:18:42.368 --> 00:18:56.319
If you had been a VC-funded startup, let's say you'd raised the pre-seed round or whatever, especially these days when that's so common, I think there's probably going to be a huge pushback against doing any of that, say this is a waste of time.

00:18:56.040 --> 00:18:56.880
Hundred percent, yeah, it's a waste of time.

00:18:56.529 --> 00:19:01.039
Now as we'll learn, Fluidware was ultimately a success.

00:19:01.401 --> 00:19:03.599
This led to the next thing and so on, and we'll go through that.

00:19:03.881 --> 00:19:07.200
Just maybe just to go on a tangent here, what are your thoughts on that?

00:19:07.359 --> 00:19:12.960
In other words, by not being tied to this big market thing, you just went step by step and listened to customers.

00:19:13.079 --> 00:19:17.920
If customers were interested, you just solved that problem and it led to something which then, as we'll see, leads to something else.

00:19:17.921 --> 00:19:21.680
That optionality wouldn't have happened if you were in this VC market world.

00:19:22.420 --> 00:19:28.509
Yeah, I think if you had invested in Fluidware, you would've told us you're not allowed to do that.

00:19:28.510 --> 00:19:30.390
Let's do the math here.

00:19:30.391 --> 00:19:33.868
So 25,000 times 25, what is that?

00:19:35.210 --> 00:19:36.789
625,000.

00:19:38.059 --> 00:19:39.349
That's your whole market.

00:19:39.631 --> 00:19:40.868
You're doing all this for that?

00:19:40.869 --> 00:19:42.190
You can't do this.

00:19:42.710 --> 00:19:42.910
Are you guys crazy?

00:19:42.911 --> 00:19:45.190
You're right.

00:19:45.431 --> 00:19:55.630
We would've been stopped from doing that and we would've-- they would've-- we would've been asked to to dream bigger or look for a bigger market or have some broader strategy.

00:19:56.250 --> 00:20:03.430
Really we were-- I think when you-- I guess where we were, again, we were very inexperienced and young.

00:20:03.431 --> 00:20:06.069
We were just trying to survive.

00:20:06.550 --> 00:20:09.309
For us, it was just like a survival game of how do we do this?

00:20:10.150 --> 00:20:19.029
Remember, I had left my job at Nortel and it was this different place where my parents were like, you're an entrepreneur.

00:20:19.310 --> 00:20:19.789
What is that?

00:20:19.790 --> 00:20:21.630
Is that like you're unemployed?

00:20:21.720 --> 00:20:22.829
It wasn't cool back then.

00:20:24.790 --> 00:20:24.910
Yeah, it wasn't cool back then, right?

00:20:24.790 --> 00:20:29.868
This was a big, risky deal and it was just-- you just wanted to survive, live to see the next day.

00:20:30.911 --> 00:20:32.829
Obviously all this stuff was really good.

00:20:32.830 --> 00:20:37.750
So now we actually had some revenue and because we had some revenue, we kept making the product better.

00:20:37.750 --> 00:20:47.440
The next thing for us was as we were talking to a lot of these users, we start to dig into this we also have to be hosted in Canada thing.

00:20:47.961 --> 00:20:49.000
We're like, what's that about?

00:20:49.840 --> 00:20:52.118
They'd say, well, there's this thing called the Patriot Act.

00:20:52.140 --> 00:21:02.519
Effectively what it means is that if you have Canadian citizen data and it's on an American server, in theory it could be accessed, right?

00:21:03.840 --> 00:21:07.599
Realistically, is anyone going to access this data?

00:21:07.930 --> 00:21:10.279
No, but theoretically it's possible.

00:21:12.000 --> 00:21:14.599
We took that and we said, well, who cares about this?

00:21:14.601 --> 00:21:36.480
They'd say,"Well, anybody who is funded by government in any way, shape or form." So municipal governments, provincial governments, colleges and universities, I would say nonprofits that have government funding of any sort, any sort of public organization would care about this.

00:21:37.349 --> 00:21:42.118
What we did for this next phase was, okay, well, let's just go reach out to all of them.

00:21:42.601 --> 00:21:50.358
Back then, a lot of these things that-- a lot of the rules around just randomly emailing people didn't exist.

00:21:50.681 --> 00:21:55.400
The Canned Spam Acts and all the rules around this stuff weren't there.

00:21:55.450 --> 00:22:02.880
So we had the-- we could just look up to see who was using other survey tools and would post public links on their website.

00:22:02.881 --> 00:22:12.759
We'd find out who they were and we'd send them an email and we'd say,"Did you know that you are susceptible to the Patriot Act and this can happen?

00:22:14.119 --> 00:22:19.839
You shouldn't be doing this." It was almost-- I don't want to use the words, but like it was a scare campaign.

00:22:21.641 --> 00:22:33.640
We went out and we just started messaging people and we said like,"Hey, you basically have to use this because there's nobody else that is Canadian hosted and we have all these federal government customers and all this.

00:22:33.641 --> 00:22:38.319
You should use us." We ended up getting a bunch of those sorts of people.

00:22:38.750 --> 00:22:41.680
It's so backwards from a VC cliche story.

00:22:41.681 --> 00:22:43.000
You're selling into government.

00:22:43.000 --> 00:22:45.640
You're selling into colleges, universities.

00:22:45.868 --> 00:22:46.920
I mean, these are all the marketplaces that--

00:22:46.921 --> 00:22:48.880
All the places that have no money that are long cycles.

00:22:48.520 --> 00:22:51.640
That's right.

00:22:52.441 --> 00:22:53.160
What was that like?

00:22:53.161 --> 00:22:57.799
I mean, was it actually not as bad as people make it seem that it is?

00:22:57.921 --> 00:22:59.599
I mean, it was definitely not sexy.

00:22:59.961 --> 00:23:06.279
So if I was at a party and I would say we're making survey software, which isn't very sexy to begin with--

00:23:06.161 --> 00:23:07.440
Starting off on a bad foot, yeah.

00:23:07.280 --> 00:23:09.839
Yeah, we're making federal government survey software.

00:23:10.240 --> 00:23:16.519
Then we got into we're now making Canadian survey software.

00:23:16.520 --> 00:23:17.240
What does that mean?

00:23:17.240 --> 00:23:20.240
Well, it's survey software, but we host our data i n Canada.

00:23:20.759 --> 00:23:23.160
Our secret sauce is accessibility and hosting.

00:23:23.161 --> 00:23:24.358
Yeah, that's right.

00:23:24.359 --> 00:23:35.640
Which is like what a major-- because I think rightfully, an investor might have said, well, can't-- I don't know, can't SurveyMonkey buy some servers in Canada and call it a day?

00:23:36.560 --> 00:23:39.118
The answer would've been, yeah, I guess they could.

00:23:39.119 --> 00:23:44.400
That was enough for us to go on to kind of expand and get a bunch of these clients.

00:23:44.401 --> 00:23:46.519
Now by the way, this was going really well.

00:23:46.520 --> 00:23:49.720
I think first year, basically no revenue.

00:23:50.269 --> 00:23:54.200
I think year two, 125k ARR at that point.

00:23:54.201 --> 00:24:01.680
Year three, maybe 500K and then year four, I think we got to 1.5 million.

00:24:03.881 --> 00:24:11.039
Year to year, it ended up adding to meaningful ARR at that point for a bootstrap company.

00:24:11.380 --> 00:24:21.680
I think what started to happen was as we were getting this revenue and as we were continuously making the product better, we thought the product started to get really good.

00:24:22.480 --> 00:24:27.358
Obviously we had really great talent on the team and we kept making the product better.

00:24:27.940 --> 00:24:31.519
People started discovering us and people started using the product.

00:24:31.618 --> 00:24:38.319
We started to basically be able to compete toe to toe with the other products.

00:24:38.240 --> 00:24:42.160
Right, for products, things outside of-- it wasn't government and government-funded institutions anymore.

00:24:42.161 --> 00:24:45.640
It was just-- it started to become just typical use cases.

00:24:46.269 --> 00:24:46.759
Yeah, exactly.

00:24:48.721 --> 00:24:53.720
We thought at the time that we had the best product on the market.

00:24:53.721 --> 00:24:56.880
You should use our software over other software.

00:24:57.441 --> 00:24:59.480
That's the way that we thought about it.

00:24:59.809 --> 00:25:01.440
We had superior features, superior UX.

00:25:01.759 --> 00:25:08.240
We thought we had the best product on the market.

00:25:08.579 --> 00:25:13.240
The problem is that just because you have the best product doesn't mean that you win.

00:25:14.000 --> 00:25:18.880
We had a situation where SurveyMonkey was started in 1999.

00:25:19.650 --> 00:25:26.440
It was arguably-- maybe there was another one before SurveyMonkey, but arguably the first SaaS tool ever created everybody.

00:25:26.441 --> 00:25:29.160
It was the brand that everybody knew of.

00:25:29.520 --> 00:25:34.559
When you thought about internet software, maybe the first name that would've come up would've been SurveyMonkey.

00:25:36.009 --> 00:25:44.319
No matter how great our product was, the way that people got to choose their survey software would've been something like, oh, I need to do a survey.

00:25:45.161 --> 00:25:47.559
Their friend would've said, oh, you should use SurveyMonkey.

00:25:47.840 --> 00:25:52.039
They would've never even searched to begin with to find our software and so on and so forth.

00:25:52.650 --> 00:26:06.680
The only thing that maybe you would search for is if you use SurveyMonkey or Zoomerang or Survey Gizmo or-- again, there were a hundred-plus of these software tools.

00:26:06.880 --> 00:26:13.440
If you use any one of them and then you start searching, you might search if the thing that you were looking for, you couldn't find.

00:26:14.789 --> 00:26:19.680
This one time, the company's 800-number was my cellphone number.

00:26:20.721 --> 00:26:31.680
Someone called me and said," Hey, we're looking to do a survey, but we're looking to do something very different in that we don't want this survey to be fluidsurveys.com/whatever title.

00:26:32.009 --> 00:26:33.680
We want it to be our own domain name.

00:26:33.681 --> 00:26:37.680
Can you do that?" This is me, the CEO on the phone.

00:26:37.681 --> 00:26:38.759
I can make any decision.

00:26:39.069 --> 00:26:40.200
"Sure, we can do that.

00:26:40.201 --> 00:26:49.599
It'll cost you$2,000." I was like, we weren't going to really do that, but if he said yes to$2,000, we would've pretty much done anything at that time.

00:26:49.961 --> 00:26:50.799
Yeah, I could do that.

00:26:51.161 --> 00:26:59.039
I was surprised and I said,"Okay, well, let me talk to the team here and we'll get back to you." We obviously did that for them.

00:27:00.721 --> 00:27:04.279
Then it was really interesting because we thought maybe this is a thing.

00:27:04.280 --> 00:27:06.640
We said,"Hey, what were you looking for?

00:27:06.881 --> 00:27:07.640
What is this thing?

00:27:07.921 --> 00:27:18.240
You want us to use your domain?" He said,"Well, I was looking for white label service software." That afternoon, we created a landing page called White Label Survey software.

00:27:18.480 --> 00:27:21.319
Because nobody else had done it, we were number one in Google.

00:27:21.779 --> 00:27:30.358
That started to bring in some traffic, not a lot, but as we started talking to those people, they were asking us for other sorts of things.

00:27:30.450 --> 00:27:33.118
So they would say things like,"Do you have advanced branching?

00:27:33.119 --> 00:27:34.160
Do you have piping?

00:27:34.161 --> 00:27:39.440
Do you have looping?" We would say,"What are those things?" They'd say,"Well, we're using this other software.

00:27:39.720 --> 00:27:41.079
We installed it on our servers.

00:27:41.080 --> 00:27:46.319
It's enterprise survey software and it doesn't exist in the cloud.

00:27:46.520 --> 00:27:58.000
Nobody's built a cloud version of this stuff." We said,"Well, how much does that survey software cost that you install on your own servers and you could do these sorts of things?" It was expensive.

00:27:58.240 --> 00:28:05.480
It was-- I think depending on what you were looking for, you might h ave paid over$100,000 for a license.

00:28:05.519 --> 00:28:08.599
Again, so this is old school ways of software.

00:28:08.800 --> 00:28:13.319
You'd pay a big license up front and some maintenance over time, but it wasn't SaaS space.

00:28:13.320 --> 00:28:17.160
So there was these large price tags associated with it.

00:28:17.641 --> 00:28:25.920
We thought, oh, so nobody's actually gone ahead and built enterprise survey software in SaaS form and put it on the cloud.

00:28:25.930 --> 00:28:29.039
So if we did that, we could get these sorts of customers.

00:28:29.730 --> 00:28:37.000
We started to take a-- at some point we realized this, which was we cannot out-SurveyMonkey SurveyMonkey.

00:28:37.329 --> 00:28:43.599
We can try to be easier to use, we can try to do all these things, but at the end of the day, their name is so dominant.

00:28:44.240 --> 00:28:49.920
They have such a brand moat that it will be very difficult for us to compete.

00:28:49.920 --> 00:28:57.200
It's always going to be an uphill battle because even if I come to you at a party and I say we make survey software, you'd say oh, you mean like SurveyMonkey?

00:28:57.569 --> 00:29:01.279
We always had to explain away ourselves; how are you different than SurveyMonkey?

00:29:01.990 --> 00:29:05.839
Even if you weren't computer-savvy, you would've known that name.

00:29:06.401 --> 00:29:11.480
It was always an uphill battle, but we finally found something that we could actually differentiate on.

00:29:12.410 --> 00:29:14.480
We started to build these advanced features.

00:29:14.480 --> 00:29:16.079
So we built advanced branching.

00:29:16.080 --> 00:29:17.799
So what does advanced branching mean?

00:29:18.200 --> 00:29:25.559
You used, to back in the day, be able to do, in an online survey, say something like, if the person answers yes, send the user to Page 4.

00:29:25.760 --> 00:29:27.799
If they answer no, send them to Page 5.

00:29:28.840 --> 00:29:33.960
We would do things like-- you could put like nine if/then conditions and like complex logic.

00:29:34.019 --> 00:29:37.880
Here's a key question because I think this is really important and fascinating stuff.

00:29:38.800 --> 00:29:39.920
You're in a super-crowded space.

00:29:40.280 --> 00:29:41.700
You're not by any means the first entrant.

00:29:41.940 --> 00:29:46.740
There's already a very dominant player from a branding perspective that's top of mind, SurveyMonkey.

00:29:46.540 --> 00:29:48.059
It's the worst market to get into.

00:29:47.901 --> 00:29:48.500
It's crazy.

00:29:48.060 --> 00:29:49.980
It's the worst market to get into i t in many ways.

00:29:51.340 --> 00:29:53.859
You end up finding these differentiated features.

00:29:53.861 --> 00:29:59.059
I don't k now i f they're even niche features because i t might not've-- a niche market might be e ven bigger than that, but these differentiated features that others aren't tackling.

00:29:59.140 --> 00:30:07.220
The classic thing is, anybody could do this, and yet they're not doing it, especially even the dominant ones with way more money, more people and stuff are not doing it.

00:30:07.701 --> 00:30:08.539
I'm sure yo u've t hought about this.

00:30:08.941 --> 00:30:10.259
Why weren't they doing it?

00:30:10.259 --> 00:30:13.980
Why do you think SurveyMonkey and some of the other big ones weren't doing it?

00:30:13.980 --> 00:30:16.779
That gave you this opportunity to lean into it.

00:30:17.009 --> 00:30:18.539
Yeah, great question.

00:30:19.300 --> 00:30:24.779
What I've realized about larger companies is they tend to do the things that most people want.

00:30:26.381 --> 00:30:31.779
So 80%-- you could build the use case for 80% of people; that will be enough.

00:30:31.780 --> 00:30:35.380
That market is so massive that you could just focus on those.

00:30:36.340 --> 00:30:37.140
This is what we realized.

00:30:37.141 --> 00:30:46.779
The people who need the advanced logic and all the stuff that we built, it's very niche, so it's maybe 20%, maybe 15% of the audience.

00:30:47.119 --> 00:30:50.380
Because it's so niche, those people are actually willing to pay more.

00:30:50.381 --> 00:30:51.579
So who are those users?

00:30:51.580 --> 00:30:54.259
They're market researchers, public opinion researchers.

00:30:54.539 --> 00:30:56.500
This is what they do for a profession.

00:30:56.500 --> 00:30:58.700
They wake up every day and they make surveys.

00:31:00.359 --> 00:31:04.539
The other stuff is-- everybody can make those surveys.

00:31:04.901 --> 00:31:13.140
The difference is if you, as a generic tool, built all those specialized functions, it would become really, really difficult for everybody to use.

00:31:13.150 --> 00:31:15.259
So you actually alienate your other users.

00:31:15.630 --> 00:31:19.420
So you're kind of in this circumstance where you have to cater to one market.

00:31:19.421 --> 00:31:23.339
Either you're that mass market tool or you're the niche tool.

00:31:24.020 --> 00:31:27.700
The good news about being a niche tool is you can charge more because you're niche.

00:31:27.750 --> 00:31:31.140
So actually both of those markets are equally attractive.

00:31:31.980 --> 00:31:37.299
This stuff did exist but because it was so niche, a lot of those players thought, oh, we're so niche.

00:31:38.020 --> 00:31:47.940
They just hadn't moved to an online version because SaaS was new and a lot of these larger companies weren't comfortable hosting their data on these other platforms.

00:31:47.940 --> 00:31:51.380
It was just early enough and we were there and we started doing it.

00:31:52.861 --> 00:31:54.420
That's when everything started to change.

00:31:54.661 --> 00:31:57.259
So at the time, we were charging$19 a month.

00:31:57.260 --> 00:32:01.380
Some guy paid us$2,000 a year to do White Label something.

00:32:01.789 --> 00:32:04.299
We asked him what else he was looking for.

00:32:04.589 --> 00:32:08.460
We started building those sorts of things and then we changed our pricing model.

00:32:08.461 --> 00:32:13.259
We said, okay, instead of charging$19 a month, what if we charge$2,000 per year?

00:32:13.450 --> 00:32:22.259
This was a game-changer because as a bootstrap company, instead of getting a$19 a month, if you get$2,000 on day one, you can spend that money.

00:32:22.060 --> 00:32:23.700
It's a game-changer.

00:32:24.621 --> 00:32:28.380
The other thing which was super interesting is those sorts of people, they didn't want one account.

00:32:28.381 --> 00:32:31.180
They would come in and say, I want to buy five accounts.

00:32:31.430 --> 00:32:41.000
So we would sell something for$10,000 and get full$10,000 on day one, which we could then use to keep making the product better and just doubling down and doing these sorts of things.

00:32:41.289 --> 00:32:45.799
It was a complete, I want to say, three stages in our product market fit life cycle.

00:32:46.369 --> 00:32:53.440
One was federal government survey tool to Canadian survey tool and then to the last one, which was the enterprise survey tool.

00:32:53.840 --> 00:32:57.960
Te last one was when we actually got that hockey stick growth.

00:32:58.210 --> 00:33:03.880
So we went from one and a half million to four and a half million and continued to double from there.

00:33:03.881 --> 00:33:08.599
It was a completely different use case.

00:33:09.040 --> 00:33:13.279
Then we could hire salespeople because we were actually selling things for a higher price point.

00:33:13.670 --> 00:33:21.039
I think our our-- the customer that was-- we were the most excited about and our largest one at the time was Proctor& Gamble.

00:33:21.099 --> 00:33:27.279
They bought 5,000 seats for one customer, the most crazy thing in the world.

00:33:28.201 --> 00:33:33.809
Everything from Gillette to Cover Girl, we covered it all for that customer.

00:33:34.920 --> 00:33:39.490
This was the realm that we ended up in.

00:33:40.611 --> 00:33:41.890
It was just completely different.

00:33:41.891 --> 00:33:44.529
We were making profit and again, we were bootstrap.

00:33:44.530 --> 00:33:46.369
We never raised any external financing.

00:33:47.770 --> 00:33:50.289
The model-- everything just started to click and s tarted to work.

00:33:51.810 --> 00:34:00.410
What I will say about product market fit, and I think this is the important point, is that I feel l ike you're always playing detective and it never stops.

00:34:00.931 --> 00:34:13.210
Product market fit only lasts-- I mean, not that it doesn't last; it can last, but you can, you can find different fit at different stages and some fit is better than other fit.

00:34:13.210 --> 00:34:22.210
So if you had talked to us before, we would've had fit then as well, but then you find another market and another place to take your product that is even better than the last one.

00:34:23.440 --> 00:34:25.130
I think like that was the main thing.

00:34:25.130 --> 00:34:30.570
So we went from a federal government survey tool to Canadian survey tool to an enterprise survey tool.

00:34:30.969 --> 00:34:32.210
That was our sweet spot.

00:34:32.210 --> 00:34:38.809
When we realized who we were, we were an enterprise survey tool and that really worked, everything else started to work too.

00:34:38.811 --> 00:34:42.489
We started to have a user conference and people would come to our user conference.

00:34:42.489 --> 00:34:56.250
We started being taught at colleges and universities and we would-- it's just everything started to to fall into place and that's when it would've taken three, four, five years to get to that stage.

00:34:56.250 --> 00:35:03.090
I would say that we didn't have true, true product market fit in a scalable, sustainable way until we got to that point.

00:35:04.771 --> 00:35:07.369
That was basically how-- and here's the other nice thing.

00:35:08.239 --> 00:35:13.530
When we-- at some point SurveyMonkey also said hey, we need to get into enterprise.

00:35:13.639 --> 00:35:15.289
Enterprise is pretty cool.

00:35:15.291 --> 00:35:16.170
How do we do that?

00:35:16.590 --> 00:35:19.969
Again, we were that niche offering who had figured that out.

00:35:20.469 --> 00:35:35.849
They came to us and they said,"Hey, let's team up." That made a lot of sense for us because we were doing one thing, they were doing another thing, and it completely made sense that if the same company did both things, then obviously you could take all of the market.

00:35:35.909 --> 00:35:39.440
It was justa natural thing to do.

00:35:39.489 --> 00:35:49.079
It was kind of strange, I will say, in the beginning because we're startup pirates against the Navy, all that fun stuff that you do when you're a startup.

00:35:49.081 --> 00:35:56.039
You call one company your enemy and then the next day your best friend and you team up.

00:35:57.481 --> 00:36:00.400
That was an interesting, interesting process.

00:36:01.269 --> 00:36:04.519
Yeah, I just thought it was-- it just all made sense.

00:36:04.760 --> 00:36:06.880
All of it really came together at the end.

00:36:07.070 --> 00:36:07.559
Yeah.

00:36:07.070 --> 00:36:09.639
I'll flag two things because I do think it's very important.

00:36:09.880 --> 00:36:28.719
Going back to it, I think when it comes to these competitive markets and especially where there are at least one-- there is at least one main competitor, this idea of having this orthogonal strategy-- What I think is core to it-- you talked about this 80/20, but it's-- the main competitor is not going to shift course on a dime.

00:36:29.001 --> 00:36:29.800
They've got something that's working.

00:36:29.800 --> 00:36:31.559
That's why they're the main-- that's why they're the big guys.

00:36:32.130 --> 00:36:43.079
If you understand that strategy, which in their case was the easy-to-use mainstream survey tool, but in other cases there's other things that people are playing for.

00:36:43.800 --> 00:36:53.440
If you do the opposite of that and you're the more complicated, deeper enterprise tool, sure, they could do it because it's software and any software can be built.

00:36:53.681 --> 00:36:57.039
The answer to why can't X do it, they could do it, but they won't do it.

00:36:57.239 --> 00:37:00.320
They won't do it because it's not strategic for them and they've got other things that they got to prioritize.

00:37:00.760 --> 00:37:03.719
By the way, it's really hard to do that too.

00:37:04.201 --> 00:37:13.960
I'm sure you've heard many stories of this, but the challenge is when you're an everybody tool and you don't have enterprise in your blood, it's a different way of being.

00:37:14.161 --> 00:37:15.360
You're doing sales-driven motion.

00:37:18.201 --> 00:37:19.199
I'll give you an example.

00:37:18.960 --> 00:37:21.519
A lot of what we would do is we would bid on RFPs.

00:37:22.360 --> 00:37:24.599
Can you believe that there are RFPs for survey software?

00:37:24.800 --> 00:37:25.480
That's how we sold.

00:37:25.201 --> 00:37:39.440
A Lot of times, again, as a bootstrapped company, we did things like this, but it would be like we might answer an RFP in a certain way and if we won, we just make sure that that feature was ready for the customer by the deployment date.

00:37:41.619 --> 00:37:48.519
You don't really do that if you're a VC-backed company necessarily because you're like, oh well, we're just going to follow our own roadmap.

00:37:48.650 --> 00:38:03.320
We followed a little bit of like a sales-driven development cycle as well because when you start to get that niche and that enterprise-y, people do have more specific requirements and sometimes you just have to operate a different way.

00:38:03.530 --> 00:38:05.599
So that's a different type of development.

00:38:05.601 --> 00:38:07.159
It's a different type of sales motion.

00:38:07.380 --> 00:38:15.239
If your company culture is a certain way, it's not easy to change your company's culture and just the way that you do business.

00:38:15.239 --> 00:38:17.079
It's like you literally have to birth a new company.

00:38:17.081 --> 00:38:26.000
That's just-- there's so much inertia that it's not even easy to do even if you wanted to do it.

00:38:26.481 --> 00:38:39.360
Sometimes what a lot of companies might do, if they're mass market and they want to serve enterprise, they might create different offices and like house people in separate places so that each one has their own culture and they behave a little differently.

00:38:39.849 --> 00:38:43.599
I mean, it is a difficult thing to address.

00:38:44.201 --> 00:38:45.760
You're right; you can't just switch on a dime.

00:38:46.219 --> 00:38:54.199
The other thing I think that's really important to flag-- and this is something that I've heard through and through with many different guests, but it really comes out here-- is just the power of optionality.

00:38:54.681 --> 00:39:05.639
I think it's important because it gets lost, especially first-time founders and especially in'21 where it was relatively easy to raise, but oftentimes you want to go raise that pre-seed round 2 million bucks and get funded.

00:39:05.869 --> 00:39:12.039
What you have to be really careful about is often enough, what you give up is not just equity; it's optionality.

00:39:12.360 --> 00:39:18.079
It's optionality to go out and just do things without having to worry about the big picture all the time.

00:39:18.349 --> 00:39:27.280
Just because customers are demanding something and you go and you fill that need and you put yourself in a position to learn insights that, frankly, you would never learn.

00:39:28.230 --> 00:39:36.880
A jaded person might say well, you could have raised$5 million and just build the enterprise tool and gone at it, but you would've never discovered the little nuggets that got you to a place to say, oh wait a second.

00:39:36.760 --> 00:39:37.960
Like you said, what's looping?

00:39:38.121 --> 00:39:39.679
What are these things that they're asking for?

00:39:40.840 --> 00:39:47.559
I think that's really important, especially for first-time founders out there, to think about those first few steps, having to bootstrap through them.

00:39:47.561 --> 00:39:56.480
There's a lot of power to that and you're not the only founder out there that found that going through those motions actually ended up in success.

00:39:56.699 --> 00:40:10.440
I know this is the main point, but I will tease in maybe one day in a few years, we'll do one of these on Fellow, but it was an interesting-- having sold a company and trying to figure out what the next company would be, you're a lot smarter.

00:40:11.760 --> 00:40:18.320
You don't do what we did, which is start a company without doing intensive research and doing all the competitors and so on and so forth.

00:40:18.320 --> 00:40:28.159
The problem is when you do things like that, you discourage yourself from being able to do anything because sure enough, if you look deep enough, you'll find someone doing something in a certain area.

00:40:28.161 --> 00:40:30.400
You end up discouraging yourself.

00:40:30.719 --> 00:40:43.159
What I realized was sometimes you just have to commit to a problem because you're obsessed about the problem and you're going to-- you just trust that you're going to find a way to solve that problem and you'll figure it out.

00:40:43.960 --> 00:40:49.960
Once you jump off the plane, there's enough pressure for you to find those things and find the product market fit.

00:40:50.300 --> 00:40:54.440
It's a skill that you're-- once you learn how to do it, it's a skill that you're going to use again.

00:40:54.469 --> 00:40:57.320
I mean, we talked about using it three times in my last company.

00:40:57.559 --> 00:41:00.519
We've used it three times at Fellow so far as well.

00:41:01.239 --> 00:41:03.559
This is just my way of building companies now.

00:41:04.070 --> 00:41:18.280
I know that whatever we start is not going to be where we end up and I will change it and it'll probably change-- sometimes it'll be minor pivots, sometimes it'll be major pivots, but it will change and eventually we're going to find something really, really great.

00:41:18.659 --> 00:41:38.559
When we first start, maybe it doesn't look like it's a huge market or is this big thing, but I trust that playing detective and constantly switching and pivoting and focusing on the next right channel or how we expand it or what market to go into, that eventually we're going to find something really, really great and it's going to grow really, really fast.

00:41:38.559 --> 00:41:50.000
What I've realized is the way that my co-founders and I have built every business we have so far, and it's just a core skillset that I think once you learn, you're going to use forever.

00:41:50.820 --> 00:41:56.960
The other way I've heard exactly that described was from Mike at Ada who talked about commitment versus attachment.

00:41:56.440 --> 00:42:14.679
I think what we're talking about is committing to solving a certain problem without necessarily being attached to the way that you're solving it today and being willing to-- okay, yeah, that's going to change, might change many, many times, but as long as the problem is interesting enough to you and your core team and you commit to solving it or something around it, then you're giving yourself the flexibility you need.

00:42:15.150 --> 00:42:17.719
Yeah, I mean, I think it's exactly that.

00:42:17.719 --> 00:42:25.559
It's the fall in love with the problem, the space, and then you'll find a way, but the key is not to give up.

00:42:26.320 --> 00:42:28.800
A lot of the time, you're going to get all these things.

00:42:28.800 --> 00:42:30.039
This market's not that big.

00:42:30.041 --> 00:42:33.760
It's not that exciting, but it's the next milestone.

00:42:33.760 --> 00:42:35.320
How do you get to the next milestone?

00:42:36.121 --> 00:42:43.800
The further along you get, the more you'll be able to see, the more knowledge you'll have and then the better you'll be able to decide what the next milestone should be.

00:42:44.170 --> 00:42:44.840
Perfect.

00:42:44.170 --> 00:42:46.599
Look, Aydin, we'll stop it there.

00:42:46.800 --> 00:42:55.280
Maybe just as a quick recap, you start Fluidware around 2008, very crowded market and you found your way selling into governments, of all places.

00:42:55.280 --> 00:43:02.400
That was your first customer, solved some niche problems for them, which-- and this is really what bootstrapping-- one thing led to the other.

00:43:02.400 --> 00:43:09.000
The other thing was selling to government-funded organizations, got you to your next milestone in terms of ARR, getting to that seven-figure ARR.

00:43:09.201 --> 00:43:18.960
Then after building what started to become a very complete product, falling into the enterprise world and having this kind of orthogonal strategy to the leader in the space, which is SurveyMonkey.

00:43:19.449 --> 00:43:36.320
Ultimately by filling that niche so well, being a great builder/buy type decision for SurveyMonkey when they decided to get into the space and bringing a good-- an amazing exit ultimately there and now jumping into your second venture at Fellow.

00:43:36.449 --> 00:43:38.320
So really appreciate you sharing the story.

00:43:38.320 --> 00:43:40.840
I think listeners w ill learn a lot from this one.

00:43:41.349 --> 00:43:42.840
Yeah, thanks for having me.

00:43:42.601 --> 00:43:43.480
It was super fun.

00:43:43.519 --> 00:43:45.519
Thank you so much for listening all the way through.

00:43:45.521 --> 00:43:46.800
It's been a pleasure having you here.

00:43:46.949 --> 00:43:49.400
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