WEBVTT
00:00:00.140 --> 00:00:12.599
When you think about product-market fit and selling to your best fit audience, usually they reach out, they're driving the conversation, they're driving the timeline, they purchase relatively quickly.
00:00:12.710 --> 00:00:13.199
There's very little negotiation.
00:00:13.380 --> 00:00:17.800
Welcome to the Product Market Fit Show, brought to you by Mistral, a seed stage firm based in Canada.
00:00:18.539 --> 00:00:20.239
I'm Pablo, I'm a founder turned VC.
00:00:20.890 --> 00:00:24.269
My goal is to help early-stage founders like you find product-market fit.
00:00:29.000 --> 00:00:32.229
Today we have Allan, the co-founder and CEO of Klipfolio.
00:00:32.780 --> 00:00:40.429
Klipfolio is a lightweight business intelligence tool that helps companies build real-time dashboards, so they can see what's happening across different parts of their business.
00:00:40.590 --> 00:00:47.219
Klipfolio is based in Ottawa and for context, they have about 60 employees, and have raised almost$20 million to date.
00:00:47.220 --> 00:00:51.420
The topic of today's episode is how to find product-market fit.
00:00:51.420 --> 00:00:53.820
Allan, it's a pleasure having you here.
00:00:54.500 --> 00:00:55.299
Hey, how you doing, Pablo?
00:00:55.640 --> 00:00:57.380
So, maybe let's start at the beginning.
00:00:57.381 --> 00:00:58.899
How exactly did Klipfolio get started?
00:00:59.229 --> 00:01:09.209
There was this brewing idea that we had, myself and Peter, my current co-founder.
00:01:09.239 --> 00:01:10.569
And this was around...
00:01:10.570 --> 00:01:17.010
there was sort of market movements where XML and RSS were coming into fruition.
00:01:17.010 --> 00:01:25.920
The internet had more and more information on it and what we were finding, and we were doing this ourselves, we were going from website, to website to website, checking up on things.
00:01:25.921 --> 00:01:26.719
How are my stocks doing?
00:01:26.721 --> 00:01:28.760
What are the latest sports scores?
00:01:29.219 --> 00:01:30.159
What's the weather?
00:01:30.361 --> 00:01:34.879
And every time we did this, we were only sort of getting a little snippet of data.
00:01:34.909 --> 00:01:42.480
The essence of this idea was there's gotta be a better way of monitoring this data on a daily basis.
00:01:42.790 --> 00:01:46.950
So, the essence of where Klipfolio started was actually on the consumer side.
00:01:46.950 --> 00:01:54.629
We were trying to solve a problem of how do we make it more efficient for an individual to monitor all the things that they care about.
00:01:54.849 --> 00:01:56.950
And that's what we built.
00:01:56.950 --> 00:01:59.790
I mean, that's how we started.
00:02:00.010 --> 00:02:02.829
So, there's interesting product-market fit lesson in that as well.
00:02:03.340 --> 00:02:13.340
We built this consumer tool, and we made it sort of that people could build little clips as we called them that would connect to The Weather Network or connect to CNN.
00:02:13.539 --> 00:02:16.620
And we had thousands of these people building these clips.
00:02:16.621 --> 00:02:24.689
And we actually had thousands of people downloading our little dashboard, our little news aggregator as well.
00:02:24.691 --> 00:02:26.849
But we couldn't find anybody to pay for it.
00:02:26.850 --> 00:02:36.090
So, on the one hand we did actually have this huge consumer group that was really interested in the app, but we were really struggling with where's the revenue going to come from?
00:02:36.590 --> 00:02:40.330
Do you build a product and launch it?
00:02:40.330 --> 00:02:43.969
Do you start validating it with other people and just seeing if it's a real problem?
00:02:44.080 --> 00:02:45.759
Do you go through some formal customer discovery?
00:02:46.719 --> 00:02:52.800
We sort of jumped fairly early.
00:02:53.139 --> 00:02:56.919
So, we started mocking up some things, and writing some things down.
00:02:56.920 --> 00:03:02.919
We sort of validated some of that thinking early on with friends, with other colleagues.
00:03:02.920 --> 00:03:12.039
So, I think that helped, but we actually started building relatively early, and then testing that entire idea.
00:03:12.040 --> 00:03:20.669
Now there was a lot of people in those early days that again said,"no, it's not a good idea.
00:03:20.670 --> 00:03:22.069
It's not going to happen.
00:03:22.120 --> 00:03:23.710
Or it's too risky," whatever it was.
00:03:23.711 --> 00:03:29.830
There were a lot of hurdles along the way that we, again, had to overcome.
00:03:29.930 --> 00:03:32.509
But we jumped fairly quickly into the new company.
00:03:32.510 --> 00:03:35.349
And I'm actually, I'm a fan of that.
00:03:35.409 --> 00:03:46.379
I do tend to see too many founders who have the comfort of a current job who are not diving off the diving board, and it changes the way you approach everything.
00:03:46.381 --> 00:03:50.580
There's a certain comfort that doesn't allow you to really fully commit to what you're building.
00:03:50.659 --> 00:03:54.860
That makes total sense.
00:03:54.860 --> 00:04:03.169
I can definitely see jumping in with two feet, just the drive, the amount of time you have to devote to it totally changes.
00:04:03.170 --> 00:04:04.689
Now let me ask this piece.
00:04:04.971 --> 00:04:14.969
You seem to say that you jumped off, which I totally get, and then you went pretty quickly into kind of building and launching a product.
00:04:14.971 --> 00:04:16.170
Now, this is a while ago.
00:04:16.170 --> 00:04:22.759
Now, these lean startup ideas are super popular and customer discovery, with Steve Blank, and all that, but it's hard for a consumer product.
00:04:22.761 --> 00:04:26.319
B2B is easier to really validate and get contracts signed and all these sorts of things.
00:04:26.321 --> 00:04:32.319
When you think back to that, do you say to yourself,"I wish we would've validated things more?" I know you pivoted away from pure consumer.
00:04:32.321 --> 00:04:33.639
Or do you think that was the right thing to do?
00:04:33.641 --> 00:04:36.120
Build something, put it out there, see what happens.
00:04:36.120 --> 00:04:40.279
I'm actually really happy.
00:04:40.281 --> 00:04:52.790
I'll tell you sort of the next chapter and what happened, and that chapter could not have happened if we had not chosen the path that we did.
00:04:52.889 --> 00:05:03.699
Now keep in mind, my background is industrial design, and as sort of UX professional as well, testing and user validation and user testing has always been something that has been close to my heart.
00:05:03.701 --> 00:05:10.939
So, this idea of going out with paper prototypes and asking for feedback is something that we did very, very early on.
00:05:10.940 --> 00:05:16.500
But we did build something, and we pushed a version one or a beta relatively early.
00:05:16.500 --> 00:05:26.689
And at the same time, we were also meeting with early angels, and CVCs, and every single one of them turned us down.
00:05:27.100 --> 00:05:30.009
There was absolutely nothing that they wanted to sort of get involved in.
00:05:30.509 --> 00:05:34.569
Was this because it was the dot com crash, or was it specific to the idea?
00:05:35.370 --> 00:05:37.569
So, you're right.
00:05:37.571 --> 00:05:38.050
You're right.
00:05:38.110 --> 00:05:48.360
There was not a single VC or angel out there that wanted to touch anything tech in 2001, 2002.
00:05:48.560 --> 00:05:49.839
So, there definitely was that.
00:05:49.841 --> 00:06:02.639
But even that sort of hardened our resolve and, I think, made us a little bit more focused, but we put the early beta or alpha product out there.
00:06:02.641 --> 00:06:05.639
And keep in mind, we have to sort of understand the context.
00:06:05.641 --> 00:06:12.639
In the early two thousands it was way harder to build software, way harder to sort of market your software.
00:06:13.579 --> 00:06:17.550
But what there wasn't is there wasn't as much competition.
00:06:18.170 --> 00:06:21.670
So, the playing field was a lot less noisy.
00:06:22.689 --> 00:06:31.670
And what we found is we put this product out and almost immediately there was this early adopter XML, RSS kind of crowd.
00:06:32.180 --> 00:06:33.269
That just totally...
00:06:34.110 --> 00:06:35.110
I have to ask, by the way, sorry.
00:06:35.339 --> 00:06:38.660
What is putting a product out in 2001 look like?
00:06:38.661 --> 00:06:39.459
You put it out where?
00:06:47.141 --> 00:06:49.660
This was a downloadable product.
00:06:50.021 --> 00:07:05.649
Almost overnight because of the lack of SEO noise, we were a player in this space, and we amassed very quickly through probably, our beta to version of one, to not even version two.
00:07:06.709 --> 00:07:10.449
We had 300,000 downloads of our little Windows application.
00:07:11.269 --> 00:07:14.250
So, there was enormous and immediate, user pull.
00:07:14.250 --> 00:07:26.959
The problem was, is that, our business model was that we were going to the access right to the user's desktop, to the CNNs of the world or the sporting news of the world.
00:07:26.961 --> 00:07:38.079
And, we thought that,"Hey, this is how you really get a captive audience, right on the desktop, in sort of a little alertable widget tray.
00:07:37.790 --> 00:07:51.870
So, cool idea, but selling to publishers in 2003, 2004, they were just scrambling to trying to figure out, what is our business model looking and selling.
00:07:51.930 --> 00:07:52.670
The idea was what?
00:07:52.670 --> 00:07:53.949
It was free to users?
00:07:54.319 --> 00:07:54.990
Free to users.
00:07:54.319 --> 00:07:58.629
Publishers would pay to have the data on it?
00:08:00.230 --> 00:08:10.579
So, we're going to get this consumer audience and publishers, you can pay us to sort of have access or promotional or brandability straight on the desktop.
00:08:10.581 --> 00:08:15.019
Here's where the pivot sort of happened.
00:08:15.139 --> 00:08:17.939
And again, it was purely, a happy accident.
00:08:18.050 --> 00:08:22.889
So, we had this massive user base, 300,000 users.
00:08:22.891 --> 00:08:25.170
And there were pockets.
00:08:25.670 --> 00:08:29.449
And Germany happened to be a really big concentration of users for us.
00:08:29.451 --> 00:08:38.049
And one day, and I remember banging my head against the keyboard, trying to figure out how we're going to turn this thing around and make money and put food on the table.
00:08:38.120 --> 00:08:39.169
And it's really hard.
00:08:39.750 --> 00:08:44.919
It's really hard when you've got a vision, and it's not working.
00:08:45.259 --> 00:08:48.399
But one day Lufthansa contacted me.
00:08:48.419 --> 00:09:27.549
So, I got an email from Lufthansa, and so he said,"we have a ton of employees who are using Klipfolio to monitor their German news and their football, their soccer scores." And we're,"oh, that's cool." And he says,"can we use Klipfolio as a way to communicate business metrics and business information?" And of course I said,"yes, of course you can." The conversation continued, the dialogue continued, and he said,"can you provide us with a quote and sort of next steps?" And at the time, nobody was thinking recurring revenue.
00:09:27.850 --> 00:09:34.149
And again, maybe this is sort of in innovation through not understanding what the norms were.
00:09:34.159 --> 00:09:36.700
I'm not a salesperson by default.
00:09:36.960 --> 00:09:41.620
And this was at this point, you had a lot of users, but you mentioned the publisher strategy wasn't working all that well.
00:09:41.840 --> 00:09:42.899
Did you have revenue?
00:09:43.120 --> 00:09:43.940
Did you have funding?
00:09:44.009 --> 00:09:44.299
How..?
00:09:44.879 --> 00:09:47.059
There was no funding.
00:09:47.061 --> 00:09:56.690
There was a little bit of early founder loans that we were getting, there were some shred dollars, some tax credits that we were getting.
00:09:56.691 --> 00:10:00.610
But there was no risk capital into the company.
00:10:00.629 --> 00:10:01.490
And was there revenue?
00:10:02.639 --> 00:10:03.970
Yes, there was a tiny bit.
00:10:03.990 --> 00:10:14.570
So, we had made some sales into some publishers, and they weren't bad deals, but it wasn't enough to say it's working.
00:10:14.571 --> 00:10:14.889
I see.
00:10:14.890 --> 00:10:19.600
We weren't delusional and thinking, this is the tip of the iceberg.
00:10:19.600 --> 00:10:20.759
This was hard.
00:10:20.860 --> 00:10:21.879
It was not working.
00:10:21.880 --> 00:10:35.080
When you think about product-market fit, and selling to your best fit audience, usually they reach out, they're driving the conversation, they're driving the timeline, they purchase relatively quickly.
00:10:35.081 --> 00:10:37.429
There's very little negotiation.
00:10:38.090 --> 00:10:42.629
So, all of those things, if I think about Lufthansa, were absolutely true.
00:10:42.630 --> 00:10:45.909
They didn't blink an eye when I said 35K annually.
00:10:45.910 --> 00:10:48.909
They started implementing this thing almost immediately.
00:10:48.910 --> 00:10:51.429
And they were one of our biggest cheerleaders as well.
00:10:51.951 --> 00:10:58.860
Not only that, but they also were happy to sort of tell everybody that they had chosen this new and innovative product.
00:10:58.929 --> 00:11:03.259
Product-market fit you have to find that customer that is just...
00:11:05.210 --> 00:11:07.779
they're really leaning in, and they love what they see.
00:11:09.220 --> 00:11:14.379
All the indicators were there, but the question is, do you drop everything and say,"holy crap, let's go chase B2B"?
00:11:14.519 --> 00:11:18.889
Or, did it take a while, like,"well I love this consumer thing, this is what we've built"?
00:11:19.770 --> 00:11:20.610
What were the dynamics there?
00:11:20.720 --> 00:11:22.250
Yes, it did take a long time.
00:11:24.451 --> 00:11:27.690
Here's where we made massive mistakes.
00:11:28.010 --> 00:11:39.799
We decided to have this sort of dual path strategy where you go to our website and on the one side, it says,"hey, if you're a consumer and publisher, go here." And then there's another path.
00:11:40.520 --> 00:11:50.840
I think we split it a 100% down the middle, 50% of the homepage real estate was enterprise and 50% was consumer publisher.
00:11:50.909 --> 00:11:57.519
Looking back, it makes no sense for any small under funded startup to ever do that.
00:11:57.779 --> 00:11:58.200
Why not?
00:11:58.220 --> 00:11:58.559
Why not?
00:11:58.561 --> 00:12:03.720
Because I have my own thoughts on this, and I will agree high-level, but people will say,"well, it's the same product.
00:12:04.441 --> 00:12:05.639
I'll sell here, and I'll sell it there."
00:12:06.200 --> 00:12:17.750
I know, but if somebody's going to reference you, and if somebody's going to be an advocate and if you want to really dominate a market and be THE player that everybody needs.
00:12:18.730 --> 00:12:19.669
Markets reference each other.
00:12:19.671 --> 00:12:24.429
And you have to build up that momentum to sort of say,"oh yeah, what does Klipfolio do?
00:12:24.431 --> 00:12:25.269
Oh." Boom.
00:12:25.270 --> 00:12:29.190
They do this for this kind of a company for this kind of a pain point.
00:12:29.191 --> 00:12:34.179
If you don't have that focus, nobody really knows what Klipfolio does.
00:12:34.181 --> 00:12:38.779
And if that's the case, you're not a specialist in anybody's problem.
00:12:38.780 --> 00:12:42.340
I think that's the problem that a lot of companies get into.
00:12:42.341 --> 00:12:55.210
They have this technology that can be applied to a lot of different things, and a lot of different technologies can, but they're not an expert, or they're not a trusted source for any particular customer or pain point.
00:12:55.549 --> 00:13:04.409
So, in other words the focus, what you're highlighting is that one of the big benefits of focus is really a marketing, branding thing, positioning thing.
00:13:04.410 --> 00:13:07.889
You need to occupy a specific pace in some customers mind.
00:13:08.230 --> 00:13:10.289
And if you're doing two things early on, you'll get neither.
00:13:10.399 --> 00:13:10.690
Yeah.
00:13:10.691 --> 00:13:14.519
And founders struggle with that all the time.
00:13:14.539 --> 00:13:19.080
And they struggle with it, not only because they're in love with the product, and the product can do everything.
00:13:19.081 --> 00:13:30.399
They also struggle because they're trying to make money, and the argument...and I've heard it a million times, the argument of, but money's money.
00:13:31.299 --> 00:13:36.629
If we sell it to consumer and publisher over here, it's still money.
00:13:36.690 --> 00:13:39.149
If we sell it to Lufthansa over here, it's still money.
00:13:39.899 --> 00:13:47.990
And it's hard because, when you're struggling to actually pay your bills, money is really, really important.
00:13:48.129 --> 00:13:56.860
So, there's a certain luxury that is required to allow you to do this, but at the same time, if you don't do that, you're never going to own and really scale within any market.
00:13:57.460 --> 00:14:01.779
So, you start off with this dual approach, and you're tackling both markets.
00:14:02.159 --> 00:14:06.379
And as you said, that was high level of mistake, you should have just focused.
00:14:06.380 --> 00:14:08.460
But what was that like?
00:14:08.500 --> 00:14:14.620
What were some of the problems that took place that then led you to obviously, ultimately abandon consumer?
00:14:14.720 --> 00:14:16.490
I'm just curious how that all played out.
00:14:16.769 --> 00:14:25.090
I think, we knew the problems.
00:14:25.091 --> 00:14:31.409
We knew that if somebody's looking at your homepage, they question, what do you guys actually do?
00:14:31.410 --> 00:14:36.009
Who are you guys actually going after, and are you going to satisfy my pain point?
00:14:36.139 --> 00:14:40.840
And tactically because we knew that, we started taking steps.
00:14:40.841 --> 00:14:52.720
So instead of having the homepage, that was split 50-50, we had subdomains so that the SEO would direct traffic to a page for consumers and publishers, and they wouldn't see the enterprise side.
00:14:52.721 --> 00:14:59.320
So, from a market and positioning point of view, we started segmenting that, and that helped.
00:14:59.321 --> 00:15:06.399
But from an internal point of view, you still have to sort of say,"okay, well, where are we going to put our road map dollars?
00:15:06.710 --> 00:15:28.230
Where are we going to put our sales dollars?" And even though we had split the external facing messaging and the position so that our customers weren't confused, we still had an internal dilemma of, well, the publishers want this feature, do we build it?
00:15:28.230 --> 00:15:32.940
Or the enterprise customers couldn't care less about that.
00:15:33.059 --> 00:15:34.700
So, eventually, that became so apparent.
00:15:34.701 --> 00:15:45.139
And again, with a small engineering team, with a small sales team, small marketing team, you just can't satisfy multiple industries.
00:15:45.370 --> 00:15:51.059
And even within an industry, if you can segment even more, and be really precise.
00:15:51.061 --> 00:16:06.929
I always use the example of, if you came to a website that said,"we've got a solution that is for people in Ottawa, that live downtown, who like to go out to restaurants in the evening, et cetera, et cetera." That is like,"wow, you know what?
00:16:06.931 --> 00:16:13.720
These guys are talking about me." And people that that's not for, they're not going to waste everybody else's time.
00:16:14.870 --> 00:16:20.080
It's as much about finding who it's for, as well as get rid of the noise.
00:16:19.880 --> 00:16:21.679
Absolutely get rid of the noise
00:16:21.940 --> 00:16:24.480
At that point was that an easy decision?
00:16:24.600 --> 00:16:31.480
When you looked at your revenue, was it like 80% was already enterprise, and so it was a no-brainer, or did you have to really shoot yourself in the foot sort of thing?
00:16:33.350 --> 00:16:39.509
It was an easy decision from a revenue point of view because the enterprise revenue started really pouring in.
00:16:39.630 --> 00:16:42.029
Pouring in for a small company.
00:16:42.030 --> 00:16:46.669
But it was very meaningful and very different than selling to the publishers.
00:16:46.990 --> 00:16:49.309
The problem was: It wasn't quite an easy decision.
00:16:49.551 --> 00:16:55.899
Pete and I started the company because it was a spark that originated on the consumer side.
00:16:56.080 --> 00:17:03.340
And there was something that we...our DNA didn't mesh with selling to enterprise.
00:17:03.879 --> 00:17:08.019
Selling to enterprise was relatively complex sales cycles.
00:17:09.329 --> 00:17:18.809
Selling to IT, dealing with legal, dealing with procurement, larger deal sizes, so a heavily sales involved model.
00:17:18.810 --> 00:17:27.009
Yes, it was starting to bring the revenue in and that was clear, but there was also another fly in the ointment.
00:17:27.010 --> 00:17:34.839
Somehow, this direction didn't feel right from a culture and a DNA point of view.
00:17:34.840 --> 00:17:36.240
And that's important too.
00:17:36.759 --> 00:17:49.480
I think founders can follow the revenue, and follow where the money's coming from, but at the end of the day, founders need to be so completely aligned.
00:17:49.480 --> 00:18:03.839
The DNA of the founder has to be so completely aligned with the mission, and why they're doing this in the first place that any kind of deviation from that, and you're going to have a problem down the road as far as scaling, hiring employees.
00:18:05.069 --> 00:18:06.039
And was that hard to reconcile?
00:18:06.240 --> 00:18:07.720
I think about the...
00:18:08.080 --> 00:18:09.869
And I had this at Gymtrack as well.
00:18:09.871 --> 00:18:12.390
You start off with a given vision, you get attached to it.
00:18:12.391 --> 00:18:15.349
In your case, something around consumers, and access to data.
00:18:15.849 --> 00:18:23.190
And obviously with the most of the pivots, they don't take you somewhere totally away where you're selling chocolate or whatever.
00:18:23.631 --> 00:18:30.500
You're still within the same world, but all of a sudden, really you're helping enterprises run their business more efficient.
00:18:30.529 --> 00:18:33.299
It's pretty different.
00:18:33.701 --> 00:18:36.539
Obviously that was part of what took so long.
00:18:36.701 --> 00:18:42.539
How did you get, I don't know about over that, but how did you buy into this new vision and get excited about it?
00:18:42.539 --> 00:18:45.740
So, the vision never changes.
00:18:46.259 --> 00:18:55.490
And I actually think that's one of the things, if you know what you're passionate about, and you're true to yourself, that actually remains throughout the life of the company.
00:18:55.490 --> 00:19:07.930
I think because we were selling to enterprise, and we were making some money, and we were scaling, we were sort of close to what we wanted to do, but we weren't quite on the right track.
00:19:07.970 --> 00:19:14.880
And again technologies are changing, the environment's changing, and people start investing more in cloud.
00:19:15.320 --> 00:19:20.640
And again, cloud is something totally separate from on-prem.
00:19:20.680 --> 00:19:30.240
Peter and I are super interested in this, and we're starting to sort of find that well, small businesses are probably more likely to adopt cloud than enterprise.
00:19:30.259 --> 00:19:31.349
And that was the case.
00:19:31.529 --> 00:19:43.750
Small businesses are way more or way closer to our mission and what we want to do as a company, than selling to enterprise.
00:19:44.609 --> 00:19:58.220
And then the third one was, if you looked at our entire corporate landscape or the competitive landscape, the business intelligence landscape was a total greenfield opportunity in the SMB world.
00:19:58.000 --> 00:20:07.140
You put all of those things together, and you've got a recipe that fully aligns with your DNA, and what you're passionate about.
00:20:07.941 --> 00:20:13.009
Peter and I both wanted to have something that would help as many people as possible.
00:20:13.670 --> 00:20:16.930
It was the same when we did the consumer side, it was quite similar.
00:20:16.651 --> 00:20:26.529
Now we're sort of helping small and midsize business be more successful with how they're running their business, how they're looking at risks and opportunities.
00:20:26.910 --> 00:20:31.730
So, that to us was, okay, that's the track that we want to be on.
00:20:32.589 --> 00:20:45.279
We pivoted from the enterprise to a cloud-based world, we changed our pricing so that we weren't selling something that was, 20 to 50K annually.
00:20:45.910 --> 00:20:50.319
We started pricing it at$20 per month per user.
00:20:50.329 --> 00:20:59.359
There was a massive risk there as well, where before I could sort of say,"okay, I've got this kind of a pipeline, here are the very stages.
00:20:59.601 --> 00:21:01.240
I think I'm going to close Ericsson now.
00:21:03.640 --> 00:21:06.319
I think I'm going to close Intel next month, et cetera.
00:21:06.400 --> 00:21:10.670
And I could sort of see how our revenue was going to be able to cover our expenses.
00:21:10.191 --> 00:21:17.950
Besides understanding your vision, on the one hand, which is, hit as many people as possible, help as many people as possible.
00:21:18.109 --> 00:21:26.869
And this SMB and cloud trend on the other, did you actually validate this and get...did you see, oh, look, we actually have SMBs using the prem product, but it's not a great fit?
00:21:26.871 --> 00:21:28.900
Or did you just take the leap?
00:21:28.900 --> 00:21:36.019
You know, I'd like to think that we did, but I actually can't remember if we validated this or not.
00:21:36.240 --> 00:21:44.299
There was lots of evidence suggesting that the market is moving in this direction.
00:21:44.300 --> 00:21:50.809
Certainly, there was more activity in the cloud, and a lot of excitement around that.
00:21:50.910 --> 00:21:53.210
But I'm not sure that we actually validated this.
00:21:52.971 --> 00:22:01.809
And a lot of our enterprise customers were very much opposed and would say things like,"we're never moving to the cloud.
00:22:02.710 --> 00:22:05.289
IT would never allow it, legal would never allow it.
00:22:06.109 --> 00:22:15.559
There's no way that's happening." By making this decision, in a sense, we were abandoning much of the revenue that was coming in.
00:22:15.579 --> 00:22:18.079
Now, again, we sort of allowed that to feather out.
00:22:18.960 --> 00:22:19.720
That's super interesting.
00:22:19.721 --> 00:22:27.599
Let me dig in with another one, which is, you could argue you had product-market fit with this tool for enterprise.
00:22:28.690 --> 00:22:37.589
The question is: How much of your decision to say,"screw that, let's go to SMB" and take this huge risk was around some vision?
00:22:37.590 --> 00:22:39.950
It's almost like a vision market fit.