The full conversation.
Cherif
0:00
I
think
it's
extremely
important.
Paul
Graham,
there's
the
popular
do
things
that
don't
scale
in
the
beginning.
We
did
a
lot
of
that
without
necessarily
knowing
it.
It
really
paid
off.
Pablo
0:11
Welcome
to
the
Product
Market
Fit
Show
brought
to
you
by
Mistral,
a
seed-stage
firm
based
in
Canada.
I'm
Pablo.
I'm
a
founder
turned
VC.
My
goal
is
to
help
early-stage
founders
like
you
find
product
market
fit.
Today
we're
talking
about
how
to
create
a
new
market
with
Cherif,
the
co-founder
and
CEO
of
Dialogue,
a
telemedicine
and
virtual
healthcare
platform
for
enterprise.
Dialogue
is
based
in
Montreal.
They
have
over
500
employees
and
are
a
public
company
worth
about
half
a
billion
dollars
at
this
time.
Cherif,
it's
a
pleasure
to
have
you
here
today.
Cherif
0:43
Thank
you
very
much.
Pablo
0:44
Maybe
for
some
context,
when
you
think
about
starting
a
new
startup,
there's
kind
of
two
ways,
two
different
types
of
markets
you
can
play
in.
I
mean,
one
market
is
what
you
might
call
an
existing
market.
The
other
type
of
market
is
a
new
market.
Think
about
an
existing
market
is,
for
example,
if
you
were
to
launch
a
new
phone
today,
you
would
be
comparing
to
Androids,
you’d
be
comparing
to
iPhones.
People
might
buy
it
or
not
buy
it
based
on
very
specific
feature
sets,
like
the
price,
the
quality,
the
speed,
the
camera,
et
cetera.
Everything's
pretty
defined.
When
you
think
about
creating
a
new
market,
that's
not
the
case.
In
fact,
there's
really
nothing
to
kind
of
compare
things
to.
People
don't
even
know
that
they
should
be
thinking
about
this
in
the
first
place.
There's
pros
and
cons
to
it.
I
mean,
the
upside
is,
if
you
launch
a
phone,
people
know
how
to
value
it.
They
know
how
to
compare
it,
but
it's
very
competitive.
If
you
launch
into
a
new
market,
people
don't
know
what
you're
even
talking
about,
but
if
you
can
get
them
to
understand
it,
then
you
might
be
the
only
player
in
town.
That's
a
little
bit
of
the
story
of
Dialogue.
I
mean,
Dialogue
today
is
telemedicine.
Everybody
knows
about
telemedicine.
Everybody's
got
some
sort
of
telemedicine.
When
you
started
five
years
ago
in
2016,
that
was
not
the
case.
People
didn't
really
realize,
enterprises
did
not
realize
that
this
was
something
they
needed
to
offer.
That's
kind
of
a
little
context.
Let's
really
kind
of
dial
it
back
and
start
at
the
beginning.
2016,
you
come
up
with
something
like
the
idea
of
Dialogue.
I
don't
think
the
beginning
was
what
it
ended
up
being.
I'm
curious.
Maybe
we
can
start
there.
What’s
the
origin
story
and
what
was
kind
of
the
first
version
of
Dialogue?
The Origin of Dialogue
Cherif
2:16
Yeah,
absolutely.
So
we
started
at
an
incubator
here
in
Montreal
called
diagram,
and
the
very
initial
idea
was
to
create
a
Uber
for
healthcare
.
So
the
idea
was
very
simple.
You
take
out
your
phone
and
you
match
with
a
physician
and
that
physician
,
um,
here's
your
story
and,
and
gives
you
a
diagnosis
of
prescription,
et
cetera
.
So
it
was
really
kind
of
a
marketplace
to
meet
,
uh,
healthcare
providers.
And
,
uh,
this
idea
was,
you
know,
not
new
around
the
world
because
in
some
of
the
best
functioning
healthcare
systems
in
the
world
,
um,
namely
the
UK
or
Scandinavian
countries,
or
even
the
us
,
these
ideas
existed.
Um,
and
we
felt
that
bringing
this
idea
to
Canada
,
uh,
would
be
a
good
thing
and
it
would
be
needed
,
uh,
considering
,
uh,
the
access
challenges
that
we
have
in
the
countries.
And
we
felt
that
this
was
a
solution
that
could
be
helpful
to
many
people.
We
knew
that
ourselves
as
individuals
and
our
families
would
love
having
access
to
that.
And
we
figured,
you
know,
we're
probably
not
the
only
one.
So
that's
kind
of
like
how
it
started
Pablo
3:18
Maybe
walk
me
through
that.
How
did
you
even
come
up
with
that
as
an
idea?
Was
this
like
a
very
methodical
kind
of
market
research
driven
exercise,
especially
because
you
were
part
of
a
venture
studio.
I'm
curious
to
dive
into
how,
I
mean,
Diagram
worked
specifically,
how
you
worked
within
it
to
come
up
with
the
Uber
for
healthcare
idea.
Cherif
3:36
Prior
to
Dialogue,
I
had
a
medical
devices
company.
We
sold
our
medical
devices
all
over
the
world.
Through
that
experience,
I
really
got
to
travel
in
many
places
and
see
how
healthcare
is
delivered
in
many
other
places,
and
kind
of
get
inspired
by
some
of
the
best
practices.
I
knew
that
for
my
next
adventure,
I
wanted
to
do
something
at
the
intersection
of
healthcare
and
IT.
I
have
a
computer
science
background.
I'm
a
techie
at
heart.
Telemedicine
was
very
appealing.
At
the
same
time,
I
met
the
folks
at
Diagram
and
they
were
starting
at
the
incubator
like
right
around
that
time.
I
think
they
were
actually
incorporated
after
Dialogue
was
incorporated,
just
to
show
you
how
early
we
were.
Their
thesis,
given
some
of
their
LPs,
was
around
creating
insurance
products.
I
think
there
was
an
inspiration
from
Oscar
in
the
US
that
has
a
vertically
integrated
insurance
and
telemedicine
product.
I
came
in
at
from
one
lens
of
seeing
what's
being
done
in
other
countries
and
applying
it
here
and
they
came
to
it
with
the
lens
of
let's
build
a
health
insurance
related
to
telemedicine
and
we
started
working
together
on
that
basis.
Pablo
4:50
What's
your
first
move?
Do
you
start
building
or
do
you
go
out
and
start
talking
to
different
practitioners?
Where
do
you
go
once
you
have
this
idea?
Supply and Demand
Cherif
5:00
As
you
can
imagine,
in
any
marketplace,
you
have
two
sides
of
the
marketplace.
In
our
case,
we
had
to
build
supply,
which
is
healthcare
providers.
Then
we
had
to
build
demand,
which
is
people
willing
to
talk
to
a
doctor
online.
The
demand
side
is
super
easy
because
of
the
access
issues
in
our
country.
Everybody
we
spoke
to
was
like,
yes,
sign
me
up.
How
much?
Whenever
we
told
them
the
pricing,
it's
too
cheap,
I'm
willing
to
pay
double.
The
demand
was
just
overwhelming.
It
wasn't
an
issue
at
all.
On
the
supply
side,
it
took
us
a
while
to
get
good
enough
supply.
That's
just
because
like
with
any
kind
of
innovation
life
cycle,
you're
always
going
to
have
the
early
adopters
who
are
willing
to
try
anything,
but
this
is
a
minority
of
people.
Then
with
time,
you
want
to
convince
a
larger
number
of
people.
The
good
thing
is
that,
as
I
mentioned,
it
was
not
like
a
crazy
new
idea
that
nobody
has
ever
thought
before.
All
these
folks
in
the
medical
profession
see
what's
being
done
in
other
countries.
They
might
themselves
be
from
other
countries.
They
read
medical
journals.
I
mean,
it's
not
a
secret
that
in
other
countries,
technology
is
better
used.
We,
in
the
beginning,
attracted
folks
that
had
either
lived
abroad
or
had
seen
what's
being
done
abroad,
were
really
excited
to
do
something
innovative
here.
We
even
had
like
a
couple
of
doctors
who
had
an
engineering
background
or
a
computer
science
background
and
had
like
a
really
interesting
fascination
of
the
intersection
of
the
two.
We
then
started
building
the
technology.
It
took
us
like
three,
four
months
from
like
just
a
dinner
conversation
to
like
we're
doing
this.
Let's
raise
money.
Let's
sign
up
with
Diagram
and
let's
do
it
formally.
Back
to
your
question,
we
started
building
the
product
and
we
started
hiring
the
practitioners
and
we
started
doing
a
little
bit
of
user
testing.
How
does
it
work
to
have
a
conversation
between
a
doctor
and
a
patient?
What's
needed?
What's
the
technology
that
you
need
to
build
on
the
back-end,
on
the
front-end?
Is
there
anything
that's
available
on
the
market
that
will
help
us
accelerate
and
not
build
everything
from
scratch?
Pablo
7:16
How
did
you
get
in
front?
What
did
that
look
like
getting
in
front
of
practitioners?
You're
calling
offices.
You're
just
showing
up
door
to
door.
Related
to
that
is,
what
is
the
value
you're
selling
them?
Because
again,
most
of
–
if
you
think
Airbnb
and
Uber
as
the
classic
ones,
it's
come
make
money,
right?
Come
in
my
marketplace
and
make
money.
Whereas
there,
these
are
healthcare
professionals.
I
don't
think
they
have
a
problem
getting
business,
especially
in
Canada.
What
is
kind
of
the
pitch
that
you're
giving
them?
Cherif
7:44
In
Canada,
the
imbalance
between
supply
and
demand
for
healthcare
services
is
something
that
is
not
seen
almost
anywhere
else
in
the
world.
These
folks
don't
have
any
trouble
earning
a
living.
The
money
was
not
an
argument.
I
mean,
of
course,
we
had
to
pay
them
enough
so
that
it's
worth
their
time,
but
once
we
did
that,
that
was
not
part
of
the
conversation.
I
think
why
we
attracted
really
good
people
in
the
beginning
is,
because
again,
they
want
to
do
something
innovative.
They
saw
that
the
way
medicine
has
been
done
here
for
the
last
few
decades
hasn't
changed.
They're
seeing
their
colleagues
in
other
geographies
doing
something
really
exciting.
They're
reading
medical
journals.
They're
seeing
what's
done
elsewhere
and
they
want
to
be
part
of
that
innovative
solution.
Also,
the
other
thing
that
telemedicine
does
is
that
it
really
changes
the
flexibility
dynamic.
As
a
physician
here,
you
have
to
comply
with
very
strict
scheduling
and
where
to
work
and
when
to
work.
For
a
lot
of
folks,
that
just
didn't
fit
in
their
lives.
Almost
all
of
our
practitioners
in
the
beginning,
like
the
first
handful
or
so,
were
women.
They
were
new
mothers.
The
practice
of
medicine
in
a
clinic
just
didn't
jive
with
their
priorities
at
the
time.
Doing
telemedicine
at
night
after
putting
their
kids
to
bed
or
on
the
weekend,
or
whatever
it
is,
was
very
attractive,
but
they
can't
do
that
in
a
clinic.
A
clinic
is
open
from
this
time
to
that
time.
You
have
to
see
these
many
patients.
We
very
quickly
realized
that
flexibility
was
like
the
top
reason
that
physicians
are
interested
in
telemedicine.
Sometimes
people
accuse
Dialogue
and
other
telemedicine
companies
of
stealing
resources
from
the
public
healthcare
system.
We've,
again
and
again,
been
very
clear
that
that's
not
the
case.
What
we're
doing
is
actually
adding
capacity
into
the
system
because
this
lady
who
is
working
two
hours
after
putting
her
kids
to
bed,
these
two
hours
are
new.
These
two
hours
are
net
new
capacity
in
the
system.
It's
not
like
she
was
going
to
work
them
somewhere
else.
Shifting to Enterprise
Pablo
9:56
Makes
sense.
That
makes
a
lot
of
sense.
Flexibility
becomes
a
key
selling
point.
Then
the
other
part
I
want
to
dive
into
a
little
bit
more
is
the
decision
to
abandon
the
marketplace
idea,
right?
Because
what
I'm
hearing
you
say,
like
some
of
the
reasons
are
that
it
was
in
a
gray
area
and
that
a
marketplace
maybe
didn't
align
with
your
goals.
Some
of
those
things
you
could
have
figured
out
even
before
starting.
I
think
even
as
you
had
the
idea,
probably
Uber
was
already
kind
of
getting
into
trouble,
and
if
you
just
think
theoretically
through
a
marketplace
and
what
it
would
mean,
I'm
sure
you
had
discussions
about,
well,
what
happens
when
they
have
a
strong
relationship
and
they
want
to
move
off
and
those
sorts
of
things.
Yet
you
launched
it
anyways,
and
then
you
must
have
seen
things
that
made
you
decide,
you
know
what?
No,
it's
not
worth
it.
Let's
shift
and
go
to
enterprise.
What
were
some
of
those
things?
I
think
it's
important
because
you
could
have
ignored
it.
You
could
have
just
kept
going
down
and
said,
you
know
what?
No,
let's
do
this
marketplace
thing.
Let’s
do
this
marketplace
thing.
I
mean,
I
don't
know
what
it
ended
up
with,
but
I
think
your
decision
was,
in
hindsight,
quite
good.
I'm
curious
to
dive
into,
what
were
some
of
the
things
that
you
saw
as
you
launched
the
marketplace
that
made
you
give
into
that
side
of
it
and
say
there's
enough
here
that
it's
not
worth
continuing
down
this
marketplace
road
and
we
should
shift
a
little
bit.
Cherif
11:14
The
thing
that
I
would
just
–
the
position
that
I
would
add
is
that
we
never
launched
as
a
marketplace.
We
never
actually,
and
that's
why
I
was
talking
about
this
is
like
pre-pivot
is
that
we
never
even
got
to
there.
It's
really
in
the
work
of
building
and
talking
to
users
that
we
decided
to
not
do
it
and
decided
to
focus
on
enterprise.
We
had
a
hunch.
It
was
like,
well,
let's
talk
to
companies
and
see,
and
it
wasn't
–
it
was
like
in
addition.
It's
like,
okay,
we're
building
this
marketplace.
Maybe
instead
of
selling
it
direct
to
consumers,
maybe
we
can
sell
it
to
companies.
Maybe
that
could
be
like
a
B2B2C,
like
that
could
be
a
channel.
When
we
started
having
these
first
conversations,
in
a
matter
of
weeks,
we
realized
that
the
pull
was
just
so
strong
and
we
realized
that
doing
the
two
at
the
same
time
was
not
helpful
because
there's
some
very
different
product
choices
that
you
have
to
make,
depending
on
which
side
you
want
to
go.
The
way
we
started
talking
to
companies
was
very
friendly
companies,
right?
We
called
up
so
many
favors.
Every
lawyer
that
we
know,
we
asked
for
intros
in
their
HR
departments
and
their
law
firm,
every
consultant
that
we
know.
My
co-founder
and
I
both
had
consulting
backgrounds.
We
called
all
the
firms.
All
of
our
entrepreneur
friends
got
hassled
by
us.
That's
really
how
we
started.
It
really
was
a
friends
and
family.
Pablo
12:38
What
were
those
initial
discussions
like?
Were
they
you
trying
to
sell
or
was
it
kind
of
more
traditional
customer
discovery
type?
Cherif
12:44
It
was
somewhere
between
the
two.
It
was
like
we
wanted
to
sell,
but
we
also
didn't
want
to
come
off
too
aggressively.
It
was
like
it
was
selling,
but
like
getting
advice
sort
of,
and
feedback
at
the
same
time.
Because
ultimately,
what
we
wanted
was
to
show
signatures
and
traction
and
we
didn't
just
want
to
get
theoretical
feedback.
I
always
believe
there's
a
big
difference
between
somebody
telling
you
it's
a
great
idea
and
this
would
work
to
actually
like
signing
a
contract.
We
really
wanted
to
get
to
the
signed
contracts
because
we
felt
that
was
the
only
actual
feedback.
Everything
else
is
just
chit-chatting.
Pablo
13:22
What
were
you
–
you're
going
into
friendly
people
that
warm
intros.
What
exactly
are
you
pitching
them
at
that
stage?
What
was
the
offering?
Cherif
13:33
The
offering
was
we're
building
this
platform
that
connects
your
employees
to
a
medical
professional,
a
doctor
and
a
nurse
or
other,
so
that
when
they're
sick
or
when
their
family
member
is
sick,
instead
of
taking
a
half
day
off
and
going
to
the
doctor,
they
can
see
a
healthcare
professional
from
their
home,
from
their
office
and
save
that
trip.
If
they
do
need
to
make
a
trip,
we
will
help
them
find
the
best
place
to
go.
We
will
help
them
get
an
appointment.
At
that
time,
because
we
had
so
little
volume,
I
mean,
some
days
we
had
no
volume
and
some
days
we
had
a
couple
of
consults
and
we
had
a
medical
team,
we
were
covering
patients
with
love
and
service.
Because
we
had
no
volume
in
the
beginning,
so
everybody
that
tried
it
was
like
truly
blown
away,
because
all
of
a
sudden,
you're
comparing
getting
an
amazing
doctor
who's
spending
all
of
the
time
in
the
world
with
you,
who
sends
you
to
the
right
next
spot,
follows
up
with
you,
explains
to
you
everything
in
detail.
You're
comparing
that
to
the
five-minute,
in
and
out,
you're
just
a
number
type
of
thing.
People
were
like,
wow,
amazing,
where
do
I
sign?
Pablo
14:52
How
important
was
that?
If
you
think
about
it,
the
stuff
you
were
doing
there
for
the
first
time
wasn't
really
scalable,
I
mean,
in
the
sense
that
at
some
point
you
try
and
get
efficiencies
and
you
try
and
get
the
right
ratios
of
coverage
and
whatnot,
but
at
the
same
time,
it
created
incredible,
I
have
to
assume,
incredible
word
of
mouth.
How
important
was
it
to
have
it
set
up
that
way
that
you
had
almost
too
many
doctors
relative
to
the
demand?
Cherif
15:11
I
think
it's
extremely
important.
Paul
Graham,
there's
the
popular
like
do
things
that
don't
scale
in
the
beginning.
We
did
a
lot
of
that
without
necessarily
knowing
it.
It
really
paid
off.
The
thing
is
that
you
can
then,
as
you
said,
find
ways
to
make
it
more
efficient,
fix
the
operations
and
fix
the
technology
and
fix
all
that
stuff,
but
that
experience
and
that
service
is
just
so
important
because
it
shows
people
the
what
if.
It
shows
people
this
thing
can
be
amazing
and
this
thing
can
be
really
different
than
trying
to
optimize
in
the
beginning.
Premature
optimization
is
not
really
helpful.
Creating Your Own Market
Pablo
15:51
One
of
the
things
–
because
we're
talking
about
how
to
create
a
new
market,
when
you're
selling
a
product
that
doesn't
really
exist
yet,
even
the
challenges,
like
who
are
you
even
selling
into?
You
mentioned
you
were
talking
to
HR
departments.
How
did
you
figure
out
–
was
there
a
process
whereby
you
figured
out
this
is
the
right
person
and
organization
to
pitch
this?
Maybe
related
to
that
is
like,
how
were
you
positioning
it
so
people
could
get
it?
Again,
back
then,
telemedicine
just
–
today,
it's
so
popular.
I
assume
you're
making
a
sale
today
by
saying
we're
the
best
telemedicine
platform
out
there.
You
should
choose
us,
not
them.
Back
then,
it
was
complete
white
space
and
why
should
I
even
bother,
right?
How
did
you
figure
out
who
to
pitch
to
and
then
how
did
you
structure
that
story
in
those
early
days?
Cherif
16:30
Yeah,
so
you're
absolutely
right.
Whereas
today,
it
almost
never
happens
that
you
call
on
a
prospect
and
they've
never
heard
of
telemedicine
or
they
don't
know
why
they
need
telemedicine.
Today,
it's
convincing
the
prospect
that
they
should
pick
Dialogue
instead
of
one
of
our
competitors.
Whereas
in
the
beginning,
we
had
to
do
education
from
the
very
beginning.
It's
like,
okay,
I
get
it.
You
speak
to
the
doctor
on
the
phone.
Cool,
but
like
we've
never
had
that
and
we've
been
fine.
We're
a
law
firm.
We've
been
around
for
a
hundred
years
and
we
survive
without
it.
We're
good.
First
of
all,
they
have
to
try
it.
I
think
in
the
beginning,
giving
out
demos
and
getting
people
to
try
it
and
just
being
blown
away
and
that
getting
this
amazing
service
–.
Pablo
17:09
For
free?
Cherif
17:09
For
free.
What
we
did
is
we
gave
people
three
months
free
if
they
sign
up
for
a
year.
We
said,
if
you
don't
like
it
in
the
first
three
months,
you
can
cancel.
Almost
nobody
canceled
because
in
those
three
months
they
got
amazing
service.
They
were
just
like
bought
in.
What
was
difficult
is
to
like,
okay,
everybody
gets
it.
What
was
difficult
is
that
nobody
had
a
budget
you're
marked
with
this.
One
of
the
hurdles
when
you're
in
a
new
market
is
that
you're
not
competing
for
an
existing
budget.
You're
trying
to
convince
people
to
create
new
budget.
Luckily,
every
company
has
a
budget
for
compensation
and
benefits.
It's
not
a
completely
new
budget,
but
it
is
an
expense
that
they
had
not
thought
they
would
make
this
year.
The
other
challenge
is
it's
very
difficult
to
demonstrate
the
ROI
of
what
we
were
selling.
It's
like,
yes,
I
love
it.
It's
amazing.
It's
a
great
experience,
but
what
am
I
getting
back?
Then
the
third
thing
is
that
in
Canada,
employers
don't
view
themselves
as
responsible
for
their
employee’s
healthcare.
In
other
countries,
for
example,
in
the
US,
your
employer
pays
for
your
healthcare
insurance
and
benefits.
In
other
countries,
it's
structured
in
different
ways,
but
in
Canada,
the
state
is
responsible
for
healthcare.
As
an
employer,
I
don't
want
to
get
involved
in
that
relationship.
It
was
a
bit
of
a
shift
of
mentality,
but
the
way
we
counter
that
is
we
say,
you're
right.
You're
not
responsible
for
the
employee's
health,
but
the
fact
that
they're
not
healthy
and
the
fact
that
it's
so
hard
to
find
a
doctor
is
costing
you
direct
dollars.
Although
philosophically,
you're
not
responsible,
in
practice,
you
are
because
every
time
Pablo
takes
a
half
a
day
off
because
they're
sick
or
their
kids,
or
whatever
it
is,
that’s
half
a
day
you
lost.
Then
we
also
realize
that
a
lot
of
people
were
putting
off
seeing
a
doctor
or
getting
medical
help
for
issues
because
it
was
so
difficult.
It's
like,
because
there's
such
a
barrier
to
see
a
doctor,
in
Canada,
people
wait
much
longer
to
get
help
than
in
other
countries.
In
other
countries
where
you
can
just
see
your
doctor
anytime,
the
second
you
think
of
something,
you
just
call
them,
they
come
to
your
house,
let's
say
some
developing
countries,
the
doctor
comes
to
your
house.
You
paid
them
$100.
It's
done.
People
are
very
quick
on
the
trigger.
Where
in
Canada,
we
discovered
people
really
wait
a
long
time.
Human Capital is Top Priority
Pablo
19:42
I
think
a
lot
of
startups
can
come
up
with
a
compelling
reason
why
this
is
important,
why
this
matters.
Then
there's
this
kind
of
delineation
between
nice
to
have
and
must
have,
right?
Where
you
do
jump
to
the
top
of
that
list
and
you
don't
get
caught
in
this,
you
know
what?
Next
year,
we'll
put
you
in
the
budget
and
next
year
comes
and
they
don't
and
you
just
keep
getting
pushed
off
because
there's
higher
priority
things.
Was
there
a
timing
element
to
this?
Was
there
part
of
the
story
–
like
could
you
reflect
on,
because
obviously,
you
found
a
way
to
make
it
to
the
top
of
that
pile.
How
did
you
do
that?
How
did
you
make
yourself
be
understood
as
something
that
must
be
dealt
with
now,
this
year,
this
budget
cycle?
Cherif
20:17
It
was
not
easy.
It
was
not
easy.
As
you
said,
some
people
said
like,
this
is
great.
We
love
it,
but
it's
not
our
priority
right
now.
Come
back.
I
think
it
was
explaining
to
people
that
employee
engagement
is
a
top
priority,
explaining
to
people
that
every
day
you
wait,
it's
costing
you
money.
You're
playing
with
employee
engagement.
You're
playing
with
retention.
You're
attracting
less
new
employees.
At
the
top
of
every
company's
priority
list
is
human
capital,
right?
Some
companies
mean
it
and
some
companies
don't.
What
we
really
try
to
do
in
the
beginning
is
target
those
companies
that
meant
it.
The
companies
that
didn't
mean
it
were
a
huge
waste
of
time
for
us
because
it's
like,
yes,
they
have
devised
on
their
website,
whatever
it
is,
but
like,
they
don't
really
want
to
invest
in
employees.
I
think
we
got
pretty
good
at
the
beginning
in
figuring
out
which
kind
of
companies
cared
and
which
companies
didn't
and
what
are
some
of
the
other
things
that
they
did
that
showed
that
they
cared
versus
they
didn't.
If
you
go
into
a
company,
for
example,
they
don't
have
good
group
benefits
insurance.
It's
like,
okay,
well,
are
they
really
going
to
invest
in
telemedicine
if
they
haven't
done
even
the
basics?
Sometimes
you
walk
into
a
company
and
we
used
to
kind
of
joke
internally,
it's
kind
of
like
the
dirty
carpet
syndrome.
Like
you
walk
into
it
and
it's
like
disgusting.
Obviously,
this
is
not
a
company
that's
thinking
like
let's
invest,
let's
have
an
amazing
work
environment.
They
don't
care.
That's
why
when
we
started,
a
lot
of
our
initial
business
was
really
high
value
kind
of
knowledge
worker
company.
I
mentioned
the
lawyers,
the
consultants,
the
accounting
firms,
the
technology
companies.
This
is
really
where
we
started.
With
time,
as
this
moved
from
being
a
niche
product
to
a
mainstream
product,
as
we
got
this
flywheel
turning,
we
now
have
companies
in
every
single
industry
of
the
economy,
including
a
lot
of
blue
workers,
including
government
employees,
including
police
forces.
There's
not
a
single
industry
that
is
not
represented,
but
we
had
to
start
somewhere.
I
was
lucky
enough
that
a
company
that
was
owned
by
some
of
my
friends
that
had
about
50
or
60
employees,
I
really
put
a
lot
of
pressure
for
them
to
sign
so
that
we
at
least
have
one
logo
to
show.
I
look
sometimes
at
our
old
sales
decks,
we
have
like
three
logos,
but
every
company
starts
somewhere.
It's
really
a
snowball,
the
first
get
the
second
and
then
you
have
two
logos
and
three
logos
and
four
logos.
Sometimes
you
have
to
give
away
the
service
for
free
for
a
few
months.
Sometimes
you
have
to
discount
very
heavily
just
to
get
the
feedback
and
get
the
logos
and
get
the
case
studies.
I
think
every
B2B
company
goes
through
that
motion.
Pablo
23:29
To
be
clear,
you're
not
giving
free
trials,
right?
People
are
signing
your
contracts
with
three
months
free
and
kind
of
no
questions
asked,
money
back
guarantees.
Is
that
right?
Cherif
23:40
Correct.
Pablo
23:40
Which
makes
a
lot
of
sense.
I
always
talk
about
how,
these
days,
like
LOIs
have
been
very
popular,
LOIs are Case by Case
Pablo
23:45
but
I
always
think,
and
I'm
wondering
kind
of
what
your
perspective
is
on
this,
that
instead
of
going
out
and
chasing
LOIs,
and
this
is
kind
of
for
pre-product
companies,
they're
not
ready
to
ship
yet,
but
still
they're
going
out,
they're
getting
LOIs,
they’re
non-binding.
Why
not
get
people
to
sign
a
real
contract
and
just
give
them
all
the
guarantees
in
the
world,
plus
a
discount,
plus
extra
customer
support,
etc.?
I'm
curious
on
your
thoughts
on
that.
Can
you
do
that
pre-product?
Maybe
you'll
get
less.
Maybe
you'll
get
30
LOIs
and
only
three
of
these
contracts,
but
isn't
it
worth
way
more
than
10
times
as
much?
Cherif
24:18
Yeah,
I
would
say
the
answer
to
that
is
it
really
depends
on
a
case
by
case.
It
really
depends
on
the
size
of
the
company.
In
some
companies,
to
sign
a
contract
is
a
very
complicated
thing.
Let
me
actually
rewind
and
give
an
important
precision
of
what
we
were
trying
to
do
versus
what
some
other
B2B
companies
try
to
do.
As
you
know,
there's
a
bottom-up
tactic
of
you
get
somebody
from
a
company
to
sign
up
to
your
product,
and
then
they
invite
–
they
put
in
their
credit
card.
They
invite
their
colleagues.
Now
you
can
put
the
logo
of
the
company
on
your
website
because
a
handful
of
people
use
that
product.
We
were
not
that.
We
were
from
Day
1
trying
to
sign
up
the
company
as
a
whole,
because
our
service
is
like
an
insurance
service.
This
means
that
the
reason
the
price
is
so
low
is
because
we
are
mutualizing
the
risk
over
a
hundred
people
or
a
thousand
people.
Of
course,
not
all
these
folks
are
going
to
be
sick
at
the
same
time
and
cost
at
the
same
time.
It's
an
insurance
product.
You're
paying
a
premium.
The
risk
is
spread
across
a
number
of
people.
Because
we
were
not
bottom-up,
it
was
a
little
bit
more
difficult
to
kind
of
sign
them
up.
If
we
were
an
SMB
or
a
land
and
expand
type
of
business,
we
would've
been
able
to
put
logos
very
quickly
because
we
would've
just
gotten
like
ten
friends
and
ten
different
companies
to
sign
up
and
pay
$10
a
month
and
we
would've
been
done,
right?
When
you're
trying
to
sign
up
the
whole
company,
depending
on
the
size
of
the
company
and
their
compliance
and
whether
it's
a
public
company
or
not
and
all
of
their
legal
rules,
it
is
sometimes
very,
very
difficult
for
a
company
to
sign
a
contract.
Even
if
the
contract
has
so
many
outs
and
guarantees
is
just
like
from
a
governance
point
of
view,
like
for
some
companies,
it
is
really
hard
to
sign
a
contract.
I
would
say
arguably
like
Dialogue
now
six
years
in
is
there.
We
can't
just
sign
a
contract
with
anybody.
It
has
to
go
through
a
full
legal
review
and
all
of
that.
I
think
it's
because
of
that
that
a
lot
of
entrepreneurs
and
companies
sign
LOIs
in
the
beginning,
because
frankly,
getting
a
full
contract
would
not
be
realistic
depending
on
the
size
of
the
company
and
their
internal
rules,
but
yes,
of
course,
contracts
are
worth
much
more
than
LOIs.
Even
if
they
have
an
out
and
even
if
they're
not
binding,
but
at
least
the
reason
a
contract
is
worth
so
much
more
is
that
you've
negotiated
all
of
the
other
things
that
you
need
to
discuss
in
the
future.
Whereas
an
LOIs
is
like,
yeah,
we're
going
to
do
this,
but
it's
like,
we
haven't
yet
negotiated
a
bunch
of
other
things
that
are
really
important.
Sometimes
the
devil
is
in
the
details
and
like,
yes,
we
agree
on
the
price
and
the
implementation
data
or
whatever,
but
we
don't
agree
on
security
and
data
retention
and
all
these
other
things.
I
would
say
that
we
learned
very
quickly
as
a
company
to
be
enterprise
ready
and
to
sell
to
enterprise.
From
a
security
point
of
view,
we
were
going
through
security
questionnaires
on
a
daily
basis,
because
a
company
like
to
send
you
the
list
of
their
employees
and
their
email
addresses
and
to
trust
you
with
their
medical
data,
that's
a
pretty
big
risk.
You
want
to
make
sure
that
you're
entrusting
it
to
a
company
that
is
serious
and
credible
and
has
done
their
homework.
When
you
ask
since
when
are
you
around
and
you're
like
four
months,
it's
kind
of
like,
do
I
want
that?
I
think
there's
a
very
natural
human
behavior
of
any
employee
at
any
company.
Yes,
they
want
to
do
great
things,
but
above
all
that,
they
don't
want
to
get
fired,
right?
Now
you're
like
signing
up
for
Dialogue.
It's
great,
employee
engagement,
all
of
that,
but
am
I
going
to
get
fired
over
this
because
the
security
is
not
where
it
needs
to
be,
the
personal
health
information,
like
all
of
that
stuff
needs
to
be
really
buttoned
up.
That's
somewhere
we
were
invested
a
lot.
I
would
say
that
compared
to
our
competitors,
because
in
2016,
there
were
three
or
four
telemedicine
companies
that
kind
of
started
around
the
same
time.
You
often
see
this
in
industries,
right?
Where
like
around
the
same
time,
like
market
conditions
are
right
and
a
few
companies
just
attack
a
market
at
the
same
time.
All
of
the
other
companies
started
as
B2C.
They
focused
a
lot
on
B2C.
They
saw
our
success
in
B2B,
and
then
they
kind
of
had
a
double
strategy
of
doing
B2C
and
B2B
at
the
same
time.
I
think
that
one
of
the
reasons
why
we
were
successful
in
breaking
away
from
the
pack
and
being
leaders
very
quickly
is
that
we
focused
on
B2B
from
Day
1
and
we
never
did
anything
else.
We
did
a
lot
of
product
and
organization
decisions
that
allowed
us
to
be
good
at
B2B
and
not
kind
of
squander
resources
and
being
all
over
the
place.
The Importance of Focus
Pablo
29:30
Maybe
touch
on
that,
like
just
the
importance
of
focus.
I
think
that
comes
up
so
much
with
startups
where
and
the
thinking
is
always
like
this.
We
have
this
product.
We're
selling
it
over
here.
We're
doing
it
like
this,
but
it's
the
same
product
if
we
just
sell
it
in
this
other
market
or
to
this
other
segment.
We
just
do
that
thing
over
here
and
we
can
do
both,
right?
I'm
always
in
the
opinion
you
probably
can't
do
both.
You’re
somehow
going
to
spread
your
resources,
but
you
chose
not
to
do
both.
You’re
talking
it's
better
do
it
and
fail.
Can
you
just
speak
maybe
a
minute
or
two
about
like
just
the
importance
of
focus,
especially
early
on?
Cherif
30:03
Yeah,
it
is
extremely
important.
It
is
one
of
the
most
important
things.
The
problem
is
like,
what
is
the
right
amount
of
focus?
Like,
is
it
this,
is
it
this,
is
it
this,
is
it
this?
Like
that
is
a
judgment
call
that
every
entrepreneur
and
every
company
has
to
make.
There's
no
science
to
that.
It's
just
like
the
more
you
close
the
aperture,
the
better
it
is,
but
it's
a
lot
of
judgment
and
intuition.
From
our
perspective,
B2B
was
so
big
that
it
wasn't
like
we
were
make
–
like
it's
not
like
we
were
–
it's
not
like
we
said,
we're
only
going
to
sell
to
mining
companies
in
the
west.
We
said
B2B
in
Canada.
That's
a
pretty
big
market.
I'm
just
like
a
person
that,
in
general,
I
like
to
be
very
disciplined.
I
like
to
be
very
focused.
I
was
lucky
enough
that
this
is
not
my
first
company
and
I've
made
the
mistake
many
times
in
my
career
of
not
being
focused
and
paying
the
price.
I
think
for
me,
at
least,
it's
something
that
I
really
needed
to
make
the
mistake
myself
to
learn
it.
Even
within
Dialogue,
we've
chased
a
lot
of
shiny
objects
over
time.
We
know
we
made
some
mistakes
and
we
got
to
a
place
where
I
think
now
we
have
a
good
level
of
focus.
We're
going
after
one
thing.
We're
doing
it
really
well.
I
think
we're
succeeding.
Pablo
31:25
You'd
started
selling
to
a
few
people,
a
few
companies.
You
had
a
few
companies
with
employees
on
there.
When
was
the
first
time
where
you
started
to
feel
like,
okay,
this
is
really
working,
this
is
the
way
to
go,
and
you
had
those
first
signs
of
product
market
fit?
Cherif
31:44
I
think
it
was
really
when
we
started
signing
companies
that
were
not
friendly.
The
friendly,
it's
the
first
times
when
we
were
in
a
real
competitive
process.
McKinsey
is
a
good
example.
My
co-founder
and
I
both
worked
at
McKinsey.
The
very
strange
thing
is
that
at
the
time
the
two
other
companies
that
were
doing
telemedicine
also
had
McKinsey
alumni
as
part
of
their
co-founding
team.
McKinsey
got
like
hounded
by
three
telemedicine
companies
at
the
same
time,
all
calling
in
a
favor.
McKinsey
did
a
pretty
detailed
comparison
of
the
three
and
picked
us.
Then
a
few
weeks
later,
we
approached
BCG
and
we
said,
hey,
we
signed
McKinsey.
BCG
essentially
hired
a
benefits
consultant
Mercer
at
the
time
and
then
Mercer
did
an
RFP
and
we
won
that
RFP.
Then
Ubisoft
was
kind
of
our
first
big
enterprise
client.
They
wanted
to
revamp
their
health
and
benefits
and
they
did
an
RFP.
We
worked
like
crazy
on
it.
We
really
gave
it
everything
and
we
won.
All
of
a
sudden,
it
was
like,
okay,
these
are
not
just
like
friendlies
that
are
signing
up
because
they
know
us
and
we
have
a
good
reputation
and
they
want
to
help
us.
A
friendly
is
a
friendly.
These
are
arms-length
companies
that
either
did
an
RFP
themselves
or
did
an
RFP
through
a
benefits
consultant.
We
won
those
fair
and
square.
We
were
not
always
the
cheapest.
When
you're
winning
a
competitive
process
and
you're
not
even
the
cheapest,
that's
when
we're
like,
okay,
we
really
have
something
here.
This
was
probably
spring
or
summer
of
2017.
This
is
like,
we've
been
doing
this
for
like
ten
months,
just
under
a
year.
We're
starting
to
win
those
first
few
competitive
situations.
This
is
really
when
we
knew
like,
okay,
like
we
have
something
real.
Recap
Pablo
33:58
Perfect,
all
right.
We'll
cap
it
off
there.
Maybe
just
as
a
refresh
kind
of
going
over
what
we
chatted
about,
you
started
off
with
this
idea,
with
a
lot
of
kind
of
market
research,
things
that
were
happening
in
other
countries
about
a
marketplace
between
practitioners,
health
practitioners,
and
consumers.
Even
before
launching
it
through
customer
discovery,
through
selling,
through
thinking
about
it,
you
decided
to
shift
away
from
that,
to
move
over
to
selling
to
B2B.
This
is
2016
when
no
one
was
doing
it.
You
used
friendlies
to
get
into
some
accounts.
You
segmented
the
market
and
tied
into
important
KPIs,
in
your
case,
employee
engagement,
which
I
thought
was
really
important,
and
used
that
to
really
get
going
and
close
your
first
customers
with
discounts,
with
free
trials,
everything
you
kind
of
needed
to
put
in
there
and
get
some
logos
on
the
board.
You
used
those
logos
to
move
up
the
food
chain,
so
to
speak,
and
finally
sell
into
non-friendlies,
into
real
RFPs,
into
real
processes.
When
you
started
winning
those,
you
realized
you
really
had
something
here.
Fast
forward
five
years
later,
you're
listed.
The
company's
worth
hundreds
of
millions
of
dollars.
It's
one
of
the
biggest
success
stories
of
Canada
in
the
last
few
years.
Congratulations
on
all
that,
and
more
to
the
point,
thank
you
so
much
for
spending
the
time
here
and
telling
the
story
with
so
many
details
that
I
think
founders
from
across
Canada
and
elsewhere
will
really
benefit
from.
Cherif
35:24
Thanks,
Pablo.
I
appreciate
Pablo
35:25
Thanks
so
much
for
listening.
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