All episodes
Episode 31October 30, 2023
The Product Market Fit Pyramid
About this episode
Think of Product Market Fit as a pyramid. At the bottom you have vision, then value prop, then product and at the top is go-to-market.
As you go from 0 to Product Market Fit your job is to tweak the pieces of that pyramid, from top to bottom, until things click.
Don't miss the next one
New episodes drop weekly.
Pick your platform and never miss a founder story.
Follow the showTranscript
The full conversation.
Pablo
0:00
So
I
was
talking
to
Andrew,
the
founder
of
Moto
Insight
the
other
week,
super
successful
founder.
He
grew
a
company
to
like
$20
million
top
line
in
,
in
ARR.
He
ended
up
selling
it
to
Autotrader.
So
things
ended
up
going
really
well
for
him.
It
was
a
long
journey,
took
12
years.
And
the
interesting
piece,
like
what
we
really
focused
on
was
the
pivot
because
for
the
first
three
years
he
worked
on
a
marketplace
that,
you
know,
had
some
traction
but
didn't
really
take
off.
And
it
was
only
when
he
shifted
to
more
kind
of
SaaS
B
two
B
enterprise
software
play
that
that
things
really
hit
it.
And
that's
where
he
kind
of
grew
it
to
$20
million
in
,
in
revenue.
This
was
14
years
ago.
And
so
the
,
you
know,
a
lot
of
the
kind
of
innovation
in
the
car
space
hadn't
happened
back
then.
And
so
the
idea
made
a
lot
of
sense.
It
was
a
car
marketplace
for
new
cars,
specifically
between
consumers
on
one
side
and
dealers
on
the
other.
And
the
idea
is
that
as
a
consumer,
instead
of
having
to
go
to
like
dealership
to
dealership
to
dealership
to
find
the
exact
car
or
the
exact
specs
that
you
were
looking
for,
you
could
just
build
it
online.
And
basically
the
dealers
would
ultimately,
whoever
had
it
would
kind
of
surface
up.
And
so
we
just
add
a,
you
know,
remove
a
lot
of
friction
from
the
buying
experience.
And
then
when
interest
starts
talking
about
the
pivot
that
he
makes,
one
of
the
things
he
says
is
they
started
asking
themselves
question,
right?
Like,
is
there
a
much
bigger
opportunity
that
we
can
capture?
And
what
he
says
is
something
that
many
founders
say
when
they
pivot,
which
is
vision,
always
stayed
the
same.
It
was
about
how
do
I
make
the
car
buying
experience
better,
more
transparent,
faster,
more
convenient?
That
was
always
the
vision,
but
it's
how
we
accomplish
that
vision
that
The PMF Pyramid
Pablo
1:24
evolved.
You
can
think
of
this
as
like
a
product
market
fit
pyramid,
right
at
the
bottom
you
have
vision,
then
value
prop,
then
product,
and
then
go
to
market
.
And
the
way
to
use
this
pyramid
is
that
when
you
start
tweaking
things,
right,
like
when
you,
you
go
after
and
you
have
a
certain
vision,
like
in
his
case,
making
the
car
buying
experience
better,
right?
You
have
a
,
a
certain
value
prop,
which
is,
in
his
case
at
least
originally,
to
uh,
help
people
like
find
the
right
car,
right?
So
maybe
that's
the
value
prop.
The
product
was
a
marketplace
that
brought
kind
of
dealer
inventory
online.
And
the
go-to
market
was
a
mix
on
the
one
side
of
like
direct
consumer
marketing.
And
on
,
on
the
other
side,
you
know,
more
B
two
B
type
,
not
really
sales
but
partnerships.
So
that's
what
it
originally
was.
When
that,
you
know,
after
a
few
years
realized
is
that
that's
not
really
working,
you
starts
to
tweak
things.
And
the
way
to
think
about
it
is
you
always
kind
of
go
from
top
to
bottom,
right?
The
first
thing
you
wanna
change
is
just
your
go-to
market
.
'cause
that's
kind
of
the
easiest
thing
to
change.
Okay,
I'm
selling
maybe
SMB
now
I'm
gonna
go
and
try
and
shift
to
enterprise.
I'm
selling
through
cold
calling.
Maybe
I'm
gonna
do
email
campaigns
or
I'm
gonna
do
it
,
uh,
through
try
to
do
like
inbound
marketing,
whatever
it
is
.
In
this
case,
specifically
when
you
think
about
un
hale
,
I'm
gonna
go
from
selling
to
direct
consumer
plus
the
B
two
B
partnerships
to
create
this
marketplace.
And
I'm
gonna
go
and
sell
direct
to
dealers.
Dealers
are
now
gonna
pay
me.
The
product
also
had
to
change,
but
not
that
much.
If
you
think
about
it,
the
product
was
already
bringing
dealers
inventory
online
and
having
a
way
for
users
to
build
it.
That
really
didn't
change
except
instead
of
being
an
open
marketplace
with
many
dealers,
he
took
that
product,
went
to
the
dealer
and
said,
you're
gonna
pay
so
that
your
inventory
goes
up
on
your
website
and
people
can
just
find
your
cars
that
much
more
easily,
right?
So
this
kind
of
Shopify
experience,
but
just
for
your
dealership.
And
then
the
dealers
would
pay
'em
directly.
So
go-to-market
definitely
changed.
Product
only
changed
a
little
bit.
Value
prop
really
didn't
change.
Like
at
the
end
of
the
day,
the
value
prop
for
the
dealers
is
sell
more
cars.
The
value
prop
for
the
users
is
to,
is
to
find
cars
more
easily.
And
the
vision
certainly
didn't
change,
right?
It
it
was
a
world
where
the
buying
,
the
car
buying
experience
is
a
lot
more
transparent
with
less
friction
and
so
on
and
so
forth.
And
that's
the
way
to
think
about
it
.
Like
this
,
the
kind
of
product
market
fit
pyramid,
as
you
go
out,
you,
you,
one
way
or
another,
whether
you
thought
about
it
explicitly
or
not,
you
have
created
this
pyramid.
You
have
a
vision,
you
have
a
vol
value
prop,
you
have
a
product
that's
supposed
to
deliver
on
that
value
prop
and
you
have
a
go
to
market
to
take
that
product
and
value
prop
to
market.
And
if
things
aren't
really
working,
you
wanna
work
from
top
to
bottom
of
that
pyramid
changing
things
until,
you
know,
worst
case
scenario,
your
vision
might
just
kind
of
be
off.
And
then
that's
probably
a
full
restart.
But
otherwise,
that's
the
way
I
would
think
about,
that's
the
construct
I
would
use
as
you're
kind
of
tweaking
things,
pivoting
on
,
on
your
journey
in
terms
of
what
you
should,
you
know,
product
is
harder
to
tweak
than
go
to
market
.
And
certainly
value
prop
is
harder
to
tweak.
Like
if
you
change
your
valid
prop,
everything
above
that
pyramid
has
to
change.
So
that's
really
the
,
the
kind
of
product
market
fit
pyramid,
right?
Start
at
the
top,
work
your
way
down.
The
other
thing
I
wanna
touch
on
is,
so
now
Andrew
kind
of
goes
through
this
,
uh,
this
pivot
and
he
starts
working
with
dealers
on
this
new
enterprise
sales
kind
of
play.
And
I
asked
him
,
you
know,
how
how
that
played
out.
And
what
he
said
is
he
started
working
with
some
automakers
that
became
their
design
partners.
Quantity of Yes vs Intensity of Yes
Pablo
4:33
And
then
note
the
difference,
right?
So
when
Andrew
actually
goes
,
starts
making
this
pivot
and
he
starts
working
directly
with
dealers
and
trying
to
get
dealers
to
pay
them,
dealers
go
from
literally
kind
of
saying,
yeah,
this
is
a
cool
marketplace
and
not
really
using
it
to
the
point
that
he's
actually
able
to
find
some
automakers
that
become
his
design
partners
and
they
help
him
finance
the
development
of
the
product,
right?
Like
Andrew's
bootstrap.
So
he
can't
move
unless
he
gets
cash
in
from
his
customers.
And
it's
not
about
quantity.
Like
he
went
to
a
bunch
of
different
dealers,
not
all
of
them
jumped
at
this
opportunity,
right?
Like,
like
always
you're
gonna
have
early
adopters,
late
adopters.
You're
gonna
have
that
kind
of
adoption
curve
and
it's
not
gonna
suit
everybody's
needs
right
away.
What
you
want
is
an
quantity
of
yes,
it's
intensity
of
yes
what
you
really
need.
And
one
of
the
big
signs
that
you're
onto
something
is
if
you
find
a
select
group
of
small
customers
that
are
really
intense
about
what
you're
building
and
really,
really
believe
in
it
to
the
point
that
they're
willing
to
invest
time
as
a
design
partner
and
money
to
actually
finance
the
creation
of
your
product.
That's
how
badly
they
think
that
your
product
is
gonna
move
the
needle
for
them
.
That
it's
worth
it
for
them
to
make
that
investment.
That's
like,
that
was
like
probably
,
probably
sign
number
one
that
this
new
play
was
actually
gonna
work
and
actually
produce
real
value
first
customers.
Constraints Set You Free
Pablo
5:43
And
on
that
note,
like
the
other
thing
that,
that
I
,
it's
this
is
the
,
the
piece
that's
important,
why
did
he
go
out
and
find
design
partners?
It
wasn't
actually
so
much
because
he
knew
that
that
was
the
way
to
get
to
success.
It
was
actually
'cause
he
needed
to,
he
,
he
didn't
have
outside
findings
.
So
he
literally
couldn't
do
anything
without
this.
And
that's
one
of
the
powers
of
bootstrapping.
And
especially
these
days
like
when
frankly
a
lot
of
founders
are
getting
forced
to
bootstrap
because
the
funding
environment
is
pretty
terrible.
Think
of
it
as
an
edge
because
it
is,
in
a
way,
it's
an
edge.
Yes,
it's
more
painful.
No,
you
don't
get
to
pay
yourself
a
salary,
maybe
a
salary
at
all.
Certainly
not
the
same
salary
that
you
would
if
you,
if
you
were
funded.
You
can't
hire
as
much.
Like
there's
just
so
many
constraints.
But
in
a
way,
constraints
set
you
free
because
they
force
you
to
do
the
things
that
you
really
need
to
do.
Had
Andrew
been
funded,
right?
Had
he
raised
like
this
four
or
$5
million
seed
round
that
was
happening
before,
he
didn't
need
to
get
these
design
partners
he
could've
built
and
then
he
might've
gone
in
a
different
direction
'cause
he
might've
had
some
other
idea,
put
a
team
on
it,
built
a
product,
gone
out
to
market
only
to
realize
that
that
also
didn't
work.
But
because
he
had
to
get
funding
from
his
own
customers,
he
ultimately
was
forced
into
a
decision
where
if
he
wasn't
gonna
provide
the
sort
of
value
that
led
customers
to
effectively
prepay
and
finance
the
development
of
his
product,
it
wasn't
a
thing
that
he
was
gonna
build.
And
that's
almost
in
B
two
B
exactly
what
you
want
because
it
makes
you
,
it
forces
you
down
the
right
path.
It
forces
you
down
the
path
of
am
I
providing
real
value
and
then
therefore
am
I
getting
closer
to
product
market
fit
versus
I've
got
all
this
money,
I've
got
all
these
resources,
let's
just
build
stuff
that
we
think
could
be
cool,
could,
you
know,
could
provide
value
but
not
force
ourselves
to
be
real.
And
I've
seen
this
plenty
of
times
and
especially
the
last
few
years
and
even
more
so
frankly
with
repeat
founders
because
they're
the
ones
that
were
able
to
attract
money
on
vision.
Like
there
are
people
that
are
really
good
at
selling
a
vision,
at
selling
a
dream
and
therefore
getting
money
like
pretty
product
market
fit
pre
idea
even
like
at
idea
stage
pre
,
uh,
pre-product
from
investors.
And
there's
like,
there's
upsides
to
that
obviously,
but
there
are
some
serious
downsides
and
I've
seen
it
so
many
times
where
because
there's
money,
people
get
hired,
things
get
built
things
then
get
over
polished
.
And
yet
if
you
go
back
to
that
pyramid,
something
was
seriously
off.
Either
the
value
prop
was
off
the
product,
the
go
to
market
,
something
was
seriously
off.
And
it
doesn't
matter
how
much
you
build
around
that
thing,
if
at
the
end
of
the
day
you're
not
clearly
moving
the
needle
for
your
customer,
the
thing's
not
gonna
work.
Doesn't
matter
how
pretty
it
looks
when
you
bootstrap,
you
just
can't
go
off
the
path
so
much
because
you
have
these
constraints
that
force
you
to
stay
on
path.
'cause
you
don't
have
money
to
go
off
path
when
you've
raised
a
bunch
of
money.
It's
actually
way
easier
than
you
think
to
go
on
the
wrong
direction
for
many
millions
of
dollars
for
many
months
with
many
people
only
to
realize,
oh
that's
not
gonna
work.
And
the
thing
I
asked
Andrew,
because
one
of
the
things
I
was
really
trying
to
get
at
is
When it's time to pivot, you feel it
Pablo
8:29
how
do
you
know
when
to
pivot?
It's
so
hard
to
know
when
to
pivot.
I
wish
it
was
a
rule,
but
there
just
isn't.
His
answer
is
there's
definitely
a
vibe
difference
that
you
can
feel
when
it's
working.
You
feel
it
that
entire
three
years,
like
when
he
was
building
the
marketplace,
every
single
step
was
a
grind.
It
felt
like
we
were
fighting
battles
every
day
,
left,
right
and
center.
And
the
winds
were
just
so
micro.
Whereas
on
the
software
side.
So
when
you
shifted
to
the
enterprise
play,
the
winds
were
way
more
tangible.
We
get,
we
,
we
land
a
new
logo,
we
land
a
huge
check
felt
like
just
momentum
that
built
on
itself.
This
reminds
me
of
when
I
was
at
Gym
Track
.
We
had
kind
of
at
one
point
we
pivoted
to
a
new
product.
Long
story
short
,
uh,
I
won't
get
into
the
to
the
why
of
it,
but
the
idea
for
this
new
product
was
it
was
a
sensor
for
,
uh,
that
would
go
on
gym
equipment
to
help
gym
operators
understand
usage,
right?
So
if
you
think
about
,
uh,
a
big,
let's
say
like
Anytime
Fitness,
right?
So
like
a
large
gym
chain,
they
have
equipment
across
many,
many
different
uh,
gyms
and
yeah,
they're
franchisees
and
these
sort
of
things,
but
at
the
end
of
the
day,
every
piece
of
equipment
costs
like
10
to
$20,000.
And
if
you
were
to
ask
some
of
these
,
uh,
operators
why
they
buy
the
piece
of
equipment
they
buy,
they,
they
don't
have
a
good
answer.
It's
like,
oh
,
I
just
thought
we
needed
15
treadmills.
Why,
why
not
12,
why
not
18?
And
all
that
optimization
actually
adds
up
to
serious
amount
of
money.
So
having
been
in
the
gym
industry
for
a
bit,
that
was
kind
of
the
problem
I
identified
by
the
sensors
that
would
go
on
the
piece
of
equipment.
We
detect
things
and
use
and
non-use
and
report
that
back
to
a
dashboard
the
gym
operators
could
look
at
and
better
optimize
their
equipment
spend
.
Sounds
like
in
theory,
like
it's
a
good
idea.
So
what
did
we
do?
Well,
frankly,
we
did
the
wrong
thing
because
we
went
out
and
spoke
with
some,
you
know,
serious
gym
operators.
But
what
do
we
do?
We
showed
them
the
product.
We're
like,
Hey,
here's
the
thing
that
we
filled
.
What
do
you
think?
I'm
telling
you,
out
of
20
conversations,
20
of
them
said,
oh
my
God,
this
is
amazing.
This
is
the
future.
This
is
exactly
what
we
need.
So
okay,
we're
super
hyped
up.
Like
this
is
awesome,
right?
Like
finally
we've,
we've
landed
like
,
oh
my
god,
I
can't
,
I
can't
believe.
And
people
were
actually
talking
about
it.
Like
we
would
hear
other
people
and
then
we
would
talk
to
somebody
say,
oh
yeah,
I
heard
about
you
from
this
other
person.
'cause
they
were
talking
about
cool
,
your
product
was
clearly
it
was
cool,
right?
It
was
clearly
innovative
for
the
time
and
for
the
space,
which
is,
you
know,
not
that
innovative,
but
that's
a
whole
,
that's
a
whole
other
thing.
Anyways,
the
point
is
then
we
go
to
sell
it
and
we're
talking
about
something
that's,
we're
like
trying
to
charge
like
a
few
thousand
dollars.
Let's
say
it's
like
5,000
a
year
for
something
that
each
treadmill
is
like
10
to
$20,000.
And
then
when
we
go
to
sell
it,
it's
effectively
crickets.
Like
we,
we
landed
some
sales,
but
it
was
so
painful.
Every
single
cell
was
so
hard.
And
then
when
you
think
about
the
fact
that
this
is
$5,000
and
a
treadmill
costs
20,000,
something's
clearly
off.
I
remember
one
day
actually
I
was
in
a
,
we
were
in
one
of
one
of
our
alpha
customers
where,
you
know,
they
have
many
clubs
like
let's
say
a
hundred
clubs
we're
just
in
one
doing
kind
of
the
first
phase.
It
had
taken
us
so
much
work
just
to
get
into
that
one
location.
And
I'm
talking
to
the
purchasing
officer
and
they're
telling
me
about
the
gym
and
they're
like,
oh
yeah,
like
actually,
you
know,
we're
gonna
replace
these.
I
just
bought,
I
think
it
was
like
eight,
eight
machines,
like
two
like
presses
this
and
that
and
the
other.
I'm
like,
how
much
was
that?
He's
like
80,000.
I'm
like,
this
person
just
spent
$80,000
on
equipment
on
a
normal
day.
Like
it's
just
like
that
was
just
another
buy,
just
80
k
cool
gone.
And
I
had
to
fight
for
months
to
get
$5,000
from
them.
Something's
wrong
and
clearly
something
was
wrong.
And
this
is
the
vibe.
Part
of
it
is
like,
I
wish
there
was,
again,
I
wish
there
was
a
rule
because
there
,
there
just
isn't.
Some
cells
are
gonna
be
hard
,
some
cells
are
gonna
be
easy,
but
you
just
kind
of
at
some
point
start
to
see
the
signs
like,
wait
a
second,
if
they're
spending
Tens
of
thousands
of
dollars
on
a
whim
on
this
other
thing
and
that
same
organization
is
making
it
so
hard
to
spend
a
few
thousand
dollars
on
my
thing,
clearly
I'm
not
solving
a
top
priority
problem
for
them.
And
really
I
wasn't,
if
you
look
back,
like
if
you
think
about
gym
specifically,
all
they
care
about
is
how
do
I
open
more
locations?
How
do
I
keep
more
members?
Like
those
are
the
two
things
and
how
do
I
get
more
members,
right?
Those
are
the
things
that
they,
they're
thinking
about
all
the
time.
And
anything
you
can
do
to
drive
that,
great,
anything
else
is
noise.
And
that's
what
we
found
out.
But
we
found
out
the
hard
way
could
we
have
found
this
out
the
easy
way?
Of
course
we
could
had
having
done
the
right
amount
of
research
at
the
outset,
instead
of
showing
the
product,
we
probably
would've
gone
these
insights
in
the
first
place
and
realized
that,
you
know,
equipment
spend
management
just
isn't
that
big
of
a
deal.
So
Andrew
had
this
idea
because
of
a
problem
he
had
himself,
right?
Like
he
bought
a
car,
he
was
like,
wow
,
this
,
this
really
sucks.
What
if
there
was
a
better
way?
And
The right way to talk to customers
Pablo
12:41
he
actually
did
some
research.
He
said
to
me,
we
spend
ton
of
time
talking
to
customers.
It's
a
no
surprise.
You
pick
10
random
people
in
the
parking
lot,
you
asked
them
,
Hey,
do
you
like
the
car
buying
experience?
Nine
out
of
10
will
probably
have
some
story
about
how
they
didn't
like
the
experience.
It's
just
one
of
those
cliches
when
we
talk
to
car
dealers,
naturally
the
first
reaction
is,
Hey,
anything
that
helps
me
sell
more
cars
is
a
good
idea.
On
the
surface
we
thought
we
deeply
understood
the
space.
That's
interesting
right
there
because,
and
this
is
so
common
,
that's
why
I'm
like
picking
on
it.
Talking
to
customers
be
has
become
such
a
cliche
that
I
really
believe
that
just
about
any
founder
is
doing
it.
Like
they're
talking
to
customers.
The
question
is
not
so
much
are
you
talking
to
customers,
the
question
is,
what
are
you
talking
to
them
about?
And
so
if
you,
if
you
actually
look
at
what
Andrew
did,
you
can
spot
the
issue.
First
of
all,
when
he
goes,
let's
say
to
consumers,
what
does
he
say?
He
says,
do
you
like
the
car
buying
experience?
That's
a
bit
of
a
setup
,
right?
I
mean
obviously
it's
not
that
good
of
an
experience.
So
a
lot
of
people
are
gonna
say,
no,
all
you're
getting
though
are,
are
kind
of
fake
results,
right?
So
what
might
you
ask
instead?
Well
remember
what
you're
trying
to
discover
are
top
of
mind
prompts
.
So
you
might
ask
them
like,
Hey,
when's
the
last
time
you
thought
about
buying
a
car?
What
have
you
done
towards
buying
a
car?
Where
do
you
go
when
you
,
when
you're
looking
to
buy
a
car?
Like
these
kind
of
top
line
questions,
top
level
questions
that
are
trying
to
answer
the
question.
When
you
get
down
to
it
and
you
say,
did
you
like
buying
a
car?
And
they're
like,
no,
okay,
you've
already
kind
of
preset
them
for
something.
What
you're
trying
to
do
is
find
out
where
they're
at
today.
Because
one
of
the
problems,
like,
so
back
to
the
original
question,
why
didn't
this
marketplace
work
even
though
customers
hated
the
old
buying
experience
and
even
those
marketplace
could
have
been,
you
know,
a
,
a
more
less
friction
full
experience,
like
a
better
experience.
Well
the
reason
is
it's
not
a
top
of
mind
thing
.
People
buy
cars
every
like
five
to
seven
years
and
you
know,
even
if
they
discover
the
car
,
the
you
have
to
get
'em
at
the
right
time.
Even
if
you
get
'em
at
the
right
time
and
they
discover
the
marketplace
today,
they
have
no
one
to
refer
to
because
they
don't
know
anybody
that's
also
looking
for
a
car
at
this
point.
Because
people
only
look
for
cars
every
five
to
seven
years.
And
when
in
five
to
seven
years
they
need
a
car
again,
they
might
have
forgotten
your
marketplace.
So
that
was
a
huge
issue.
On
the
flip
side,
when
he's
talking
to
dealers,
it's
a
similar
thing.
Like
if
you're
like,
Hey,
here's
my
idea,
it's
gonna
help
you
sell
more
cars.
What
do
you
think?
Of
course
dealers
are
gonna
tell
you
that.
Yeah,
why
not?
Like
<laugh>
,
it's
a
great
idea.
Sure,
it's
gonna
help
me
sell
More
stuff.
I
love
it.
And
by
the
way,
that's
the
another
problem
is
that
when
you
go
out
and
you
talk
to
customers,
if
what
you're
doing
is
selling
'em
,
like,
here's
what
I'm
thinking.
Here's
my
idea.
What
do
you
think?
Just
put
yourself
in
their
shoes,
right?
Like,
are
you
gonna
tell
somebody
that
you
think
their
idea
is
bad?
Probably
not.
What
you
want
do
is
please
people.
So
in
all
likelihood,
psychologically
you're
gonna
tell
'em
,
oh
yeah,
that's
a
great
idea.
I
mean,
what's
the
harm
to
you
?
You
have
no
skin
in
the
game,
so
you
might
as
well
kind
of
be
a
nice
person
and
that's
what
you're
gonna
get.
And
that
doesn't
help
anybody.
And
so
when
you
go
to
dealers,
the
questions
have
to
be
a
lot
higher
level.
Like
what
is
your
day
like
when
you
get
in?
What
do
you
do?
How
do
you
sell
cars?
What
channels
matter?
What
channels
don't,
how
many
cars
do
you
sell
?
Like
all
of
these
much
higher?
Like
what
websites
do
you
use?
Which
ones
work?
Which
ones
don't?
Just
to
actually
understand
the
reality
of
a
car
dealer
and
okay,
how
many
cars
do
you
move
per
month?
How
many
cars
would
I
need
to
move?
Help
you
move
per
month
for
it
to
be
a
meaningful
thing
to
you?
Like
these
are
the
kind
of
questions
that
are
actually
gonna
help
you
understand
what
the
car
dealer's
situation
is
like,
what
their
day-to-day
is
like,
what
they
value,
what
they
don't
value.
You
can
ask
them
like
even
what
is
the
number
one
problem
that
you
have
on
a
daily
basis?
What
are
the
most
important
problems
that
you
face?
And
let
them
tell
you
what
their
problems
are.
Instead
of
saying
to
them,
Hey,
is
selling
a
car
problem?
Like,
is
this
a
problem?
Is
this
thing
that
I'm
solving
a
problem
to
you?
Most
people
are
gonna
be
biased
and
they're
gonna
tell
you,
yeah,
it
is.
Yeah,
sure
it's
a
problem
,
but
you're
not
finding
out
nearly
enough.
You're
trying
to
figure
out
what
is
their
number
one
or
number
two
problem
.
What
are
they
thinking
about
all
the
time?
What
could
you
solve
that
would
have
a
huge
impact
for
them
?
Huge.
ROI
.
That's
what
you're
after.
And
and
you
get
that
by
asking
the
right
questions
upfront
.
So
it's
not
just,
are
you
talking
to
customers?
Is
are
you
talking
to
them
about
the
right
things?
Are
you
doing
it
the
right
way?
The
nuances
is
really
the
key
that
sets
apart
research,
true
research
and
effectively
fake
research,
which
is,
you
know,
gonna
help
you
speed
through
discovery
phase,
checks
some
boxes,
and
ultimately
if
you
know
closer
a
product
market
fit
on
that
same
tangent,
by
the
way,
as
because
we're
on
a
topic
of
marketplaces,
it's
actually
quite
common.
I
would
argue
that
marketplaces
that
sound
like
they
make
sense
actually
don't
work
out
at
all.
This
one
being
a
case
in
point,
right?
Like
a
marketplace
for
new
cars
sounded
like
it
made
sense
three
years
later,
you
know,
just
wasn't
really
spinning.
And
then
you
compare
it
to
marketplace
that
really
did
work.
Like
let's
say
Uber
or
Airbnb
or
even
eBay.
And
I
think
one
of
the
di
one
of
the
key
things
that
you
have
to
think
about
if
you're
building
a
marketplace
is
you
need
to,
and
I'm
sure
there's
exceptions
to
this,
I
can't
think
of
any,
but
I'm
sure
there
are
exceptions
to
everything.
But
I
think
The key to marketplaces
Pablo
17:13
as
a
rule,
you
need
to
be
critical,
critical
to
at
least
one
side
of
the
marketplace.
So
you
take
Uber,
for
example,
if
Uber
stops
working
tomorrow,
I'm
okay.
I
mean,
I'll
take
a
taxi,
it
sucks,
but
whatever.
But
the
Uber
drivers
are
out
of
a
job,
whether
they're
part-time
workers
or
full-time
workers,
they're
out
of
a
job
that's
critical.
You
think
about
Airbnb,
and
again,
today,
Airbnb's
morphed
and,
and
there's
a
lot
of
other
places
that
you
can
kind
of
rent
your
place,
but
when
Airbnb
started
and
we're
talking
about
zero
product
market
fits
,
that's
what
we
care
about.
When
Airbnb
started,
the
only
way
for
you
to
earn
income
off
your
property
was
through
Airbnb.
If
Airbnb
shut
down,
you
lose
your
entire
stream
Of
income.
Again
for
a
user,
you
would
just
maybe
go
to
a
hotel,
go
to
a
hostel,
whatever,
you
have
other
options.
But
for
the
owner
of
that
Airbnb,
Airbnb
was
absolutely
critical.
eBay,
same
thing
when
it
came
out.
The
only
way
for
you
to
sell
whatever
you
were
selling
was
through
eBay.
It
was
absolutely
critical
for
the
sellers.
And
so,
and
usually
I
would
arm
,
I'm
sorry
,
at
least
these
three
examples,
it's
critical
on
the
supply
side.
So
if
you're
building
out
a
marketplace,
like
take
now,
un
haggle,
right?
Which
was
the,
the
first
version
of
Motor
Insight
,
the
the
new
car
marketplace,
was
it
critical
to
either
side
dealers?
No.
'cause
dealers,
they're
still
selling
cars,
whether
on
haggle
works
or
doesn't,
they
have
other
channels,
they're
already
selling
cars.
Is
it
critical
to
the
users?
No,
because
they're
already
buying
cars.
And
so
that
creates
a
lot
more
friction,
makes
it
way
harder
for
the
marketplace
to
get
off
the
ground.
You've
gotta,
I
think
one
of
the
things
you
really
need
to
think
about
is,
is
your
marketplace
critical
to
at
least
one
of
the
two
sides,
even
if
it's
a
niche,
you
know,
initial
segment
because
the
problem
is
it's
chicken
and
egg,
right?
And
so
you
need
one
of
the
two
sides
to
feel
like
it's
so
critical
that
they
need
to
be
there,
even
though
the
other
side
is
maybe
not
really
there
yet,
right?
Until
things
get
off.
Once
a
marketplace
gets
off
the
ground,
it
tends
to
take
care
of
itself.
But
at
the
beginning,
when
you're
going
from
zero
to
one,
zero
to
product
market
fit,
if
you're
not
critical
to
at
least
one
of
the
two
sides,
it's
gonna
be
really
hard
to
kind
of
balance
the
two
sides
of
the
marketplace
to
keep
them
together
for
long
enough
to
really
kind
of
create
the
fire.
If
you've
listened
to
this
episode
and
the
show
and
you
like
it,
I
have
a
huge
favor
to
ask
for
you.
Well,
it's
actually
a
really
small
favor
,
but
it
has
huge
impact.
But
whichever
app
you're
listening
to
this
episode
on,
take
It
Out,
go
to
a
product
market
fit
show
and
leave
a
review,
please.
It's
going
to
help.
It's
not
just
gonna
help
me
to
be
clear,
it's
going
to
help
other
founders
discover
this
show
because
the
algorithms,
whether
it's
Spotify,
whether
it's
Apple,
whether
it's
any
other
podcast
player,
one
of
the
big
things
they
look
at
is
frequency
of
reviews.
It's
quantity
of
reviews.
And
the
reality
is,
if
all
of
you
listening
right
now,
left
reviews,
we
would
have
thousands
of
reviews.
So
please
take
literally
a
minute.
Even
if
you're
just
writing
like
great
podcast,
or
I
love
this
podcast,
whatever
it
is,
just
write
a
few
words.
Obviously
the
longer
the
better,
the
more
detailed
the
better.
But
write
anything,
leave
five
stars
and
you'll
be
helping
me.
But
most
importantly,
many
other
founders
just
like
you,
discover
the
show.
Thank
you
.