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Episode 32November 6, 2023
Mark Ang, Founder of GoBolt | How to Pivot to Product Market Fit
About this episode
Everyone tells you that you need to start with a niche, a beachhead market, and then grow from there. But how does that actually work? What does that really look like? It looks like Mark's story starting and growing GoBolt.
Mark started off storing items for students over the summer. He expanded to storing all things for all people. He now provides logistics for enterprises. He's raised over $150M and has over 1,000 employees. But it wasn't pre-destined, it was 100% organic.
What really matters is finding a problem that you're acutely positioned to solve and then solving that problem. If you have real demand, and you stay close to your customers, things tend to take care of themselves.
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Follow the showTranscript
The full conversation.
Pablo
0:00
I
think
this
is
actually
one
of
the
best
examples.
They
talk
about
how
you
need
to
start
small,
right?
You
need
to
start
with
a
niche,
a
beachhead
market,
and
then
grow
from
there.
I
find
the
issue
sometimes
is
people
take
that
strategy,
and
they
try
to
make
it
a
bit
too
formulaic.
They
try
to
say,
okay,
this
is
my
beachhead
market,
then
I'm
going
to
expand
to
this
market,
then
I'm
going
to
expand
to
that
market.
It's
fine
to
plan,
but
the
reality
rarely
works
out
that
way.
I
think
in
this
episode,
what
you're
going
to
see
is
just,
even
though
that
is
many
times
what
happens,
is
that
somebody
goes
after
a
niche
market
and
grows
from
there,
the
way
it
happens,
it's
much
more
organic
than
you
would
think.
Mark,
ultimately,
he
starts
off,
he's
a
student
and
he
sees
that
when
summertime
rolls
around,
students
have
all
this
furniture
and
they
need
to
store
it
for
the
summer,
and
so
he
just
solves
that
problem.
He
didn't
have
some
massive
idea
about
where
things
were
going
to
end
up.
He
just
literally
starts
solving
that
problem,
and
demand
pulls
him
and
it
pulls
him.
What
Mark
does
that
is
very,
very
smart
and
resourceful,
is
that
he
stays
very
close
to
the
data.
He
stays
very
close
to
the
customer,
and
so
he
learns,
and
he's
able
to
evolve
from
there
to
a
broader
storage
company,
and
they
rebrand.
They
were
called
Second
Closet
back
then.
They
rebrand
to
GoBolt
and
go
after
this
kind
of
broader
storage
play.
Then
from
there,
he
then
notices
a
different
segment
of
customers,
business
customers
that
are
using
his
business
in
an
entirely
different
way.
He
shifts
again,
at
this
point,
the
company
was
much
bigger,
to
this
much
larger
opportunity.
He
didn't
see
these
phases
at
the
outset.
He
just
went
with
it
and
really
saw
the
opportunities
because
he
was
so
close
to
the
customers.
He
saw
the
opportunities
every
single
time,
and
he
leveraged
them
as
much
as
possible,
and
it
worked.
Now,
GoBolt's
raised
over
$150
million.
They
have
over
a
thousand
employees.
They're
a
massive
enterprise,
but
it
didn't
start
out
this
way.
I
think
listening
through
this
episode
and
understanding
how
things
really
evolved
will
help
you
understand
that
what
really
matters,
at
the
end
of
the
day,
is
finding
a
problem
that
you're
acutely
positioned
to
solve
and
then
solving
that
problem.
If
you
have
real
demand,
things
will
take
care
of
themselves.
Welcome
to
the
Product
Market
Fit
Show
brought
to
you
by
Mistral,
a
seed-stage
firm
based
in
Canada.
I'm
Pablo.
I'm
a
founder
turned
VC.
My
goal
is
to
help
early-stage
founders
like
you
find
product
market
fit.
Well,
Mark,
welcome
to
the
show.
Mark
2:23
Yeah,
thanks
for
having
me,
Pablo.
Pablo
2:24
Let's
start
at
the
beginning.
You
now
have
a
company
called
Bolt,
but
you
started
off
and
it
was
called
Second
Closet.
I'm
sure
things
have
changed
quite
a
bit.
That
entire
change,
we'll
be
diving
into
today,
but
maybe
to
set
context,
if
you
could
tell
us
about
the
time
when
you
started
Second
Closet.
Mark
2:46
We've
How it all started
Mark
2:47
actually
undergone
three
rebrands,
so
we're
not
Bolt
anymore,
we're
now
GoBolt
which
is
the
official
trade
marketable
name.
We're
happy
to
be
finished
our
rebranding
journey.
When
the
business
started,
as
you
pointed
out,
we
were
called
Second
Closet.
We
were
a
totally
different
business
than
what
we
are
today,
but
the
inner
workings
of
it
are
much
the
same.
Second
Closet
was
a
valet
storage
company
that
would
pick
up,
store,
and
return
people's
stuff.
We
started
by
breaking
into
the
international
student
market
because
every
summer,
students
needed
to
store
their
things
when
they
went
back
home.
This
was
very
common
practice,
and
it
was
a
pretty
niche
and
lucrative
industry.
We
decided
to
attack
that
just
because
we
were
university
students
at
the
time
and
understood
it
really
well.
Eventually,
it
evolved
to
start
storing
things
for
people
like
you
and
me.
Seasonal
wardrobe,
seasonal
items,
and
eventually
typical
storage
applications.
Pablo
3:38
Take
us
back
to
those
early
days,
pre-Second
Closet.
What's
going
on?
Are
you
in
this
mindset
of
like,
you
want
to
start
a
business
and
you're
looking
for
the
thing,
or
how
do
you
even
come
up
with
that
first
idea?
Mark
3:49
It
was
a
very
much
go-with-the-flow
moment
in
time.
My
co-founder,
Heindrik,
and
I
both
had
full-time
jobs
lined
up.
I
was
supposed
to
be
a
management
consultant.
He
was
supposed
to
be
a
product
manager
at
a
large
health
tech
company.
We
were
just
doing
Second
Closet
as
a
side
hustle
to
make
more
money
on
the
side.
The
problem
was
that
with
$500
invested
into
guerrilla
marketing,
and
by
guerrilla
marketing,
I
mean
we
used
U
of
T
printing
credits,
which
were
free,
Vista
Print
business
cards,
which
are
super,
I
don't
even
know
how
they
make
money,
it's
super
inexpensive,
and
some
really
targeted
Facebook
ads
geographically
confined
to
campus,
so
$500
in
total.
We
generated
20k
of
monthly
recurring
revenue
in
two
weeks.
We
said,
holy
shit.
Pablo
4:32
How
cheap
were
those
Facebook
ads?
Each
one
is
supposed
to
be
at
least
$2,
$3
to
get
an
actual
event.
No?
Mark
4:38
Well,
let's
keep
in
mind
this
was
back
in
2017
when
the
times
were
good.
Before
any
kinda
iOS
changes.
We
probably
had
the
benefit
of
some
of
that
tailwind.
We
had
the
benefit
of
being
able
to
target
just
university
students,
just
in
these
postal
codes.
Our
frequency
of
someone
seeing
our
ads
was
super
high.
It
built
a
lot
of
trust
in
the
brand
that
they've
never
heard
of
before.
Then
seeing
our
flyers
inside
of
bathroom
stalls
and
in
front
of
urinals,
I
don't
know
if
that
added
or
detracted,
probably
how
the
hell
did
these
things
get
in
here,
but
in
any
event,
people
had
high
frequency
in
their
dorm
buildings
and
then
we
slipped
the
business
cards
under
people's
dorm
room
doors
when
we
broke
into
all
the
buildings
somewhat
illegally,
but
we
were
technically
students,
so
it
was
okay.
All
that
to
say,
we
had
a
very
targeted
campaign
with
very
cheeky
messaging
because
our
audience
were
students.
We
said,
"Hey,
summer
storage
made
sexy,
use
code
wrap
it
up
for
$10
off
bubble
wrap,"
knowing
full
well
that
no
one
actually
even
would
redeem
that
code
because
they
don't
really
need
to
use
bubble
wrap.
Just
cheeky
messaging
like
that
caught
their
attention,
and
then
they
went
to
our
site
and
ended
up
booking
a
ton
of
orders.
It
was
a
bit
of
a
crazy
moment
for
us
when
the
orders
started
to
roll
in
because
they
were
fast
and
furious.
Pablo
5:51
What
even
led
you,
this
is
when
it
was
already
kind
of
a
side
hustle
and
this
was
your
growth
hack,
let's
say,
but
how
did
you
come
up
with
the
idea
of
helping
people
store
stuff
for
the
summer?
Mark
6:02
Yeah,
I
think
my
mentality
in
general
is
obstacle,
solution,
obstacle,
solution.
In
this
case,
the
seed
was
planted
when
I
had
moved
out
of
our
family
home
as
a
17-year-old
with
my
brother
and
we
moved
into
a
tiny
condo
in
Liberty
Village.
Really
only
started
working
on
the
idea
much
later
in
2016,
built
a
website
with
a
team
overseas
that
was
super
inexpensive,
launched
with
that
website,
and
some
tweaks
thereof.
It
was
a
personal
experience
that
drove
it.
The
ultimate
application
of
what
it
was,
the
beachhead
market
was
a
lot
different.
It
was
just
a
good
moment
in
time
to
revisit
the
business
and
push
it
out.
We
did
that
and
saw
that
really
early
success,
and
shortly
after
that
big
push,
we
raised
the
500k
seed
round
a
day
before
I
was
supposed
to
start
full-time
on
June
1st
and
rescinded
our
offers
with
two
weeks'
notice
technically,
but
in
advance
of
starting,
and
I've
never
looked
back.
Pablo
7:01
I'm
curious.
We
will
jump
into
that
in
a
second
but
you
talk
about
this
obstacle,
solution,
obstacle,
solution,
which
I
think
is
a
pretty
common
frame
of
mind
amongst
founders.
That's
what
makes
them
builders.
Was
this
your
first
business,
or
was
this
the
first
one
that
worked?
I'm
curious
if
you
had
a
bunch
of
other
attempts
prior
to
that.
Fundraising and Serendipity
Mark
7:19
I
had
an
e-commerce
brand
that
was
a
watch
company.
I
had
built
a
prototype,
kickstarted
it,
built
another
model,
kickstarted
it.
Always
aiming,
as
a
broke
student,
use
as
little
as
possible
upfront
to
then
build
into
something
great.
That's
where
Kickstarter
was
awesome
for
product-based
businesses.
A
$300
prototype
ended
up
garnering
a
250k-a-year
business
for
me
that
helped
me
pay
my
way
through
school,
and
build
a
small
stock
portfolio
that
would
help
me
pay
for
some
of
my
living
expenses
with
dividends.
That
was
the
business
before.
It
wasn't
a
smashing
success.
I
probably
should
have
raised
money
for
that
business
because,
at
the
time,
Facebook
ads
were
even
cheaper.
This
was
like
2014,
2015.
Then
on
top
of
that,
a
competitor
was
just
starting
out
called
Movement,
which
ended
up
getting
sold
to
Movado
for
$100
million
a
handful
of
years
later.
That
was
the
first
brush
with
business,
of
starting
something
from
scratch
as
a
product-based
business
based
online.
This
was
a
service-based
business
based
online
so
a
lot
of
the
marketing
knowledge
was
helpful,
but
running
a
service
business,
totally
different
than
a
product
business.
Pablo
8:32
How
did
that
early
fundraising
go?
Was
that
from
VCs,
angels?
Did
you
already
have
kind
of
a
network
at
that
point?
Mark
8:38
No,
no
network
whatsoever
actually.
A
lot
of
this
was
just
a
stroke
of
luck.
I
ran
into
an
angel
investor
named
Michael
Hyatt
at
a
startup
career
expo
where
we
were
advertising
our
business
for
student
ambassadors.
It
was
an
engineering
thing.
Selfishly,
we
wanted
to
get
the
brand
more
exposure
and
have
them
book
storage
with
us,
but
then
the
byproduct
was
that
we
might
also
find
some
really
good
early
talent.
We
kind
of
got
both
in
the
end.
That's
actually
where
I
met
Heindrik
for
the
first
time,
my
co-founder
and
our
CTO.
Michael
ended
up
saying,
"Hey,
this
is
a
really
cool
business."
Gave
us
a
small
convertible
note,
eventually
just
abolished
that
agreement,
put
it
into
a
full-blown
500k
seed
round
a
few
weeks
later
just
because
the
success
was
so
quick.
He
asked
a
question,
"How
much
of
the
money
is
left,"
after
we'd
grown
to
the
20k
a
month.
We're
like,
"Substantially
all
of
it."
In
fact,
we've
grown
it
now
to
30k
or
35k
based
on
the
fact
that
we
weren't
really
spending
much.
Everything
that
we
did
at
the
time,
by
the
way,
was
fully
outsourced
to
a
file
storage
company.
They
would
pick
up,
store,
and
return
the
stuff
for
us.
All
we
were
is
a
marketing
company
and
a
customer
support
company,
and
everything
else
was
totally
outsourced.
Pablo
9:50
By
the
way,
I
think
there
is
a
story
there
in
the
sense
that
you
have
to
be
ready
for
when
it
comes.
I
think
a
lot
of
these
early
rounds,
these
first
few
hundred
thousand
dollars
that
are
from
angels
are
less
methodical,
like
a
series
A
or
a
series
B
will
be,
and
a
lot
of
serendipity,
but
it's
80%,
90%
of
the
business
and
the
people,
that's
got
to
be
legit
so
that
when
you
meet
a
Michael
Hyatt,
there's
something
to
be
impressed
about.
Going all in
Mark
10:14
Yeah,
there
was
preparation
there,
right?
We
were
already
in
market,
we
were
already
advertising,
we
were
at
a
startup
career
expo.
All
these
things
sort
of
culminated
to
create
these
subconscious
snaps
fires
that
were
helpful
in
the
end,
I
think.
Look,
the
business
was
supposed
to
be
asset-light.
We
became
very
asset-heavy
and
we
now
have
tens
of
millions
of
dollars
invested
in
physical
infrastructure.
We
had
this
partner
that
was
supposed
to
be
great.
On
April
28th,
our
busiest
day
of
the
student
storage
season
of
our
first
year,
they
called
us
up
at
9:37
AM.
Our
first
appointment
was
to
start
in
23
minutes,
and
they
said
that,
"Our
guys
are
refusing
to
work.
You're
completely
on
your
own
today."
This
was
problematic
because
Heindrik
was
already
just
entering
an
exam
at
9:00
AM
and
I
was
supposed
to
go
into
my
final
exam
at
11:00
AM.
We
would
not
overlap.
This
was
hugely
problematic,
and
again,
this
was
like
getting
slapped
in
the
face
as
a
founder.
The
option
was,
cancel
all
these
orders
and
tell
them
to
figure
something
else
out,
or
do
the
unthinkable
and
just
figure
out
a
way
to
spin
up
logistics
that
15
trucks
were
going
to
do
for
us
with
a
small
team
of
two.
Pablo
11:23
To
be
clear,
what
you
have
to
do
at
this
point
is
go
to
a
bunch
of
different
places
and
pick
up
a
bunch
of
different
furniture
and
store
it.
Mark
11:29
Yeah.
Aggressive.
I
think
on
that
day,
we
had
about
84
appointments,
and
at
the
time,
most
trucks
were
doing
8
to
10
a
day
themselves.
Okay?
We
now
have
to
do
10
times
the
normal
volume
that
10
trucks
would've
done
in
one
truck,
and
this
is
the
end
of
the
month.
If
you've
ever
tried
to
move
yourself
and
get
a
U-Haul
at
the
end
of
the
month,
unless
you
book
it
two
weeks
in
advance,
you're
fucked.
We
had
to
send
Heindrik
an
hour
out
of
the
city
to
get
the
only
U-Haul
left.
I
remember
writing
my
exam
in
like
10
or
15
minutes,
getting
out,
starting
to
move
people's
stuff
down,
and
then
see
Heindrik
roll
up
on
St.
George
Street
in
the
tiniest
U-Haul
you've
ever
seen.
It
was
the
10-foot
box
truck.
I'm
like,
"Oh
my
God,"
but
beggars
can't
be
choosers.
In
this
case,
we
had
to
do
way
more
runs
back
to
their
warehouse
to
drop
off
the
product.
Then
I
ended
up
using
my
dorm
on
campus
as
a
staging
ground
as
well,
which
was
filled
with
these
green
totes.
We
worked
until
4:00
AM
that
night
and
then
we
did
it
again.
Pablo
12:32
From
when
to
when?
Like
noon
to
4:00
AM
ish?
Something
like
that?
Mark
12:35
Yeah,
it
was
like
11:30
AM
until
4:00
AM,
and
then
we
did
it
again
the
next
day
and
the
next
day.
Then
we
said,
holy
shit.
If
we're
going
to
do
this
business,
we
have
to
do
it
full-time.
We
had
just
started
negotiating
terms
with
Michael,
and
we
said,
okay,
let's
close
this
round,
and
let's
quit
our
jobs
and
let's
do
this
full
time
because
I
think
we
have
a
real
business
here.
Pablo
12:53
That's
an
amazing
story.
It's
very
prototypical
of
the
founder
DNA,
right?
When
you
boil
it
down,
I
like
to
think
about
some
of
the
best
founders
are
insanely
focused,
and
they
just
have
one
goal
in
mind,
whatever
that
goal
is.
I
think
here,
it's
like,
make
the
thing
work.
<laugh>
I
say
insanely
because
the
thing
that
happens
is
actually
insane.
Two
people
driving
around
for,
whatever,
16
hours
or
so,
moving
boxes.
It's
just
insane,
but
at
the
end
of
the
day,
it
was
either
that
or
you
return
everybody's
money,
which
was
unacceptable,
so
you
did
it.
Niche Markets First
Mark
13:27
Well,
the
reputational
hit,
we
would
never
have
recovered,
ever.
We
have
this
mantra
that
like
every
single
stop,
every
single
customer
needs
to
be
successful.
It
was
that
maniacal
focus,
one
of
our
company
values
right
now
is
sweat
the
small
stuff.
Every
single
customer
mattered,
but
of
course,
we
had
to
compromise,
right?
You're
constrained
and
everyone
had
these
time
slots
and
we
said,
to
hell
with
the
time
slots,
we're
going
come
to
you
and
we
tell
you
we're
ready,
and
we're
going
to
now
bundle
all
these
customers
together.
If
you're
at
110
St.
George,
be
ready
at
this
time.
In
fact,
if
you
can
bring
your
stuff
down
for
us,
that
would
also
be
very
much
appreciated.
We
just
communicated
to
all
these
customers
and
said,
we're
going
to
be
here
and
make
it
work.
We're
sorry.
Like
we're
inundated
with
a
crazy
amount
of
work.
We're
apologetic.
And
you
know,
students
to
their
credit
are
a
special
breed
of
consumer
where
they
just
wanna
get
it
done
and
the
service
might
be
choppy,
but
as
long
as
like
the
outcome
is
what
they
wanted,
they're
gonna
be
okay.
And
so
we
were
very
fortunate
to
start
in
a
pretty
like,
you
know,
soft
,
uh,
consumer
environment
and
then
move
into
more
high
demanding
kind
of
,
uh,
quote
unquote
adults
that
are
very
discerning
with
what
they
pay
for
and
what
they
get
in
return.
Pablo
14:33
What
was
the
alternative?
What
were
students
doing
before
Second
Coset
with
their
stuff?
Mark
14:37
They
were
using
a
very
longstanding
incumbent
called
Store
Your
Dorm
that
would
charge
four
to
five
times
what
we
would
charge
to
do
the
same
thing.
Taking
a
step
back,
that
is
probably
why
we
were
inundated.
We
did
a
great
job
getting
our
name
out
there,
and
of
the
people
that
saw
us,
they
booked
with
us.
Then
the
next
year,
our
student
rush
was
way
bigger
than
we
saw
in
2017
just
because
we
had
plastered
the
subway
with
our
ads
and
built
more
credibility
and
so
on
and
so
forth.
The
moment
we
exited
consumers,
and
students,
I
should
say,
we
went
to
the
typical
storage
consumer,
which
was
someone
that
lives
in
a
home
or
a
condo
that
needs
excess
space.
I
remember
we
graduated
from
the
U-Haul
to
a
Mercedes
Sprinter
van,
and
we're
like,
oh,
this
is
a
Mercedes.
It's
super
high-end.
In
reality,
it's
just
a
big
minivan.
We
didn't
wrap
it
because
to
wrap
it
would
cost
$3,000
and
fuck
that,
that's
way
too
expensive.
We
only
raised
500k.
Let's
be
frugal,
but
as
we
still
did
all
the
pickups
ourselves,
and
I
did
all
the
customer
Being Close to Your Customers
Mark
15:40
support
myself,
all
the
sales,
and
all
the
inbound
management,
I
could
feedback
loop
what
consumers
were
saying
on
the
ground,
what
they
were
complaining
about
to
support,
what
they
wanted
to
see,
and
so
on.
I
remember
doing
a
pickup
one
day
and
the
husband
and
wife,
we
were
picking
up
their
sofa,
the
wife
was
whispering
because
we
were
just
in
Nike
athletic
gear
and
shoes
and
we
thought
that
that
was
nice
but
obviously,
it
wasn't
branded
and
—
Pablo
16:07
You
got
the
Mercedes-Benz,
you
got
the
Nike
gear,
you're
good
to
go.
Mark
16:10
Yeah,
big
ball.
We
probably
should
have
thrown
on
spinners
on
the
truck
as
well
just
to
really
wrap
it
up,
but
they
were
like,
"Oh
my
god,
is
this
a
scam?
They're
going
to
steal
our
furniture?"
I
just
remember
thinking
like,
shit,
we
do
not
do
a
great
job.
We
have
this
little
clipboard
with
this
poorly
colored
printed
manifest
that
looks
like
shit.
I'm
like,
if
we're
going
to
take
possession
of
people's
things
and
be
in
their
home,
we
need
to
show
up
a
lot
differently.
The
next
week,
we
had
this
really
cool
truck
wrap
designed,
slapped
it
on
the
truck,
$3,000
later,
we
went
to
the
cheapest
screen
printing
shop
to
get
Second
Closet
shirts
printed.
In
the
end,
we
ended
up
getting
a
look
and
feel
that
when
we
showed
up,
that
never
happened
again.
It
was
a
micro
pivot
of
how
we
invest
capital
because
now,
those
people
might
go
tell
other
friends
like,
"Hey,
I
had
a
great
experience
with
this
branded
business
and
it
was
super
legit.
Stored
our
stuff,
they
brought
it
back.
Same
people,
same
experience."
I
just
think
that
we
were
very
receptive
to
those
little
things
over
time
that
ultimately
helped
us
build
a
business
that
was
highly
recurring
revenue
and
had
a
high
referral
base.
Pablo
17:20
They
talk
about
how
you
have
to
be
close
to
your
customers
and
it's
examples
like
this
that
bring
out
what
that
really
means.
Small
data
is
so
important
in
those
early
days.
Obviously,
as
a
founder,
you
hope
you're
not
the
one
doing
the
deliveries,
you're
not
the
one
doing
customer
support,
but
in
the
beginning,
it's
critical
that
you
do
because
you
get
these
little
tiny
nuggets
that
have
such
outsized
impact.
When small, act big
Mark
17:43
One
of
the
things
that
we
learned
was
that
people
wanted
to
book
their
logistics
in
storage
whenever
they
wanted
and
on
their
schedule.
We
had
a
wide
range
of
demo,
young
families,
single
people,
our
oldest
client
was
94
years
old.
I
had
to
convince
her
to
give
me
her
credit
card
over
the
phone,
and
she
was
like,
"This
is
a
scam."
I'm
like,
"No,
it's
not,
here's
a
link
to
the
Toronto
Star.
Click
it
and
you
can
read
about
us."
She's
like,
"Oh,
okay.
I
know
the
Toronto
Star,
and
you're
in
it
so
that
probably
is
legit
enough."
I
remember
taking
a
call
at
2:00
AM.
We
use
Grasshopper
as
our
1-800
line,
and
it's
the
cheap,
again,
having
a
1-800
versus
a
416
or
647
number
totally
changed
the
game
because
it
made
you
look
bigger.
We
hired
this
British
voice
actor
to
do
our
intro
because
it
sounded
nice
and
sophisticated.
We
did
little
things
like
that
that
dressed
up
the
experience,
and
of
course,
it
was
available
24/7.
I
was
the
guy
that
was
answering
the
call.
At
2:00
AM,
I
get
this
call,
and
I'm
groggy.
Pablo
18:46
Is
that
normal?
You
get
calls
in
the
middle
of
the
night
and
you
just
pick
it
up?
Mark
18:51
If
my
phone
rang,
I
would
pick
it
up
whenever
because
it
could
have
been
a
sale.
I
was
like,
we
want
to
be
available
for
the
customer.
They're
like,
"This
must
be
a
big
company.
They're
answering
the
phone
at
all
hours
of
the
day."
I
would
always
be
available
and
have
a
notebook
to
take
down
orders,
or
have
my
computer
with
me
so
I
could
pop
it
open
and
hotspot,
and
then
book
the
order,
and
that
customer
ended
up
booking
at
like
2:30
after
I
had
told
them
about
us
and
what
we're
doing
and
that
sort
of
thing.
I
would
never
tell
them
who
I
was.
There
was
multiple
Marks
in
the
business.
There
was
a
Mark
in
the
office
and
a
Mark
on
the
road.
I
remember
just
going
through
crazy,
crazy
stories
where
this
one
Russian
lady
that
we
went
to
was
trying
to
convince
Mark
the
mover
that
Mark
in
the
office
agreed
to
free
storage
for
a
certain
amount
of
time.
I'm
like,
I
don't
think
he
did,
but
let
me
go
call
him.
I'll
have
him
call
you.
I
would
go
to
the
van,
I
would
say,
"Hey,
Mark,
I
need
you
to
call."
I
would
wait
five
minutes
because
there
has
to
be
an
interaction
between
the
Marks.
Then
Mark
from
the
office
would
call
the
client,
and
then
obviously,
Mark
from
the
office,
he
needs
to
call
Mark
from
the
van
back,
and
then
Mark
from
the
van
would
go
back
and
talk
to
the
client
and
be
like,
"Hey,
did
that
clear
things
up?"
Little
things
like
that
to
just
make
sure
that
we
were
always
punching
above
our
weight
class
just
from
a
look
and
feel
perspective
was
important.
Look,
experiences
like
that
and
being
on
the
ground,
I
would
not
trade
it
for
the
world.
We
were
doing
moving
and
driving
for
the
first
year
of
the
business,
and
our
investors
eventually
were
like,
"What
the
hell
are
you
doing?
Hire
people
and
start
to
grow."
We
were
growing,
we
had
filled
up
a
ton
of
space.
Pablo
20:12
How
much
did
you
grow,
that
first
year
you
hit
20,000
I
think
in
a
month
or
so,
where
were
you
a
year
later?
Revenue in the First Years
Mark
20:19
Our
first
year,
we
did
a
couple
hundred
thousand
in
revenue.
The
next
year,
we
did
1.6
million.
It
was
like
an
8x,
and
it
has
grown
considerably
since
then.
We're
fortunate
to
be
doing
over
nine
figures
of
revenue
now.
Pablo
20:35
I'm
just
curious,
were
the
margins
a
challenge
back
then?
What
kind
of
margins
were
you
looking
at,
and
did
investors
care?
Mark
20:42
Margins
were
actually
really
good.
I
really
liked
data.
I
really
like
playing
around
with
the
look
and
feel
of
things.
Tying
the
analytics
behind
marketing
to
this
bootleg
Photoshop
instance
that
I
had,
to
change
our
copy
and
our
visual
look,
to
drive
conversions
and
A/B
test
things,
anyone
can
get
into
that
pretty
easily.
The
tools
are
pretty
straightforward.
We
were
able
to
get
our
customer
acquisition
cost
down
considerably
to
what
the
lifetime
value
was.
That
made
our
marketing
cost,
which
traditionally
is
the
biggest
thing
for
a
D2C
business
or
a
consumer
business,
really
low.
Then
logistically,
we
had
very
good
margins
on
storage
because
we
were
selling
by
the
piece,
but
we
could
co-mingle
them
in
our
warehouse.
It
was
really,
really
high
margin
once
we
had
the
product
in
our
warehouse.
That's
why
we
offered
free
moving
initially.
We
just
wanted
to
be
frictionless.
Move
your
stuff
into
storage
for
free
and
we'll
bring
it
back
to
you.
We
wanted
just
people
to
convert.
Over
time
though,
I
think
about
a
year
and
a
half
in,
we
started
to
hire
a
lot
more
movers.
We
had
a
lot
more
trucks.
I
was
like,
we
really
should
recuperate
more
of
this
cost
and
try
to
cost
recover.
We
said,
what's
a
nice
easy,
approachable
price?
We
said,
let's
just
try
charging
a
dollar
per
minute
per
mover
while
on-site
at
the
customer
home.
This
way,
they're
not
paying
for
travel
time
or
gas
or
truck
fees
or
insurance.
Just
a
dollar
per
minute
per
mover
while
on-site.
Sounded
simple
enough.
We're
like,
great.
No
one
batted
an
eyelash
at
it.
That
line
of
business
started
to
generate
tens
of
thousands
of
dollars
a
week,
a
month,
et
cetera.
We
scaled
it
up,
and
because
there
was
no
pushback
to
me,
Mark
the
CS
guy,
or
Mark
the
mover,
when
we
did
that,
we
said,
okay,
why
don't
we
try
to
increase
the
rate
one
more
time?
We
said
$2
a
minute
is
probably
too
high
per
person,
it'll
be
$120
an
hour.
Let's
go
halfway,
let's
go
$1.50.
Totally
like
FMA.
We
got
a
little
bit
of
pushback
but
we
were
able
to
sell
against
it
and
demonstrate
that
it
was
still
valuable.
It
was
at
that
moment
that
we
knew
that
we
had
reached
a
place
where
the
market
would
clear,
it
was
a
good
equilibrium
price,
and
because
consumers
were
happy
with
it
in
the
end
and
they
should
feel
like
they're
paying
for
a
premium
service.
We
knew
that
we
had
a
good
price
point.
That
was
the
first
evolution
of
our
pricing,
I
would
say
a
big
pivot
in
how
we
started
to
generate
revenue.
That
line
ended
up
growing
to
be
in
the
teens
of
percent
of
our
overall
revenue
on
a
consistent
basis.
As
we
got
up
into
like
400,000
a
month,
500,000
a
month
plus,
back
when
we
were
Second
Closet,
that
was
pretty
meaningful.
It
was
a
big
revenue
driver.
Pablo
23:20
That
was
how
you
increased
the
pricing
I
think
on
the
moving
side.
Then
how
did
you
price
for
the
actual
storage
side
of
it?
Mark
23:28
As
we
got
more
noticed
and
people
were
talking
about
us
at
their
dinner
table
and
amongst
the
friend
groups,
we
did
this
massive
TTC
campaign
that
garnered
like
300
million
impressions
purportedly.
That
thrust
us
into
some
spots
on
TV,
and
this,
that,
the
other.
The
mainstream
consumer
storage
customers
started
to
come
to
us,
but
they're
used
to
buying
space.
They're
like,
"How
the
hell
am
I
supposed
to
tell
you
how
many
items
I
have?
Then
you're
going
to
price
it
per
piece,
$6
for
this
box,
and
$29
for
that
sofa,
and
$18
for
my
mattress.
What
the
heck?
That's
way
too
complicated."
The Next Tier of Customer
Pablo
24:04
That
was
born
out
of
the
students,
which
kind
of
knew
like,
"Okay,
I'm
in
a
little
dorm,
I've
got
three
boxes."
Mark
24:09
Three
boxes,
a
mini
fridge,
and
a
mattress,
take
it
away.
That
was
approachable.
Then
we
said,
okay,
shit,
we
need
to
start
to
pivot
because
now,
we're
in
this
next
tier
of
customer
and
if
we're
going
to
price
discriminate,
we
should
cater
to
people
that
store
more
stuff,
they
might
store
longer,
they're
going
to
be
more
expensive,
or
more
valuable
clients
to
us,
and
obviously,
have
a
more
expensive
storage
bill.
We
said,
we're
going
to
have
an
item
plan,
which
is
classic,
pay
by
the
item
for
just
what
you
need,
and
we're
going
to
have
a
space
plan,
storing
a
lot,
this
is
your
solution.
Now,
we
have
this
extra
dimension
of
consultative
sales
talk.
We
introduced
space
plans,
5
x
5s
up
to
10
x
30s.
That
was
the
next
S-curve
that
we
rode
from
a
customer
acquisition
perspective,
and
we
were
able
to
start
to
pull
people
away
from
self-storage,
and
that
was
big.
Then
we
started
filling
up
warehouse
that
were
hundreds
of
thousands
of
square
feet
at
that
point.
Pablo
25:06
Are
these
customers
that
you
think,
before,
they
actually
could
have
been
buyers,
they
just
weren't
buyers
because
of
this
space
thing?
Mark
25:10
I
think
so.
Let's
zoom
out
and
think
about
if
this
was
a
"bigger
business."
You'd
have
a
marketing
leader,
you
have
an
operations
leader,
and
they
may
get
together
strategically
at
best,
once
a
quarter,
but
realistically,
probably
once
a
year,
to
actually
sit
down
and
be
like,
"What
the
hell's
going
on?"
You
hope
that
that
operations
leader
would've
pulled
insight
from
his
movers
or
her
movers,
and
you
hope
that
the
marketing
leader
would've
been
talking
to
CS
and
understanding
the
conversion
funnel
and
how
customers
dropped
off,
to
be
able
to
marry
the
two
things
together.
That
doesn't
happen,
unfortunately.
People
aren't
that
entrepreneurial
in
major
corporations
such
that,
unless
they're
incentivized
in
the
right
way,
or
they're
groomed
or
hired
and
conditioned
to
be
that
way,
certainly
in
a
storage
company,
probably
not
the
pedigree
that
you
would
expect,
not
for
anything
to
do
with
the
storage
company
or
the
brand,
but
they
often
outsource
marketing,
and
their
operations
as
you
come
to
us.
We
were
doing
it
differently,
and
we
had
the
benefit
of
having
the
tightest
feedback
loop
possible.
I
was
CS,
marketing,
and
operations.
Pablo
26:14
Even
still
at
that
time?
Mark
26:15
Even
still
at
that
time,
even
in
2018,
yeah,
up
until
mid-2018,
and
even
later,
I
would
still
hop
in
a
truck
every
now
and
then,
and
still
do
today
to
stay
close
to
the
business.
It's
a
fundamental
principle
that
I
believe,
and
I
can
touch
on
that
in
a
sec.
We
had
a
zero
feedback
loop
and
it's
what
I
strive
to
maintain
today.
That's
why
I
dumpster-dive
different
areas
of
the
business
to
pull
out
insights.
Every
time
I
zoom
into
the
company,
I'll
leave
with
a
month's
worth
of
insights
of
things
that
we
can
do
better
for
our
customers.
At
the
time,
it
was
just
very
rapid,
very
rapid
iterations.
To
go
from
$0
moving
fees
to
$1
to
$1.50.
It
allowed
us
to
resource
our
moves
in
a
better
way.
We
didn't
have
to
have
really
big
time
windows
to
optimize
our
routes.
We
could
have
really
tight
time
windows
because
we
made
enough
revenue
from
that.
That
insight
would
probably
have
taken
a
year
to
go
back
to
the
ops
leader
and
marketing
leader
of
a
bigger
company,
and
then
they
might
iterate
and
have
a
plan
for
the
next
year
hopefully,
or
maybe
not.
That,
I
think
is
a
very
special
thing
in
small
companies.
I
think
a
lot
of
the
time,
people
try
to
specialize
early
team
members
quickly.
Actually,
I'm
in
favor
of,
try
to
be
as
general
as
possible
for
as
long
as
possible
because
yeah,
sure
you
might
lose
the
production
on
the
Model
T
if
someone's
doing
an
end-to-end
as
a
custom
build,
but
that's
what
they
did
before
they
had
enough
volume
to
production
line
it,
and
then
they
started
to
do
okay,
you
do
the
chassis,
you
do
the
steering
column,
you
do
the
tires,
you
do
the
doors,
fine.
Holding
out
as
long
as
possible
will
let
you
cross-functionally
share
more
insights,
and
not
cross-function
in
terms
of
department
heads,
but
department
functions.
Then
you've
got
way
more
seasoned
leaders
that
know
more
about
the
business
so
that
you
can
grow
faster
when
you
need
to
start
specializing.
Pablo
27:56
It's
one
of
the
hardest
things
I
think
to
get
right,
which
is
this
balance
between
you
want
to
be
adaptable,
but
you
also
want
to
be
focused.
If
you're
not
focused,
you
don't
have
enough
resources,
you're
just
not
going
to
do
anything
well
enough
that
it
matters,
but
if
you
don't
stay
adaptable,
you
might
miss,
you're
kind
of
ramping
up
this
hill
and
there
might
be
an
even
bigger
hill
over
there
if
only
you
would've
seen
it.
I
think
this
thing
you're
talking
about,
which
is
these
tight
feedback
loops,
which
is
staying
really
close
to
the
customer,
small
data,
right?
Seeing
these
little
things
helps
you
navigate
that,
right?
You've
got
the
whole
business
on,
let's
say,
the
original
ricing
model,
right?
You've
got
the
whole
business
on
free
delivery,
free
delivery
matters.
This
is
just
how
we
do
it,
but
because
you're
also
kind
of
in
the
business,
right?
You're
doing
all
these
little
pieces
of
it,
you're
seeing
all
the
little
insights,
until
you
realize,
wait
a
second,
what
if,
right?
Wait
a
second,
there's
people
that
just
can't
resonate
with
this
pricing
model.
What
if
we
tried
this
space
plan
thing?
That's
the
adaptability
piece.
Going
back
and
forth
between
those
two,
I
think
is
really
hard,
as
you
say,
if
you
almost
scale
the
team
too
fast,
right?
If
you
professionalize
and
polish
everything
too
fast,
then
you're
going
to
the
hierarchy
that
a
big
company
runs
at,
and
you're
missing
out
on
the
adaptability
that
you
need.
Mark
29:09
Look,
I
love
to
cook.
I'm
going
to
use
a
food
analogy.
I
can
cook
a
mean
steak,
a
killer
vegetable
side,
and
some
awesome
potato
bravas,
and
have
a
good
meal.
I
don't
need
to
specialize
in
just
searing
and
cooking
steak,
and
I
don't
need
another
specialist
for
the
potatoes.
I
don't
need
another
specialist
for
the
vegetables.
It's
good
enough
to
have
one
person
put
that
whole
meal
together
and
see
that
project
through
end-to-end
and
have
an
enjoyable
meal
for
you
and
a
buddy
or
friend.
You
don't
need
a
Michelin
star-grade
line
cook
set
up
to
have
a
good
outcome.
Early
days,
80/20
rule
needs
to
apply.
You
don't
have
the
resources
to
seek
perfection.
I
think
that's
a
problem
with
sometimes
early
founders
think
that,
"Hey,
this
is
my
personal
brand,
everything
needs
to
be
perfect
because
I'm
being
graded
against
these
other
companies."
If
you
wake
up
and
smell
the
coffee,
these
other
companies,
they
don't
always
get
it
right
either.
In
fact,
you're
probably
going
to
do
a
much
better
job
just
because
you
care.
I
just
remember
all
the
things
that
we
used
to
do
in
the
early
days,
whether
it
was,
we
had
a
negative
Google
review,
we'd
call
the
person
right
away
and
say,
"Hey,
we're
going
to
make
this
right,
we're
going
to
give
your
credit
on
your
next
month
storage,
we're
going
to
do
this
that
the
other."
They're
like,
"Oh
my
God.
I
was
just
writing
this
to
vent,
but
the
fact
that
you
took
the
time
to
call
me
and
respond
and
do
something
about
it
and
change
a
policy
or
do
some
training,
that
means
so
much
to
me.
In
fact,
I'm
going
to
change
my
review
to
a
five-star."
We
have
like
7,000
five-star
reviews
on
Google
now,
and
we
continue
that
practice
even
in
logistics,
which
is
the
hardest
thing
to
maintain
positive
reviews
with.
It's
important
to
understand
80/20
rule
is
very
real
in
the
early
days.
In
fact,
it's
probably
more
aggressive
and
that
it
doesn't
need
to
be
perfect.
Good
is
probably
good
enough
in
that
regard.
A Big Pivot
Pablo
30:51
At
this
point,
it
sounds
like
everything's
going
pretty
well.
You've
expanded
your
market
step
by
step.
You've
made
these
pivots,
the
micro
pivots,
really,
these
tweaks,
really,
these
optimization
tweaks
along
the
way
to
change
your
pricing,
to
expand
your
market,
and
so
on,
and
demand
seems
to
be
flourishing.
I'm
curious,
how
do
you
go
from
there
to
such
a
big
pivot
or
rebrand?
Mark
31:15
Yeah,
it's
a
really
good
question.
Things
were
generally
going
well.
We
had
raised
another
$2
million
seed
round
extension,
and
we
expanded
to
Vancouver.
We
actually
achieved
cash
flow
positivity,
and
then
we
started
to
notice
that
our
power
users
were
using
us
an
insane
amount.
We
had
people
that
were
using
us
consistently,
but
going
to
downtown
addresses
or
commercial
addresses,
and
we're
like,
what
the
hell
is
going
on?
We
picked
up
the
phone
and
called
them,
and
these
were
actually
businesses,
the
people
that
use
us
for
their
personal
life
that
had
a
really
great
experience
and
said,
"Hey,
we
want
to
use
you
for
our
company."
Whether
it
was
Chanel,
WeWork,
or
BMW,
the
decision
makers
at
those
businesses
used
us
on
a
personal
capacity
and
said,
"Hey,
I
had
such
a
great
experience,
I
want
to
use
you
for
my
business.
Can
I
do
that?"
They
started
to
use
the
service
and
hack
it
to
solve
this
business
logistics
problem.
What
turned
us
on
to
doing
more
of
that
or
exploring
it
more
intellectually
was,
well,
if
a
consumer
stores
and
picks
up
their
stuff
once
every
12
months
or
18
months,
but
these
people
are
doing
it
frequent,
like
many
times
a
week
or
many
times
a
month.
Pablo
32:20
Take
BMW
or
take
any
of
these
examples.
What
exactly
were
they
doing?
Mark
32:25
We
work
with
storing
their
excess
furniture
because
Instagram
didn't
want
20
desks
in
this
little
room.
They
wanted
five
and
they
wanted
some
sofas,
but
then
Pinterest
wanted
at
this
other
location,
two
more
desks
and
two
chairs,
or
this
chair
was
broken,
so
take
it
away
and
dispose
of
it
and
put
this
one
in.
They
were
using
us
to
manage
physical
stuff,
and
it
was
all
digital.
They
had
photos
of
their
stuff,
QR
codes
to
everything.
You
could
literally
just
go
online
at
3:00
AM
and
click
everything
you
wanted
to
have
happen,
and
then
it
could
happen
as
early
as
the
next
day.
For
them,
it
was
magic.
It
was
super
simple.
That
simplicity
is
something
we've
carried
forward
to
how
we
kind
of
operate
today
for
our
customers.
For
instance,
just
to
go
down
a
rabbit
hole
for
a
sec,
we
allow
you
to
schedule
your
time
slot
in
as
far
in
advance
as
two
months.
If
you
are
doing
a
little
reno,
but
you
ordered
some
stuff
that
we're
delivering,
you
can
book
1:00
PM
to
4:00
PM
on
Saturday,
November
13th,
2023
if
you
wanted.
Then
on
the
day
before,
we're
going
to
send
you
a
real-time
truck
tracking
link
with
a
prediction
down
to
the
minute
of
when
we'll
arrive.
You
now
don't
have
to
be
shackled
to
your
house
for
this
delivery
slot.
The
industry
today
just
tells
you
the
day
before,
whether
you're
an
AM
or
a
PM
delivery,
and
it's
like
a
six-hour
window.
Pablo
33:36
Yeah,
by
the
way,
how
are
you
doing
that?
Actually,
we
just
bought
a
home
and
so
we
bought
a
bunch
of
couches
and
it's
like,
delivery,
it's
tomorrow
seven
to
seven
and
we'll
give
you
a
four-hour
window
hours
before.
I'm
like,
are
you
serious?
Tech-Enabled Logistics Company
Mark
33:48
Yeah,
it's
terrible.
In
short
and
honestly,
Pablo,
and
I
need
to
get
that
as
a
testimonial
later,
but
we
use
technology.
We
do
our
own
route
algorithm
and
machine
learning
and
big
data
evaluation
internally.
We
make
predictions
because
you
and
me
as
a
team
might
deliver
faster
or
slower
than
the
next
team,
and
that
impacts
the
chain
of
events
that
happen
throughout
the
day.
Let's
say
we
assume
an
appointment's
going
to
take
9
minutes,
but
it
takes
15,
well,
that
has
a
downstream
impact
on
all
the
other
appointments
for
the
day,
but
you
don't
want
to
keep
updating
the
customer
on
that
happening
at
every
single
appointment.
What
if
you're
doing
20
stops
and
stops
1
through
19
go
terribly,
and
stop
20
is
like,
"Oh,
sorry
dude,
you're
being
rescheduled
to
tomorrow."
That's
not
a
good
experience.
We
use
ML
and
data
to
plan
in
advance
and
assign
drivers
in
an
intelligent
way.
When
we
say
we're
a
tech-enabled
logistics
company,
it's
not
because
we're
using
iPhones
to
run
our
driver's
app
and
we
have
everything
digitized,
that's
very
table
stakes.
There's
more
to
it
to
manage.
Now
that
we've
implemented
an
EV
fleet,
there's
even
more
variables
to
manage
around
battery
range
and
weather
and
traffic
patterns,
et
cetera.
Are
you
on
a
highway
or
a
city
street?
All
this
impacts
battery
range.
Again,
another
pivot
in
our
software
is
now
managing
that
new
reality
and
adapting
to
the
change.
I
think
that's
probably
just
been
a
very
consistent
theme
over
this
conversation
and
over
our
business
is
that
you
have
to
be
able
to
adapt
to
change
quickly
driven
by
the
market.
It's
great
that
we
move
from
$0
moving
fees
to
$90
an
hour
moving
fees,
helped
us
grow
and
scale
a
logistics
division.
It's
great
that
we
really
execute
every
single
time
because
then,
these
consumers
use
it
for
their
business.
Then
now,
we
started
to
store,
fulfill,
ship,
and
deliver
product
at
scale
for
big
brands,
whether
it's
an
IKEA,
or
a
Rove
Concepts,
or
a
Lululemon.
These
are
now
the
businesses
that
we
are
fortunate
to
be
able
to
handle
their
logistics
in
some
capacity.
We
take
that
very
seriously
because
we
were
a
consumer-facing
business
before.
We
still
view
ourselves
as
one
today.
We
just
happen
to
do
it
in
partnership
with
these
fantastic
businesses.
That
culture
has
always
stayed
the
same.
The Details Matter
Pablo
35:54
The
details
matter,
right?
Even
in
your
case
of
how
you're
predicting,
it's
because
you're
going
down
to
the
team-level
unit
and
all
these
other
things.
I
have
to
share
the
story.
<laugh>
I
think
a
lot
of
big
brands
don't
actually
get
that,
I
forget
who
said
this
to
me,
but
the
experience
doesn't
until
the
item
gets
into
your
door,
right?
They
feel
like
the
experience
ends.
I
go
to
the
store,
I
buy
a
couch,
they
treat
me
well,
shipping
date's
set
up,
and
okay,
sale
done,
but
I
don't
have
my
couch
yet.
My
experience
is
not
done
yet.
I
had
a
couch
delivered,
<laugh>
so
it
was
one
of
these,
right?
Oh,
it'll
be
tomorrow
between
seven
and
seven,
right?
7:00
AM
7:00
PM,
okay
cool.
It's
like
6:30
PM,
they're
not
there.
I'm
like,
what's
going
on?
I
call
them,
like,
"Oh,
sorry,
things
got
delayed."
They
didn't
call
me,
"Things
are
delayed.
We're
going
to
be
there
at
9:00
PM.
Is
that
still
fine?"
"Fine,
okay,
let's
do
9:00
PM."
9:00
PM
rolls
around,
they're
not
there.
I
ended
up
getting
my
couch
at
11:30
at
night
and
it
was
like,
if
you
don't
take
the
11:30,
it's
going
to
be
Tuesday.
It
all
reflects
bad,
I
don't
know
who
the
delivery
company
is.
It
just
reflects
bad
on
the
brand
as
far
as
I'm
concerned.
I
don't
want
to
buy
from
them
again
because
they
just
didn't
serve
me
as
a
customer
properly.
Mark
37:01
It's
so
true.
A
very
powerful
example
of
how
we've
tried
to
be
very
boutique
but
at
scale
is
whenever
we're
doing
reverse
logistics
for
one
of
our
box
mattress
companies,
and
we
were
still
doing
the
deliveries
in
those
days,
we'd
always
ask
the
customer
like,
"Why
are
you
returning
your
mattress?
What
did
you
not
like
about
it?
Why
are
you
returning
this
piece
of
furniture?
What
did
you
not
like?
What
could
we
have
done
differently
as
a
team?"
We
would
feed
that
info
back
to
our
customer,
and
it
was
incredibly
valuable
to
them
because,
as
you
say,
they're
selling
digitally,
how
do
we
be
their
eyes
and
ears
on
the
ground
and
feedback
info
and
data
that
is
valuable
for
them
to
do
product
development
or
market
better
or
target
the
right
customer.
I
think
it's
just
about
being
extremely
customer-obsessed
and
driven
to
provide
value,
and
caring
enough
to
sweat
the
small
stuff,
and
doing
that
in
the
way
that
exemplifies
the
most
amount
of
ownership
possible.
Those
coincidentally
are
three
of
our
six
values.
Customer-obsessed,
sweat
the
small
stuff,
and
to
act
like
an
owner.
I
was
someone
that
would
dismiss
the
need
for
values
and
vision
back
in
the
day.
It's
like,
you
come
to
work,
you
know
what
you're
doing.
If
you're
a
CS,
provide
incredible
service,
but
you
need
to
clearly
articulate
values
to
your
people
so
that
they
know
how
to
react
in
specific
moments
and
that
they
can
self-police
each
other
when
they're
not
acting
in
the
right
way.
An
example
of
this
today
that
makes
me
proud,
and
really
understand
that
it's
working
is,
when
we're
making
big
decisions
that
impact
our
merchant
or
the
shopper,
it's
like,
is
this
the
most
customer-obsessed
way
we
can
do
it?
Are
we
over-indexing
on
acting
like
an
owner
and
seeking
cost
reduction,
and
we're
not
balancing
these
other
realities
that
we
want
to
be
as
a
business?
For
our
team
to
start
having
an
intellectual
debate
without
my
presence,
around
our
values
and
how
we
want
to
show
up
as
a
company,
that's
when
you
know
you've
hit
some
product
market
fit
with
the
talent
and
the
people,
and
in
many
ways,
GoBolt
is
a
product
to
an
employee
base
and
a
team
base.
That,
to
me,
is
like,
you
are
buying
into
what
we're
selling,
and
you're
able
to
then
use
it
to
manage
decision-making.
Another
reality
that
I
came
to
probably
a
bit
late
to
the
party
on
was
the
need
for
those
things
and
how
it
can
help
drive
the
seeking
out
of
product
market
fit
at
various
levels
and
continue
our
acceleration
as
a
business.
Pablo
39:17
I
don't
know
if
you
listen
to
a
lot
of
podcasts,
but
David
Senra
talks
about
this,
which
is
like,
the
best
companies
are
really
the
founder
multiplied
by
1,000
or
10,000.
I
think
culture
is
the
way
you
do
that.
It
really
becomes
the
values
that
obviously
you
believe
in,
but
how
do
you
put
that
in
a
way
and
instill
that
so
that
everybody's
acting,
not
obviously
exactly
like
you,
but
at
least
at
a
high
level,
is
aligned?
I
think
that's
incredibly
important.
Going
back
to
the
main
storylines,
sorry,
took
us
off
on
a
tangent
there.
BMW
and
big
companies
are
kind
of
hacking
it.
WeWork,
you
mentioned,
was
hacking
it.
Take
us
back
there.
You
started
to
see
this
as
interesting.
Where'd
you
go
from
there?
Mark
39:57
Yeah,
I
found
it
interesting
since
I
was
also
our
bookkeeper.
I
was
like,
"Oh,
these
are
like
really
good
accounts."
I
was
like,
we
need
to
do
more
of
this.
We
assembled
a
sales
team
of
one
person
and
we
said,
let's
go
knock
on
doors,
and
let's
go
drum
up
some
last-mile
logistics
business,
because
we
had
trucks,
we
had
warehouses,
we
had
movers
that
were
capable
and
drove
great
experiences.
Let's
do
more
of
that.
This
is
like
2019,
we
started
to
build
software
specifically
for
fulfillment.
We
got
our
first
e-commerce
pick-and-pack
business
that
year.
We
started
doing
delivery
and
reverse
logistics
for
local
furniture
companies
and
brands.
Then,
our
biggest
development
was
when
we
started
to
integrate
with
IKEA.
This
is
advance
of
us
having
a
formal
MSA
at
the
time.
This
was
December
of
2019,
and
we
finished
the
integration
end
of
January
2020,
and
this
thing
called
COVID
hit.
When
everyone
was
at
home,
they
started
buying
a
lot
of
stuff,
and
they
wanted
their
backgrounds
to
look
good,
and
have
a
painting
like
yours,
and
do
all
these
little
things
to
their
place
to
make
it
more
homey.
IKEA's
volume
skyrocketed
and
they
need
more
logistical
support.
We
were
able
in
the
right
moment
to
say,
okay
team,
we're
now
going
to
help
deliver
commerce
in
the
moment
where
the
world
needs
it
most.
We're
going
to
help
people
enjoy
their
space
that
they're
confined
to
for
obviously
health
reasons.
We
took
our
entire
Toronto
fleet
and
turned
it
into
a
last-mile
delivery
team
that
was
one
of
the
best-performing
teams
in
the
country.
It
was
a
really
fast
pivot,
and
as
things
gradually
opened
up,
and
people
needed
more
logistical
support,
we
were
able
to
capitalize
on
that
and
grow,
and
support
all
these
businesses
in
a
moment
of
need.
We
were
also
able
to
keep
our
team
fully
employed
and
actually
grow
that
team
over
that
period.
We
had
an
aerospace
QA
engineer
delivering
for
us,
and
crazy
stuff.
We
were
very
lucky
because
some
of
those
people,
we
pulled
into
management,
and
as
we
grew,
they've
grown
with
us
as
well.
That
was
late
2019,
I
would
say
H1
and
H2
of
2020,
super
pivotal
for
the
business.
We're
where
we
are
today
because
of
the
events
that
happened
then.
They
were
just
listening
and
reacting
to
small
things
that
we
pulled
from
the
day-to-day.
I
was
in
an
IKEA
meeting,
we
were
talking
about
reverse
logistics
and
helping
with
their
buyback
program,
which
still
hasn't
launched
in
Canada
yet.
Then
we
talked
about
our
sustainability
ambitions,
and
that
really
kind
of
piqued
everyone's
interest
because
we
were
probably
the
only
company
in
the
country
that
said
we
want
to
be
fully
electric
one
day.
It
just
so
happened
that
IKEA
also
had
internal
goals
to
do
that,
which
are
now
super
public.
That
was
able
to
start
a
relationship
that's
led
to
further
growth
and
an
investment
from
Inca,
the
parent
company.
Pablo
42:41
What
do
you
do
with
Second
Closet
during
this
time?
Mark
42:44
Second
Closet,
I
mean
the
nice
thing
with
storage
is
it
just
kind
of
keeps
tolling.
We
just
had
all
this
high
gross
margin
storage
revenue
in
our
warehouses
that
let
us
finance
all
our
software
development
and
builds
for
this
new
B2B
business.
They
were
all
still
in
our
warehouse,
bearing
in
mind
that
when
you
are
using
your
last-mile
fleet,
it's
not
touching
the
warehouse
largely,
right?
It's
just
they're
dormant
and
collecting
revenue,
which
is
the
great
thing
about
the
business
model,
but
also
the
thing
that
we,
as
founders,
weren't
super
excited
about
anymore,
it's
just
literally
collecting
dust.
If
our
success
is
going
to
be
measured
by
how
much
dust
is
on
top
of
a
pallet,
that's
a
really
shitty
measurement
of
success.
Let's
go
do
something
that's
way
better
from
a
consumer
experience
perspective,
and
let's
go
create
cool
experiences
for
brands
that
sell
online.
Pablo
43:31
What
percent
of
your
revenue
now
is
the
last-mile
delivery
GoBolt
piece?
Mark
43:36
Our
business
breaks
down
almost
perfectly.
Roughly
half
of
it
is
warehousing
and
everything
to
do
with
our
fulfillment
business,
and
the
other
half
is
our
last-mile
business
truck
and
parcel.
It's
almost
half-half
between
warehousing
and
transportation.
Pablo
43:52
The
warehouse
is
not
fueling
self-storage,
it's
fueling
the
delivery,
the
commerce
piece.
Mark
43:57
Yeah,
exactly.
We'll
store
hundreds
to
thousands
of
pallets
for
brands
that
store
things
like
water
bottles
or
couches
or
work.
Yeah,
it's
a
totally
diverse
storage
base
now.
One Step at a Time
Pablo
44:13
It's
funny
how
if
you
try
to
predict
looking
forward
from
2017
or
whatever
year
it
was,
storing
things
for
the
summer,
to
becoming
a
fully
integrated
third-party
logistics
provider
for
some
of
the
biggest
brands
in
the
world,
you
could
never
predict
it,
but
looking
backwards,
it
all
fits,
right?
It
all
makes
sense.
It
was
one
step
at
a
time.
Mark
44:34
Yeah,
we
could
tell
this
story
in
a
different
way
and
make
it
seem
like
it
was
all
planned,
and
purpose-driven,
and
sound
super
Harvard
MBA,
McKinsey-esque
but
the
reality
is
we
just
made
the
best
decision
possible
in
that
moment
in
time.
We
are
so
lucky
that
the
big
decisions
ended
up
working
out
for
us.
Tons
of
small
decisions
that
went
to
shit,
but
the
big
ones
worked
because
we
were
trying
to
be
thoughtful.
Looking
back,
they
all
kind
of
stitched
together
nicely.
Now,
what
I
challenge
myself
to
do
is
look
forward
to
the
future,
5
years
out,
10
years
out,
what
does
the
world
look
like?
We're
too
big
now
as
a
business
and
we
have
too
many
people
that
are
super
smart,
capable,
ambitious,
to
not
have
a
rudder
and
not
have
a
North
Star.
Pablo
45:21
How
big
are
you
now?
Mark
45:22
We're
over
a
thousand
people.
I
think
we
were
six
people
in
2017.
It's
grown
a
lot,
and
everyone
deserves
to
know
what
we're
here
to
do
and
what
they're
here
to
help
us
do,
right?
That's
the
product
that
GoBolt
offers
our
team,
and
people
join
us
because
they
want
to
help
make
logistics
way
more
sustainable
than
it
is
today.
That
is
a
core
reason
why
some
people
choose
to
join
GoBolt.
Other
people
join
because
they're
tired
of
the
way
these
big
old
logistics
companies
operate,
and
they
like
that
we're
a
Nuvo
tech-enabled
business,
and
they
can
have
an
impact
and
fingerprints
all
over
our
growth.
Now,
I
think
more
about
what
we
will
be
when
we
grow
up
than
ever
before.
It's
important
because
that's
about
understanding
how
do
we
fit
into
the
market
in
five
years'
time,
because
what
we've
built
so
far
has
legs
to
run
that
journey
and
we
might
need
to
reinvent
ourselves
a
couple
more
times
in
five
years
to
really
have
good
staying
power.
Pablo
46:19
That's
great.
Let's
stop
it
there.
Let
me
just
finish
off
with
the
two
questions
that
we
always
finish
off
with.
The
first
one
is
if
you
could
go
back,
having
learned
everything
that
you've
learned
over
the
last
six
years
or
so,
if
you
could
go
back
to
Mark
starting
off
Second
Closet
with
one
piece
of
advice.
What
might
that
be?
One Final Piece of Advice
Mark
46:43
That
is
a
great
question.
It's
so
tough
because
the
butterfly
effect
is
real,
and
if
you
change
one
thing
back
then,
does
it
maybe
change
the
trajectory
of
where
you're
going?
The
one
piece
of
advice
would
need
to
have
accelerated
where
we
ultimately
got
to.
I
would
say
ironically,
I
would
say,
where
a
hundred
percent
of
our
time
then
was
one
foot
in
front
of
the
other,
I
would
probably
want
to
have
dedicated
at
least
10%
to
thinking
a
bit
further
in
the
future
because
that
would've
probably
inevitably
moved
us
in
the
right
direction
sooner.
The
other
thing
I
would
say
is
that
hire
help
faster
because
to
do
everything
yourself
only
works
for
so
long.
Probably
hiring
a
generalist
sooner
would've
been
better
because,
I
was
like,
"I
have
to
choose
between
finance
and
CS
and
sales.
That's
not
great."
If
I
had
hired
another
generalist
or
a
young
business
grad
who
was
just
looking
to
learn,
you
could
probably
have
resourced
the
team
equally
across
divisions
and
done
better.
I
would
say,
it'd
be,
dedicate
some
more
time
to
think
about
the
future
and
bring
on
more
generalists
sooner.
Pablo
47:53
I
think
this
is
really
important,
so
I'll
deep
dive
on
this
one.
What's
the
profile
of
the
right
generalist?
You're
a
pre-seed
or
seed-stage
company.
Are
we
talking
a
year
out
of
school,
five
years
out
of
school,
20
years,
gray
hair?
What's
the
perfect
profile?
Mark
48:05
I
don't
think
it
matters.
I
was
in
school
when
we
came
up
with
Second
Closet.
It
doesn't
matter.
I
think
it's
more
so
about
are
they
curious
and
are
they
going
to
run
through
a
wall
for
you?
That
is
it,
because
curiosity
will
lead
you
to
come
up
with
random
crazy
shit
that
you
need
to
then
run
through
a
wall
and
execute
on.
You
need
both
those
things
to
be
true.
Someone
that
will
run
through
walls
for
you
time
after
time
needs
to
be
told
which
walls
to
run
through.
Someone
that's
just
curious
is
probably
just
theorizing
what
needs
to
happen.
You
need
someone
that
will
do
both.
That
could
be
a
17-year-old
or
an
18-year-old,
that
could
be
a
22-year-old,
that
could
be
a
50-year-old.
Pablo
48:38
That
makes
sense.
Then
the
last
question,
when
was
the
first
time
that
you
felt
like
you
had
true
product
market
fit?
Mark
48:48
It
was
when
we
started
to
look
at,
we
used
to
have
paper
manifest
before
we
had
a
digital
driver
app.
In
our
very
first
year,
in
the
early
part
of
the
year,
we
filed
our
paper
manifests
chronologically.
A
small
folder
would
be
a
full
month's
worth
of
manifest.
Then
over
time,
a
fat
folder
would
be
a
week,
and
then
a
fat
folder
would
be
only
a
day.
Then
one
time
we
needed
multiple
folders
for
a
single
day.
Then
that's
when
I
was
like,
holy
shit,
you
can
see
a
visual
progression
and
this
filing
cabinet
was
five
drawers
deep
and
super
wide.
This
is
it.
If
we
charted
this
out,
the
growth
is
literally
exponential.
That
super
simple
stupid
reality
made
me
feel
like
the
momentum
is
clearly
here.
Obviously,
I
probably
could
have
just
looked
at
a
data
table
and
figured
out
the
same
thing,
but
it's
different.
It's
different
when
you're
signing
all
those
manifests
and
you're
processing
them
physically.
It's
cool.