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Episode 36December 4, 2023
I Was Supposed to Be a Millionaire at 25… Instead, I Went Bankrupt.
About this episode
This is the story of the emotional rollercoaster that was my last startup, Gymtrack. Hope you find it helpful as you navigate your own startup journey.
You can read the article here as well: https://entrepreneurshandbook.co/i-was-supposed-to-be-a-millionaire-at-25-instead-i-went-bankrupt-ef525370e353
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Follow the showTranscript
The full conversation.
Pablo
0:00
So
I
wrote
this
article
on
the
story
of
GymTrack,
my
last
startup
and
a
lot
of
founders
wrote
back
to
me
saying
that
this
story
really
resonated
with
them
so
I
decided
to
record
it
and
publish
it
on
the
podcast.
Here
it
is.
I
hope
you
like
it.So
you
know
what
they
say,
right?
Startups
are
supposed
to
be
about
changing
the
world.
They're
supposed
to
be
about
making
an
impact.
Steve
Jobs
was
like,
I
wanna
make
a
dent
in
the
universe.
That's
what
he
said.
But
I'm
22
and
I
have
one
goal
to
make
serious
money.
That's
it.
I
don't
care
what
I'm
gonna
build.
I
don't
care
what
the
startup's
gonna
do
as
long
as
I'm
hyper
successful.
And
that's
my
mindset.
In
2014,
when
my
co-founder
Lee
Silverstone
and
I
s
tarted
a
company
called
Gym
T
rack,
which
had
the
goal
of
letting
members
automatically
track
t
he
w
orkouts,
it
was
Peloton
for
the
gym.
And
we
had
a
,
a
tagline
back
then,
it's
the
future
of
fitness.
It's
cheesy.
I
mean,
it's
seriously
cheesy,
but
it
w
orks.
In
fact,
we
get
off
the
ground
running
pretty
quickly.
And
we
were,
like
I
said,
22
at
the
time
we
had
just
graduated,
we
had
started
a
different
business
called
My
T
utor
Tutoring
Company,
and
that
was
kind
of
running
off
on
the
side.
So
we
have
this
idea
for
Gym
Track
.
One
of
the
big
things
that
happens
really
early
on
is
that
we,
my
co-founder
goes
to
a
conference
called
Startup
Fest
in
Montreal.
It's
funny
because
when
I
think
back
at
that
time,
we
had
so
much
that
we
were
already
doing,
we
already
had
a
few
people
helping
us
work
on
this.
And
the
accelerator
where
we
were
working,
the
incubator
had
kind
of
this,
this
shuttle
bus
that
was
driving
people
from
Ottawa
where
we
were
to
Montreal
two
hours
away.
And
they
were
kind
of
really
pushing
us,
Hey,
you
should
really
go
to
this
event.
You
should
really
go
to
this
event.
And
my
co-founder,
he
is
getting
really
antsy.
He's
more
of
an
extrovert
type.
And
so
he
was
like,
maybe
I
should
go.
And
I'm
like,
dude,
like
we
have
so
much
stuff
going.
What
are
you
gonna
,
what's
Startupfest
Pablo
1:45
gonna
happen
to
this
conference?
Why
would
you
waste
time?
Anyways,
he
ultimately
decides
that
he's
gonna
go.
So
he
goes
to
this
conference,
I
get
a
call
about
a
day
later
and
he
says,
listen
man,
I
just
met
this
guy
,
uh,
Dave
McClure.
I'm
like,
who's
Dave
McClure?
And
he's
like,
dude,
this
guy's
a
big
deal.
Anyways,
I
look
him
up
and
he
was,
he's
the
founder
at
that
time,
the
CEO
of
500
startups,
which
is
kind
of
like
sec
,
uh,
there's
Y
Combinator
and
then
there's
500
startups,
at
least
there
was
back
then
in
2014.
And
he's
like,
look,
I
,
I
met
Dave
McClure
at
this
conference.
I
was
introduced
to
him.
He
wants
to
go
for
drinks
tomorrow,
so
I'm
gonna
do
that.
I'm
like,
go
ahead.
And
so,
so
he
does
that
the
next
day,
and
then
I
get
another
call
and
he
says,
listen,
Dave
McClure
wants
us
to
join
his
accelerator
in
sf.
I'm
like,
okay,
cool.
When
does
it
start?
He's
like,
this
is
Saturday.
And
he's
like,
it
starts
on
Monday.
So
we
get
in,
we
literally
get
handpicked
by
Dave
McClure.
Way,
way
after
the,
all
the
applications
had
gone
through,
all
the
interviews
had
gone
through
Dave
McClure
meets,
Lee
likes
his
startup
,
likes
the
future
of
Fitness
and
decides
you
guys
are
in,
and
I
think
we
were
batch
10
at
the
time.
So
we
get
to
500
startups,
and
at
the
time
we
had
already
raised
half
a
million
dollars
from
Angels,
which
today
doesn't
sound
like
a
big
amount,
but
I
swear
it
was
back
then.
And
importantly,
it
was
more
than
any
other
startup
had
raised.
So
we
come
in
there
handpicked
from
Dave
McClure
raised
more
than
every
other
startup
that's
in
this
accelerator
that's
brought
startups
from
across
the
globe.
As
far
as
I'm
concerned,
we
are
right
on
track.
I
swear
to
God,
I
feel
like
I'm
gonna
be
the
next
Steve
Jobs,
the
next
Mark
Zuckerberg.
And
so
we
go
through
the
accelerator
and,
you
know,
near
Demo
day,
right
after
demo
day,
we
start
fundraising
as
many
startups
do.
We
go
pretty
far
along
with
,
uh,
a
,
a
VC
firm
and
sign
a
term
sheet.
And
ultimately
they
start
making
it
through
due
diligence.
And
as
that
happens,
we
get
a
Dave McClure's Accelerator
Pablo
3:29
call
from
a
company
that
I'm
not
gonna
name
because
I'm
,
because
it's
still,
believe
it
or
not,
under
NDA
,
but
let's
call
them
Equip
Fit
.
And
they
are
one
of
the
largest,
they're
a
European
gym
equipment
manufacturer,
one
of
the
largest.
And
they,
they
tell
us,
look,
look,
we
love
what
you're
doing.
We
love
your
vision,
we
wanna
lead
your
seed
round.
But
as
I
said,
at
that
point,
we'd
already
signed
a
term
sheet
with
a
bc
we
would
really
follow
along
and
we
didn't
wanna
,
you
know,
risk
that
falling
apart
by
starting
a
separate
process.
So
we
ultimately
tell
'em,
look
,
sorry,
we
,
we
can't
do
it.
And
they
kind
of
go
away.
We
close
our,
our
seed
round.
So
a
year
after,
literally
12
months
after
incorporating
this
company,
we
close
a
$2.5
million
seed
round,
which
again,
today
it's
peanuts
back
then
was
a
lot
bigger,
especially
for
2
20,
2
23
year
olds
out
of
Ottawa.
So
we,
we
tell
Equip
we
can't
take
their
money,
but
they
literally
won't
take
no
for
an
answer.
The
CEO
of
Equip
Fit
sends
his
head
of
m
and
a
from
Europe
across
the
the
globe
to
Ottawa.
He
takes
us
out
for
dinner
and
he
tries
to
convince
us
to
take
their
money.
And
he
literally
says,
I
can
do
two
things.
The
CEO's
already
signed
off
for
me
to
do
one
of
two
things.
If
you
want,
we'll
sign
off
on
the
exact
same
term
sheet
that
the
VC
signed
onto
and
we'll
just
replace
them
.
Or
what
I'll
do
is
what
we've
already,
well
,
what's
already
been
okayed
is
$250,000
worth
of
secondary
from
each
of
you.
So
we'll
buy
$250,000
worth
of
your
personal
shares.
And
as
soon
as
we
sign
,
you
know,
we
close
this,
this
investment,
you
will
each
have
One of Two Things
Pablo
4:53
a
quarter
million
dollars
in
your
bank
account.
And
you
gotta
understand,
like
a
,
a
minute
ago,
I'm
a
broke
student,
like
<laugh>
,
literally
I'm
a
broke
student
and
now
I'm
offered
$250,000
cash
effectively,
no
questions
asked.
And
I
swear
in
the
second
that
he
says
it
,
Lee
and
I
look
at
each
other
and
right
away
we're
like,
no,
we
<laugh>.
We're
23
year
olds,
we
don't
know
how
to
spell
hardware.
We
get
offered,
what
if
you
think
about
is
maybe
nothing
in
the
world
of
startups,
but
it's
more
than
what,
99%
of
50
year
olds
make
$250,000
for
shares
of
an
idea.
And
without
thought,
we
say
no.
And
the
reason's
simple,
as
far
as
I'm
concerned,
I'm
the
next
Steve
Jobs,
I'm
the
next
Mark
Zuckerberg.
They
would
never
sell
their
their
shares
this
early,
so
why
would
I?
So
anyways,
that
kind
of
goes
away.
We
close
the,
the
seed
round
two
and
a
half
million
dollars
a
year
after
incorporating,
we're
truly
on
top
of
the
world
and
Equip
Fit
calls
us
back
and
he
says,
look,
I
know
we
couldn't
get,
get
aligned
on,
on
the
seed
round.
We
still
wanna
do
something
here.
Let
us
lead
your
series
a
a
month
after
we
close
our
seed
round,
they
tell
us
they
want
to
lead
our
series
A,
as
far
as
I'm
concerned,
we
are
right
on
track.
And
this
time
they
invite
us
to
fly
across
the
world
to
their
offices
in
Europe.
And
so
we
do,
we
fly
there,
Lee
and
I,
I
remember
the
night
before,
I
mean
the
night
before,
we,
we
thought
so
much
about
how
are
we
gonna
handle
this
meeting?
How
are
we
gonna
handle
this,
these
negotiations?
What
are
we
gonna
ask
for?
And
we
had
just
raised,
mind
you,
at
$6.65
million
post
money
,
that
was,
that
was
our
valuation.
And
we
thought
out
and
we
said,
look,
we
have
all
this
money
in
the
bank.
When
we
raise
a
series
A
in
18
months,
we
should
be
worth
at
least
25
million.
And
so,
you
know
what,
if
they
want
to
lead
our
series
A
right
now,
great,
but
it's
gonna
be
at
25
million.
That
was
gonna
be
our
ask.
It
was,
it
was
super
high
and
it
was
,
uh,
equally
absurd.
But
that's
the
way
we
thought
about
it.
And
the
night
before,
we
went
through
every
single
scenario
possible.
I
mean,
literally
every
tangent
you
can
imagine,
okay,
if,
if
they
say
this,
what
do
we
respond?
We
say
that.
And
if
they
say
this,
how
do
we
respond?
And
literally
every
single
thing
you
can
imagine
for
hours
and
hours
and
hours,
I
just
remember
we
were
so
excited,
but
more
than
anything,
we
were
so
nervous
because
this
meant
everything
to
us.
I
didn't
sleep
one
second
that
night.
So
the
morning
rolls
around
and
9:00
AM
we
show
up
at
their
headquarters,
which
is
literally
like
a,
it's
like
a
mini
Google
village
in
this
small
town
in
Europe.
They've
effectively
owned
that
town
<laugh>
.
And
they
have
what
really
looks
like
a
mini
Google-like
campus.
And
they've
got,
you
know,
the
nice
cafeteria
and
they've
got
the
ping
pong
tables
that
nobody
uses
and
all
these
sort
of
things.
And
so
that
was
impactful.
But
what
was
more
impactful
is
that
we
show
up
and
we
sit
down
at
reception,
and
I
swear
that
the
minutes
go
by,
the
minutes
go
by,
it's
nine
15,
it's
nine
30,
it's
10:00
AM
And
I'm
thinking
to
myself,
why
are
they
making
us
wait
so
much?
Is
this
like
some
kind
of
negotiation
tactic,
<laugh>
,
what's
going
on?
So
finally
at
10:00
AM
uh
,
they
show
up,
they
show
us
around
their,
their
whole
offices,
and
around
1:00
PM
we
get
into
a
room,
we
have
the
head
of
m
and
a
that
we
dealt
with.
And
so
when
he
brings
us
to
this
room,
the
CEO
and
the
CFO
walk
in
,
and
that's
when
the
game
begins.
I
mean,
and
I'll
tell
you
this
like
as
an
aside,
I
mean,
normal
series
A
negotiations.
I've
seen
many
of
them
.
Now,
they're
not
really
that
exciting.
I
mean,
for
,
for
the
most
part,
a
valuation
gets
said
by
some
lead
vc
and
almost
always
the
founder
accepts
it.
Maybe
they
negotiate
a
little
bit,
you
know,
if
they
have
multiple
term
sheets,
then
there's
a
bit
of
a
bidding
war
that's
even
too
much
to
call
it.
I
mean,
you
know,
if
you
have
multiple
term
sheets,
you
play
people
off
each
other
a
little
bit
and,
and
try
to
maximize
what
you
can
get.
And
,
and
that's
about
it.
But
it's
really
not
all
that
exciting.
That's
normally
what,
what
The Game Begins
Pablo
8:32
it's
like,
this
was,
this
was
completely
abnormal
<laugh>
.
And
so,
and
,
and
I
can't
make
this
up.
I
mean,
to
me,
this
whole
situation,
even
when
I
think
about
it
now,
when
I
was,
when
it
was
happening
in
the
moment,
felt
like
a
scene
out
of
a
movie
and
not
even
a
realistic
scene,
like
a
completely
unrealistic
scene
that
if
I
saw
it
in
a
movie,
I'd
say,
this
is
so
fake.
This
is
not
how
this
stuff
happens.
But
this
was
real,
this
is
exactly
how
it
happened.
And
so
we
get
into
that
room
and
I
say,
look,
we
just
raised,
we
,
we
don't
need
the
money.
Our
goal
is
to
raise
a
Series
A
in
12
to
18
months
at
25
million
premoney.
So
if
you
wanna
invest
now,
great,
but
uh,
it's
gonna
have
to
be
a
25
million
Premoney
<laugh>
.
That's
how
I
start
things
off.
And
uh
,
well
they
tell
us,
you
know,
you
guys
are
crazy.
You
just
raised
it
6.65
million
posts.
So
they
open
up
at
,
at
around
8
million
valuation.
And
then
here's
the
challenge.
The
challenge
is
that
there
is
nothing,
nothing
to
ground
these
negotiations.
If
you
negotiate
a
car,
you
can
start
talking
about
comparables.
What
are
other
cars
that
look
like
this?
What
do
they
sell
for?
If
you're
buying
a
house,
you
can
look
at
the
house
down
the
street
and
compare
it.
If
you're
valuing
a
company
that
has
real
revenues,
real
ebitda,
you
can
talk
about
multiples.
But
when
you
are
valuing
what
is
effectively
still
a
seed
stage
company
with
no
revenue
and
just
an
idea,
what's
it
worth?
How
do
you
defend
a
valuation?
You,
you
don't.
And
so
this
entire
negotiation
was
based
on
nothing.
There's
nothing
to
negotiate,
nothing
to
give
and
take.
No
meaningful
arguments
can
be
made
to
actually
close
the
gap.
It's
literally
just
a
battle
of
wills.
And
so
what
happens
is
we
say
number
and
we
defend
it,
and
then
they
discuss
it
and
say
number
back.
And
sometimes
they
would
ask
to
break
for
30
minutes.
We
would
go
into
like
literally
this
is
literally
happening.
We
go
to
a
separate
room
while
they're
in
another
room
and
I
don't
even
know
what
math
we're
possibly
doing
or
what
we're
even
like
taking
the
time
to
do
because
there's
nothing
to
calculate.
And
then
we
go
back
and
they
have
a
whiteboard
going,
right?
And
they're
scratching
numbers
and
putting
numbers
back
in.
And
at
one
point
they're
talking
to
us
like,
you
know
,
okay,
what
if
we
set
up
this
structure
or
that
structure?
It
got
crazy.
But
you
know,
after
literally
a
few
hours,
we
were
at
14
million
ask
and
they
were
12
million
bits.
So
we
had
tied
in
that
quite
a
bit.
And
the
founder
of
this
company
who
is,
you
know,
30,
40
years
my
senior
and
is
worth
hundreds
and
hundreds
of
millions
of
dollars
is
staring
across,
you
know,
is
standing
up
on
the
other
side
of
the
room.
At
this
point,
we're
all
standing
and
I'm
on
the
other
side
of
that,
that
table.
Uh,
and
I'm
a
kid
and
I
look
at
him
in
the
eyes
and
I
said
to
him,
listen,
I'll
be
honest.
And
I
was
not
being
honest,
but
I
said,
listen,
I'll
be
honest,
the
lowest
I
can
go
is
13.3
million.
It
was
a
very,
very
specific
number.
That's
two
x
the
last
valuation,
and
it's
the
absolute
lowest
the
VCs
will
let
us
go.
That
was
my
kind
of
story.
It
was,
look,
hey,
it's
not
my
fault,
it's
the
VC's
fault.
They
don't
want
us
to
raise
at
anything
lower
than
this.
That
was
a
complete
lie.
I
don't
know
what
they
would've
gone
to,
but
that's
what
I
said.
And
I
really
felt,
I
mean,
I'm
not
gonna,
like,
I
felt
like
I
was
the
next
Steve
Jobs,
and
so
I
had
very
Real But Imaginary Confidence
Pablo
11:13
real
but
imaginary
confidence
<laugh>.
And
so
I
started
in
the
eyes
and
I
put
out
my
hand
like
we're
on
Shark
Tank,
I
this,
I
can't
stress
enough
how
fake
this
all
sounds
when
I
say
it.
And
yet
I
swear
to
God
it
is
real.
And
it
worked
because
he
shook
my
hand
and
we
agreed
to
a
$13.3
million
valuation
to
,
for
an
$8
million
series
eight
locked
in
from
one
of
the
largest
Jim
McQuinn
manufacturers
in
the
world,
just
14
months
after
we
incorporated.
I
will
never
forget
the
feeling
right
after
that,
when
Lee
and
I
went
to
a
rental
car
and
we
are
sitting
there
and
we
are
just
elated.
I
mean,
2
23
year
olds
we're
just
like
<laugh>
,
you
know,
like
high
fiving
each
other.
Just
can't
believe
what
has
just
happened.
And
at
this
point,
I
mean,
I'm
like
five
espressos
in.
I'm
running
on
no
sleep.
I'm
barely
awake.
Everything
feels
surreal.
I
mean,
honestly,
are
we
living
in
a
movie?
This
,
this
really
just
happened.
Am
I
the
next
Steve
Jobs?
But
it
felt
like,
you
know
what,
we're
right
on
track.
And
so,
you
know,
things
quite
down
after
that,
we
go
back
to
Ottawa
and
we
start
to
negotiate
what
was
a
handshake
deal,
literally
to
an
actual
investment.
And
that's
when
things
start
to
break
down.
Because
when
we,
when
we
start,
you
know,
negotiating
the
term
sheets,
there's
some
control
terms
that,
that
the
,
that
equip
fit
is
asking
for
that
our
VCs
will
just
not
accept.
Uh
,
and
we
really
wanted
the
money.
I
mean,
we
wanted
the
partnership,
but
really
more
than
anything,
I'm
being
honest,
we
wanted
the
hype.
That's
what
we
were
really
after.
I
mean,
the
hype
of
raising
that
much
money
that
quickly
at
that
age
was
just
too
much
to
resist.
So
we
did
everything
we
could
and
we
argued
hard
with
our
VCs
to
let
us
do
this,
but
it
wouldn't
fly.
And
so
ultimately
Things Start to Break Down
Pablo
12:51
we
go
back
with
counter
and
we
tell
'em,
look,
if
you
want
to
control
this
company,
because
some
of
those
terms
weren't
true
full
control,
but
that
was
kind
of
where
it
was
going.
And
we
said,
look,
if
you
wanna
control
this
company,
you'll
have
to
buy
it.
And
you
have
to
understand
at
that
point,
our
startup
was
more
in
our
heads
than
,
than
in
reality.
I
mean
,
we
had
a
team,
we
built
an
alpha,
but
we
had
no
customers
yet
the
product
was
not
ready
for
primetime
and
the
company
was
not
worth
$14
million.
And
yet,
about
a
week
after,
two
weeks
after
we,
we
make
that
ask,
they
call
us
back,
we
get
a
call
and
they
say,
you
know
what?
We're
in,
we
want
to
do
it.
We'll
buy
you
for
$14
million.
All
cash.
So
that
was
massive.
I
mean,
<laugh>
that
was
just
couldn't
believe
that
that,
I
mean,
when
we
asked
them
to
buy
us,
we
figured
that
was
the
end
of
that
partnership,
negotiation,
whatever
you
wanna
call
it.
And
so
the
fact
that
they
actually
accepted
was
mind
blowing
to
us.
But
all
right,
you
know,
let's
go.
And
so
now
we,
we
spend
months
negotiating
the
new
term
sheet
for
the
acquisition
because
there's
a
bunch
of
things
you
gotta
negotiate
in
there.
And
then
they
send
several
members
of
their
team
over
to
our
offices
for
in-person
di
diligence,
we
move
to
final
contracts.
These
are
like
dozens
and
dozens
of
pages,
you
know,
red
lines
and
all
these
things
back
and
forth.
So
much
time,
so
much
effort,
so
much
thought.
We
work
out,
even
an
employment
agreement
at
this
point.
What
it
said
was,
I'm
gonna
make
personally
$1.7
million
at
signing.
I'm
gonna
make
$200,000
USD
,
which
mattered
'cause
we
were
in
Canada,
so
let's
call
it
like
in
,
in
our
mindset
,
$250,000.
And
I'm
like,
you
know
,
23
,
uh,
a
million
dollar
bonus
in
three
years.
And
I
would
still
own
shares
in
my
company.
So
I
am
literally,
I
mean,
in
another
world,
and,
and
I'm
gonna
admit,
I
mean
at
this
point
I'm
buying
Teslas
and
condos
in
my
head,
I'm
just
thinking
like,
you
know,
don't
count
your
your
chicken
silly
hatch
,
right?
I'm
,
I'm
counting
<laugh>
,
I'm
all
in.
What
am
I
gonna
get?
What
condo
?
Where
should
I
buy?
Like,
all
these
sort
of
things
are
going
through
my
head
and
I
can't
help
it
because
I'm
24
years
old
and
as
far
as
I'm
concerned,
I've
made
it,
but,
but
it
did
feel
a
little,
you
know,
too
good
to
be
true.
Just
felt
too
easy.
So
what
I
do
is
I
think,
well,
you
know
what,
like
our
lawyer
who
I
would
continue
to
have
a
great
relationship
with
to
this
day,
a
person
that
I,
that
I
really
trust.
And
so
I
went
to
him
and
I
said,
look,
you've
seen
hundreds
of
these
transactions,
tell
me
honestly
how
many
deals
make
it
this
far
and
fall
through
and
fail.
And
he
said,
and
I'll
never
forget
it,
he
said
to
me,
99%
of
deals
that
make
it
this
far
close,
I'm
like,
boom,
that's
exactly
what
I
needed
to
hear.
We
are
golden.
Except
we
weren't
golden.
We
were
the
1%.
And
at
that
point,
we
are
burning
$250,000
a
month
because
we
have
like
30
engineers
trying
to
make
this
thing
work.
And
we
have
a
million
dollars
in
the
bank.
So
four
months
of
runway.
The
problem
is
we
didn't
wanna
lay
people
off
because
we
thought
we
were
gonna
get
acquired.
And
we
certainly
needed
to,
you
know,
we
didn't
wanna
look
weak
during
negotiations,
We Were The 1%
Pablo
15:43
nor
did
we
wanna
,
you
know,
cut
staff
that
we
didn't
need
to
cut
if
we
were
gonna
get
acquired
.
And
of
course
this
company
was
gonna
put
in
a
bunch
of
money
into
the
actual
operational
business,
so
there
was
no
need
to
do
anything.
But
at
this
point,
the
jig
was
up
quick
fit
calls,
they
tell
me
they're
out,
and
we
negotiate
a
break
fee
,
which
is
an
amount
that
the
acquirer,
the
potential
acquirer
would
have
to
pay
us
in
case
they
pulled
out,
unless
they
pulled
out
for
a
set
of
reasons
that
were
specifically
outlined
and
negotiated.
And
I
think
they
named
one
of
those
reasons.
And
you
know,
we
could
argue,
oh,
you
know,
that
doesn't
make
sense
because
of
this
and
that,
but
at
the
end
of
the
day,
we're
a
startup
running
outta
cash
four
months
of
runway
against
a
behemoth.
So
what
are
you
gonna
do?
You
gonna
sue
them?
Just
wasn't
an
option.
So
at
the
end
of
the
day,
they
said
many
different
things
and
done
to
the
mat
and
then
reality
set
in
,
and
the
thought
of
laying
off
literally
two
thirds
of
the
team
that
we
fought
so
hard
to
hire
over
the
years
was
too
much
to
stomach.
I
mean,
did
I
really
go
from
multimillionaire
to
bankrupt
in
one
phone
call?
And
that's
what
it
was.
The
dream
was
debt
.
And
first,
you
know,
I
was
and
then
I
was
sad,
and
then
I
bawled
like
a
little
kid
whose
candy
got
taken
away.
And
I
remember
that.
And
um
,
I'm
sharing
it
because
I
guarantee
you
I'm
not
the
only
founder
that's
had
those
ups
and
downs
because
this
is
what
they
mean
when
they
call
startups
roller
coasters.
It's
the
highest
of
highs.
It's
the
lowest
of
lows.
All
it
took
was
one
phone
call
after
Multimillionaire to Bankrupt in One Phone Call
Pablo
17:04
that,
for
what
it's
worth.
We
kept
going
on
for
about
two
years.
We
tried
a
few
different
pivots,
we
hired
a
new
CEO
,
but
the
air
had
been
sucked
outta
the
balloon
.
Jim
Track
died
that
day.
Fast
forward
like
many
years
to
now,
a
few
months
ago,
and
I
met
the
founder
and
CEO
of
push
and
push
was,
I
knew
this
company
from
like
day
one
that
we
started
Gym
Track
because
they
were
also
in
the
wearable
space.
It
was
in
the,
you
know,
it
was
the
same
vintage.
The
founder
was
around
my
age,
but
I
always
dismissed
them
at
niche
because
they
were
going
after
pro
sports
and
university
streams,
not
mainstream
users.
We
were
going
after
like
gyms
and
just
the
average
person.
So
they
were
millions
and
millions
of
potential
users.
They're
going
after
pro
sports
,
they're
measuring
like
specialized
metrics
that
only
matter
to
serious
athletes.
So
as
far
as
I'm
concerned,
they
can
never
be
a
unicorn.
But
he
took
me
through
his
story
and
,
and
I
realized
like
he'd
actually
done
it
the
right
way
because
Push
Pablo
17:48
he
bootstrapped
his
weight
to
success
by
starting
with
a
small
market.
And
he
actually
did
wanna
build,
and
I
didn't
know
this,
but
he
did
wanna
build
a
,
a
kind
of
product
for,
for
the
masses.
He
just
started
by
selling
B2B
to
pro
sports
teams.
And
so
the
beauty
of
it
was
like
capital
requirements
were
way
lower,
and
more
importantly,
the
customer
value
was
clear.
He
was
delivering
real
customer
value.
And
so
when,
you
know,
we
were
in
the
wearables
space,
wearables
were
super
hype
when
we
started.
And
that
changed,
and
it
changed
for
him
as
well.
The
difference
was
that
when
investor
sentiment
turned,
it
didn't
kill
a
startup
because
he
still
had
a
real
business
that
was
delivering
real
value
that
he
could
drive
forward.
Instead
of
chasing
hype,
he
built
a
real
company
instead
of
chasing
unicorns,
he
delivered
real
value.
And
you
might
not
think
that
he's
changed
the
world,
but
from
his
customer's
perspective,
he
did.
He
had
real
traction,
real
impact,
and
now
a
real
exit.
He's
an
actual
millionaire,
not
just
an
imaginary
one.
I
say
all
this
and
like
kind
of
the,
maybe
the
takeaways
here,
right?
Like
I
,
I
share
this
story
because
frankly
it's
fun
for
me
to
share
it
,
but
also
because
I
think
there
is
something
to
learn
here.
You
know,
at
the
end
of
the
day,
founders
we're
always
told
to
dream
big,
build
huge
companies,
swing
for
the
fences.
Uh,
but
at
the
end
of
the
day,
who's,
who's
who
selling
that
dream?
Like
who's
actually
pitching
that?
And
frankly
it's
VCs
like
me.
And
look,
I
win.
Like
if
I
have
15,
20
portfolio
companies
and
every
single
one
swing
for
the
fences
and
only
a
few
make
it,
I
still
win.
But
if
you're
putting
all
your
eggs
in
one
basket,
if
you're
the
founder,
you
need
to
watch
that
basket
because
if
your
business
goes
outta
business,
that's
you,
you
have
one
of
one
.
And
so
look,
I
I
think
back
to
it
like
could,
could
the
gym
track
story
have
gone
a
different
way?
Could
it
have
closed?
It
might've,
and
you
know,
for
sure
had
it
close
and
had
it
become
multimillionaire,
I'd
be
a
different
person
and
I'd
be
sharing
a
totally
different
story.
But
the
reality
is
that
strategy
can
be
based
on
hope,
right?
Strategy's
gotta
be
based
on
reality,
on
probabilities.
And
when
you
actually
look
at
the
data,
even
though
it
seems
like
you
look
at
Zuckerberg,
you
look
at
jobs,
they
were
all
so
young
when
they
made
it
happen,
the
data
actually
tells
you
it
doesn't
really
work
that
way.
The
data
says
that
super
founders
and
these
are
founders
of
successful
materially
successful
startups
are
six
times
more
likely
to
create
a
unicorn
than
first
time
founders.
The
other
way
to
think
about
this
is
that
like
everything
else
in
the
world,
practice
matters.
And
so
yeah,
sure,
sometimes
your
first
one
is
your
biggest
one,
and
if
you
have
that,
you
should
really
go
for
it
because
that's
special.
And
frankly
it's
great.
But
as
a
strategy
at
the
outset
to
think
I'm
gonna
start
a
company
and
it's
going
to
be
a
unicorn,
that
is
the
wrong
mindset.
Instead,
your
goal
with
your
first
one
should
be
to
get
a
win.
Hopefully
it's
a
big
win,
but
at
least
a
win.
And
your
odds
of
getting
a
win
are
much
higher
when
you
focus
on
value
versus
hype,
when
you
focus
on
customers
versus
Tam
.
And
when
you
focus
on
building
and
not
pitching.
So
three
overall
kind
of
like
observations,
right?
The
first
one
is
honestly,
if
I
were
to
do
it
all
over
again,
I
would
lower
my
ambitions.
I
know
it
sounds
weird
because
everybody
tells
you
to
like
aim
high,
but
the
point
I'm
making
is
I
would
just
think
about
delivering
real
value,
about
getting
real
traction.
I
wouldn't
worry
about
like
I
did
back
then,
I
remember
spending
so
much
time
thinking
about
what's
the
massive
billion
dollar
unicorn
story,
but
that's
all
hype,
that's
all
bss.
It's
really
about
delivering
real
value
to
customers.
And
sure,
maybe
caps
out
a
million
in
revenue,
maybe
10
million
in
revenue,
but
at
least
you
got
something.
And
yeah,
if
you
get
lucky,
it'll
be
a
hundred
million
billion
dollar
revenue
and
you'll
have
something
If I Could Do It Over Again
Pablo
21:00
really
big.
But
as
long
as
you
have
something
that
works,
you
will
not
only
learn
much
more,
you'll
make
more
money
and
you'll
have
real
impact.
You're
actually
changing
somebody's
world.
The
second
thing
is
when
they
say
start
for
roller
coasters,
they
mean
it.
And
in
fact,
roller
coasters
might
be
like
underselling
it
because
it's
truly
hard,
it's
emotionally
taxing
and
there's
just
no
way,
like
I'd
say
be
prepared,
but
there's
really
no
way
to
be
prepared.
What
you
should
know
is
that
even
what
to
you
from
the
outside
might
look
like
a
rocket
ship.
And
it's
easy
to
do
that.
Compare
yourself
to
other
founders,
other
startups
that
seem
to
be
crushing
it,
raising
money,
everything's
going
well.
I
guarantee
you
,
from
the
inside
it
doesn't
feel
that
way
because
startups
are
hyper
fragile.
You're
literally
one
employee,
one
customer,
one
investor
away
from
complete
success
and
sometimes
from
death.
And
that's
just
what
you
sign
up
for.
But
the
more
hype
you
build
around
it,
the
bigger
the
unicorn
you
chase,
the
more
all
that's
amplified.
So
again,
no
way
to
be
prepared,
but
all
goes
back
to
the
same
kind
of
principle
value
over
hype,
which
leads
to
the
third
point,
which
is
there
is
no
substitute,
none
for
solving
real
customer
problems.
There's
no
smoke
and
mirrors,
no
massive
round
,
no
pr,
no
hype's
gonna
save
you
if
you're
not
solving
a
top
of
mind
problem
for
your
customers.
You
might
have
10
customers,
you
might
have
a
thousand,
you
might
have
10,000
customers.
But
at
the
end
of
the
day,
if
you
were
to
go
to
your
customers
today
and
ask
them,
am
I
solving
a
number
one
or
number
two
problem
for
you?
Their
answer
needs
to
be
yes.
If
you've
listened
to
this
episode
and
the
show
and
you
like
it,
I
have
a
huge
favorite
to
ask
for
you.
Well,
it's
actually
a
really
small
favorite
,
but
it
has
huge
impact.
But
whichever
app
you're
listening
to
this
episode
on,
take
It
Out,
go
to
Product
market
Fit
show
and
leave
a
review,
please.
It's
going
to
help.
It's
not
just
gonna
help
me
to
be
clear,
it's
going
to
help
other
founders
discover
this
show
because
the
algorithms,
whether
it's
Spotify,
whether
it's
Apple,
whether
it's
any
other
podcast
player,
one
of
the
big
things
they
look
at
is
frequency
of
reviews.
It's
quantity
of
reviews.
And
the
reality
is,
if
all
of
you
listening
right
now,
left
reviews,
we
would
have
thousands
of
reviews.
So
please
take
literally
a
minute,
even
if
you're
just
writing
like
great
podcast,
or
I
love
this
podcast,
whatever
it
is,
just
write
a
few
words.
Obviously
the
longer
the
better,
the
more
detailed
the
better.
But
write
anything,
leave
five
stars
and
you'll
be
helping
me.
But
most
importantly,
many
other
founders
just
like
you,
discover
the
show.
Thank
you.