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Episode 6February 5, 2024
He Almost Went Bankrupt TWICE...Then exited for $30M. w/ Canvaspop CEO Nazim Ahmed
About this episode
This isn’t a unicorn fairytale. It’s a story about what it really takes to build a company and get to an exit.
Nazim takes us through how he nearly went bankrupt, took years to turn things around, and ultimately sold his business for $30M all cash.
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Follow the showTranscript
The full conversation.
Pablo
0:00
So
Nazim's
story
isn't
like
the
classic
unicorn
fairytale.
This
is
a
real
example
of
what
it
takes
to
build
a
solid
business
that
does
over
$10
million
in
revenue
and
ultimately
gets
acquired,
in
his
case,
for
$30
million,
but
it
was
not
easygoing.
It's
like
the
real
roller
coaster
that
you
can
expect
to
ride
if
you
decide
to
go
through
this.
Actually,
when
Nazim
started,
he
started
as
a
side
hustle,
and
that
same
year,
his
boss
find
out
that
he
was
doing
a
side
hustle
and
fired
him.
That's
how
things
got
started.
Luckily,
two
years
later,
he
was
doing
a
million
dollars
in
revenue,
but
then
just
when
he
thought
he
had
it,
once
again,
things
changed
on
him,
and
he
goes
super
close
to
bankruptcy
another
time,
flips
it
around,
comes
back.
This
is
a
14-year
journey,
a
14-year
roller
coaster
to
ultimately
bring
his
business
to
$15
million
in
top
line
revenue
and,
like
I
said,
a
$30
million
exit.
It's
an
amazing
story,
full
ups
and
downs,
and
you're
going
to
just
learn
some
real
lessons
from
what
Nazim
went
through.
Welcome
to
The
Product
Market
Fit
Show,
brought
to
you
by
Mistral,
a
seed
stage
firm
based
in
Canada.
I'm
Pablo.
I'm
a
founder
turned
VC.
My
goal
is
to
help
early-stage
founders
like
you
find
product-market
fit.
Naz,
welcome
to
the
show.
Nazim
1:13
Thanks
for
having
me.
Pablo
1:14
You
went
on
a
pretty
incredible
journey.
I
mean,
we're
talking
a
16-year
journey
from
beginning
to
–
well,
end
is
not
really
–
you're
still
going
on,
let's
say,
a
different
journey
but
at
least
in
terms
of
what
we'll
cover
on
this
episode,
and
that's
normal,
I
would
say.
In
the
world
of
startups,
it's
–
you
don't
flip
these
quickly.
These
always
take
longer
than
you
expect,
and
you
started
in
a
–
I
would
say
a
humble
way,
right?
I
mean,
2005
was
a
crazy
year
for
you.
Just
to
maybe
sum
it
up,
you
start
a
side
hustle.
You
get
fired
from
your
full-time
job,
and
you
manage
to
almost
go
bankrupt
all
in
the
span
of
12
months.
Let's
start
there.
I
mean,
take
us
back
to
that
time
and
how
you
started
what
I
guess
was
DNA11
and
just
maybe
some
context,
and
we
can
go
from
there.
The first startup
Nazim
2:03
Yeah,
absolutely.
Yeah.
My
journey
is
definitely
a
little
bit
atypical
in
the
startup
world.
My
background
was
actually
molecular
genetics,
so
I
finished
my
honors
degree
in
genetics
from
the
University
of
Western
Ontario.
I
decided
a
life
of
academia
was
not
the
path,
so
I
took
a
couple
years
of
software
engineering
and
ended
up
working
at
a
Bay
Area
biotech
company
for
about
four
years.
My
nights
and
weekends
were
all
working
on
side
hustle,
side
projects.
For
me,
it
was
a
creative
outlet,
number
one,
and
number
two,
I
had
just
a
bunch
of
entrepreneurial
friends.
It
was
just
a
great
opportunity
to
just
work
on
ideas.
After
a
bunch
of
ideas
did
not
work,
there
was
one
idea
that
was
never
supposed
to
be
a
business,
and
my
best
friend
and
I
at
the
time,
Adrian
Salamunovic,
came
up
with
an
idea
of
taking
people's
DNA,
so
that
was
my
world,
and
turning
it
into
personalized
pieces
of
artwork,
and
digital
marketing
was
his
world.
We
put
our
two
worlds
together,
and
we
put
up
a
website
called
DNA11.com,
which
we
can
get
into
the
details
in
a
moment.
That
business
ended
up
miraculously
turning
into
a
million
dollar
a
year
e-commerce
store
with
75%
gross
margins
and
became
my
source
of
cash
to
start
other
companies.
I
can
get
into
a
little
bit
more
of
the
details,
if
you
want,
on
how
that
actually
happened.
Pablo
3:24
Yeah,
maybe
just
the
specifics
around
how
you
come
up
with
that
idea.
I
mean,
it's
kind
of
–
it's
out
there.
I
know
you
can
rationalize
it
because
it
is
your
world
and
his
world.
I'm
just
curious
how
did
that
actually
happen?
Hey,
let's
take
people's
DNA,
take
swabs
of
DNA,
and
then
blow
them
up
into
art.
Nazim
3:39
Sure.
First
it
was,
Adrian
and
I,
we’re
always
talking
about
ideas,
and
we
tried
to
start
a
couple
of
things
that
didn't
quite
work
out
initially.
Then
we
saw
this
trend
of
personalization
happening.
I
think,
at
the
time,
M&M’s,
for
example,
were
personalizing
their
M&M’s,
and
that
was
starting
to
become
a
thing
in
2005,
I
think.
I
think,
at
that
time,
Nike
started
personalizing
their
shoes.
My
whole
world
of
DNA
and
Adrian's
worlds
of
digital
marketing,
he
looked
at
his
DNA
images
on
some
of
my
technical
documents,
and
to
him,
it
looked
like
artwork,
looked
like
really
cool
design.
The
first
idea
was
actually
taking
people's
DNA
and
putting
it
on
t-shirts,
but
the
DNA
processing
was
so
expensive
that
no
one
would
spend
2,
$300
on
a
T-shirt.
Then
we
came
up
with
this
idea
of
printing
it
on
artwork
so
your
DNA
from
a
mouth
swab,
brought
to
a
lab,
extracted,
fingerprinted,
brought
into
a
photo
shop,
colorized,
printed
on
large,
four
pieces
of
canvases,
artwork.
Pablo
4:47
Did
that
just
grow
organically,
or
did
you
start
running
paid
ads
against
it?
How
did
you
get
it
from
–
I
guess,
you
started
2005.
Couple
years
later,
you’re
doing
a
million
in
revenue,
which
is
not
trivial.
Nazim
4:58
When
we
launched
a
website,
ended
up
doing
this
launch
party,
and
Fashion
Television
actually
covered
the
launch
event.
The
first
thing
that
happened
was
we
got
traffic
through
regular
PR.
Adrian,
his
whole
background
was
muttering
up
PR,
and
then
we
started
seeing
people
come
to
the
website.
Sales
started
trickling
in,
and
at
the
same
time,
my
manager
for
biotech
company
saw
me
on
Fashion
Television
promoting
DNA11,
ended
up
firing
me.
He's
like,
“Okay,
you
can't
run
these
two
things
at
once.”
At
that
moment,
I
had
a
decision
to
make:
stop
working
on
DNA11
and
go
back
to
the
world
of
biotech,
get
another
job,
or
cash
in.
I
think
I
had
$20,000
in
savings,
try
to
make
a
go
of
this
DNA
art
thing.
I
ended
up
cashing
out
my
savings,
and
we
just
start
continuously
working
on
the
site.
Pablo
5:47
What
was
your
thinking,
by
the
way?
Just
how
did
you
make
that
decision?
It's
not
easy
decision
to
just
go
all
in.
What
gave
you
that
push?
What
gave
you
that
shove
to
just
do
it?
Going All In
Nazim
5:58
I
looked
at
the
two
options.
Number
one,
option
one
–
I
was
in
my
20s
at
the
time,
so
option
one,
I
could
take
a
lot
of
risk.
Option
one,
burn
through
my
$20
in
savings.
Worst
case
scenario,
DNA11
doesn't
work
and
then
go
back
to
option
two,
which
was
go
back
to
the
world
of
biotech.
Then
the
other
option
was
not
even
give
it
a
try,
still
have
$20,000
in
the
bank,
and
then
go
right
into
my
job,
which
at
that
time,
$20,000
could
mean
I
could
take
a
lot
of
risk.
For
me,
it
was
a
no-brainer
to
just
carry
this
through.
Pablo
6:32
I
think
that's
true.
I
think,
especially
when
you're
young,
you
really
can't
lose.
Worst
case
scenario,
you
just
go
back
to
what
you
were
doing
anyways,
and
your
experience,
especially
at
that
age,
is
going
to
be
seriously
valued
by
most
employers.
That
makes
sense
to
me.
Nazim
6:46
Yeah,
correct.
Even
if
it
ends
up
failing,
I
think
people
on
exterior,
especially
today,
are
going
to
respect
the
fact
that
you
took
risks.
You
tried
something
interesting.
Even
if
it
didn't
work,
exactly,
you
learn
a
lot,
and
then
you
just
move
on
to
the
next
milestone.
Pablo
7:02
Was
it
like
you
go
all
in?
You
obviously
experienced
some
serious
growth.
You
get
to
a
million
in
revenue
two
years
in.
Everything's
good
at
that
point,
I
mean,
high
margin?
Everything's
going
well,
or
what
are
the
main
challenges
that
happened
around
2007,
2008?
Nazim
7:17
No.
Things
were
going
very,
very
well
at
the
time,
and
we
just
had
a
lot
of
fun.
We
got
our
portraits
in
the
Museum
of
Modern
Art
through
all
their
design
stores
in
New
York,
so
it’d
be
a
sample
portrait
and
a
DNA
collection
kit.
They
would
pay
for
the
portrait,
take
the
kit,
send
it
back
to
us.
We
are
running
dozens
of
samples
a
day.
I
had
a
partnership
with
a
biotech
company
that
was
doing
the
lab
processing.
I
remember
Alexis
Ohanian
from
Reddit
bought
the
–
one
of
the
first
portraits
and
ended
up
–
after
he
got
it,
ended
up
in
a
bunch
of
venture
capitalist
offices
all
throughout
the
Valley
and
in
New
York,
which
is
awesome.
Pablo
7:50
That’s
sick.
Nazim
7:50
It
became
like
a
big
Christmas
gift.
I
remember
Marissa
Mayer,
former
CEO
of
Yahoo;
before
that,
early
Google,
ended
up
buying
all
of
her
friends
DNA
portraits
for
Christmas.
She
spent
30,
$40,000
at
a
time,
and
they
were
just
a
super
fun
business.
It
was
super
niche,
number
one,
and
you
knew
it
was
never
going
to
turn
into
a
really
big
thing.
Number
two,
we
just
looked
at
it
as
a
source
of
cash
flow.
What
we
did
is
we
used
that
cash
to
develop
infrastructure,
develop
customer
service,
bring
our
web
development
in-house,
and
really
just
learn
the
craft
of
e-commerce.
Then,
once
you're
in
the
market,
you
can
then
start
seeing
other
opportunities
where
you
can
leverage
what
you
built
and
get
into
something
bigger,
and
then
that's
what
allowed
us,
once
we
were
in
the
market,
to
see
in
2007
the
iPhone
launch.
Then
we
saw
the
growth
of
that,
so
we
thought
mobile
photographs
were
going
to
be
ubiquitous.
They
could
be
everywhere,
or
people
are
going
to
want
to
do
things
with
mobile
photographs.
Instead
of
putting
your
DNAs
there,
we
did
a
sister
company
as
your
photos
on
our
focus
on
mobile.
We
launched
that
in
2009,
and
then
that
went
from
a
million
DNA11,
then
1.8,
three,
five,
seven.
It
just
started
growing
like
crazy,
which
gave
us
a
ton
more
resources
to
continuously
do
other
things.
Pablo
9:14
Yeah.
Before
we
do,
I
mean,
you
mentioned
between
2007,
when
you're
doing
well
in
2009,
there's
a
period
where
you
almost
go
bankrupt.
What’s
that
story?
Leap of Faiths
Nazim
9:24
There’s
various
periods
where
you
have
to
take
some
sort
of
leap
of
faith
into
something
that'll
get
you
to
that
next
level,
but
you're
going
to
risk
your
existence.
There
was
a
period
where
DNA11
and
CanvasPop
were
starting
to
go.
The
back-end
infrastructure
was
completely
collapsing,
and
we
couldn't
really
run
a
sustainable
business.
The
only
way
to
do
it
was
–
there
was
nothing,
no
back-end
ERPs
for
mass
customization
companies
at
the
time,
and
to
build
our
own,
we
had
to
bring
a
solid
engineering
team
in-house.
Overhead
got
really
expensive,
and
it
took
twice
as
long
to
build
it.
We
ended
up
going
through
any
cash
that
we
had
accumulated,
and
then
I
got
to
a
point
where
I
either
needed
to
take
a
step
back
and
fire
the
engineering
team
and
say,
geez,
this
is
a
horrible
mistake,
or
put
a
line
of
credit
on
my
home,
bridge
us
until
we
can
launch
the
new
ERP.
I
ended
up
taking
the
line
of
credit
on
my
house,
which
was
ridiculous,
but
anyway,
bridged
it.
We
ended
up
launching
ERP,
and
then,
as
soon
as
that
happened,
we
rebuilt
the
sites.
Conversion
went
up.
Speed
of
the
site
went
up.
Efficiency
went
up.
Profitability
went
up.
Then
we
were
able
to
quickly
launch
a
new
product,
which
drove
revenue,
but
in
the
back
end,
it
was
profitable
revenue.
That
allowed
us
to
continue
to
build,
but
there
was
just
periods
where
you're
on
your
deathbed
if
you
don't
take
that
leap
of
faith,
right?
Pablo
10:46
One
of
The pivot
Pablo
10:47
the
things
you
mentioned
earlier,
you
have
to
be
in
the
market
to
see
opportunities.
What
we
say
on
the
show
quite
often
is
you
have
to
be
in
the
market
to
win
the
market,
right?
You
just
don't
know
where
things
are
going
to
lead,
but
until
you're
there
doing
things,
you
just
will
not
be
close
enough
to
the
opportunities
to
be
able
to
actually
seize
them.
Maybe
walk
us
through
the
iPhone
comes
out.
You're
doing
the
DNA
printing.
It's
like
an
evolution,
a
pivot,
whatever
you
want
to
call
it,
to
CanvasPop.
Just
walk
us
through
how
that
happens.
Nazim
11:14
I
always
just
looked
at
each
business
as
a
source
of
cash
flow
to,
A,
capitalize
on
other
opportunities,
or
B,
use
it
to
solve
my
own
problems
that
I
was
facing,
that
there
was
no
solution
out
on
the
market.
My
idea
was
always,
okay,
if
we
could
create
something
that
would
solve
our
own
problems
software
based,
then
we
can
always
open
it
up
and
give
it
to
other
people
that
are
experiencing
other
–
similar
problems,
and
that
would
drive
all
sorts
of
growth
and
open
up
new
opportunities.
One
of
those
examples
was
the
back-end
ERP,
so
once
that
was
built
and
it
was
running
everything
efficiently,
then
we
opened
up
an
API.
Then
mobile
and
web
applications
plugged
into
us
to
leverage
all
of
our
infrastructure
in
the
back
end,
both
digitally
as
well
as
our
physical
infrastructure
of
printing
and
fulfillment.
If
you
look
at
all
of
our
other
competitors
that
were
just
putting
photos
on
Canvas
and
selling
through
Groupon,
they
never
looked
at
their
businesses
that
way,
and
they
all
ended
up
dying.
It
was
a
way
of
looking
at
our
business
as
a
source
of
cash
to
solve
our
own
problems
and
then
using
the
solutions
that
we
solve
and
open
it
up
and
leverage
it
to
create
more
revenue
and
more
opportunities
for
ourselves.
It
was
a
unique
way
to
look
at
the
business,
but
it
ended
up
paying
off
in
the
long
run.
Pablo
12:29
What
was
CanvasPop
at
the
end
of
the
day?
I
guess,
did
you
shut
down
DNA11
and
then
go
all
in
just
on
CanvasPop,
or
did
they
merge
and
become
part
of
the
same
thing?
Nazim
12:40
Yeah,
great
question.
First,
I
always
kept
it
under
the
same
corporation.
These
were
just
product
lines,
but
they're
on
different
websites.
Second
is,
as
CanvasPop
started
to
grow,
we
knew
DNA11
didn't
have
as
much
growth
potential,
so
we
slowly
started
moving
marketing
resources
towards
CanvasPop
and
trying
to
grow
that
while
keeping
DNA11
on
autopilot
and
not
growing
but
using
the
cash
flow
to
drive
the
larger
potential
business.
Then,
over
time,
DNA11
was
dropping
in
revenue,
but
CanvasPop
was
accelerating
much
more.
By
the
time
I
sold
the
whole
thing,
which
we
can
get
to,
DNA11
was
doing
maybe
50
grand
a
year
in
the
background
just
leveraging
all
the
existing
SEO
we
had,
and
CanvasPop
was
doing
15
million
a
year
in
revenue.
It's
a
process,
but
you
got
to
manage
the
resources
very
carefully
and
do
everything
at
the
right
time.
If
you
put
everything
on
this
–
the
new
thing
right
away
and
the
old
thing
that's
generating
cash
dies
too
quickly,
then
you
get
yourself
into
trouble.
Pablo
13:45
Just
in
simple
terms,
what
was
CanvasPop?
How
did
that
product
work?
What is Canvaspop and its Market
Nazim
13:50
Yeah,
so
you
come
to
our
website.
It
was
super
simple:
upload
your
photograph,
choose
your
sizing,
choose
your
frame
options.
Then,
once
the
order
is
placed,
we
would
print
the
photograph
on
canvas,
frame
it,
ship
it
to
you.
First
we
started
just
in
North
America.
Then
we
opened
up
Europe.
Then,
at
the
end
of
it,
we
were
selling
in
over
50
countries.
Before
we
started
outsourcing
our
stuff,
when
manufacturing
companies
got
to
scale,
we
actually
were
doing
all
of
our
printing
and
fulfillment
in-house,
so
I
have
a
30,000
square
foot
facility
in
Las
Vegas.
We’d
ship
hundreds
of
pieces
a
day
out
of
there,
and
then,
Europe,
there
was
more
partnerships.
Pablo
14:29
Was
it
a
competitive
space?
I’m
curious,
again,
really
the
beginning
when
–
to
get
that
first
million
or
two
in
revenue
from
CanvasPop,
just
what
was
that
like,
and
what
sort
of
tactics
and
strategies
did
you
use
to
grow
demand?
Nazim
14:42
Yeah,
great
question.
The
first
couple
of
years
it
was
not
very
competitive,
and
we
were
early
movers
in
the
space.
We
were
the
only
design
players
in
the
space,
and
we
focus
very
much
on
user
experience.
We
got
a
head
start.
Then,
over
time,
then
Shutterfly
got
into
the
space,
and
Costco
got
in
the
space.
Then
Walmart
got
in
the
space.
Then,
if
you
were
to
look
at
Walmart
and
Costco,
they
didn't
look
at
these
as
profit
centers.
They
looked
at
this
as
an
opportunity
to
drive
people
into
their
store.
They
would
sell
it
online,
and
then
you
had
the
ability
to
go
pick
up
the
canvas
or
the
photo
products
in
store.
Then,
hopefully,
they
go
there,
and
they
buy
other
products
in
store.
They
could
really
undercut
you,
so
now
it's
a
race
to
the
bottom.
What
ended
up
happening,
a
lot
of
our
competitors
went
down
that
race
to
the
bottom.
We
took
the
opposite
approach
where
we
invested
in
innovation
and
technology
and
created
all
of
these
unique
products.
For
example,
we
were
the
first
company
in
the
space
for
you
to
log
in
to
your
Instagram
and
take
directly
from
your
Instagram
and
have
those
printed
as
art
shipped
to
you,
and
this
is
early
on
when
Instagram
first
launched.
That
was
something
unique
that
differentiated
us
in
the
space.
Over
time,
we
even
launched
a
product
that
used
artificial
intelligence
to
scan
your
image,
and
we
called
these
things
–
called
pet
portraits.
It
would
recognize
if
there
was
a
pet
in
there.
It
would
remove
the
background.
It
would
add
different
filters
on
it.
Then,
all
of
a
sudden,
you
have
your
pet
stylized
as
a
piece
of
artwork,
but
it
was
using
all
this
complex
technology
in
the
background
differentiating
us.
We
focused
on
innovation,
design,
user
experience,
customer
service
while
they
focused
on
a
commodity,
and
that's
what
allowed
us
to
continue
to
grow
but,
more
importantly,
charge
for
products
at
a
higher
price.
It
was
not
a
race
to
the
bottom,
and
we
continue
to
drive
profits
that
way.
Pablo
16:29
What
made
you
bring
in
things
like
fulfillment,
things
that
I
think
most
entrepreneurs
would
think
just
keep
outsourcing
them?
Is
that
really
somewhere
where
you
can
have
an
edge?
You
brought
all
that
in-house.
A,
was
it
a
good
idea,
and
B,
why
did
you
decide
to
go
that
way?
Nazim
16:43
When
we
first
started,
I
was
actually
outsourcing
to
these
printing
companies,
and
then
I
was
trying
to
find
a
large
fulfillment
partner
to
handle
our
volume.
There
was
no
partner
out
there
at
that
time.
Keep
in
mind,
this
is
super
early,
right?
I
was
able
to
do
it
at
scale
so
just
slowly,
one
printer.
One
printer
turned
into
two.
First
it
started
in
my
apartment.
Then
it
started
in
a
larger
space.
Then
we
went
to
the
US
and
kept
going
from
there,
but
then,
over
time,
these
larger
manufacturers
finally
got
to
the
point
where
they
can
handle
large,
large
volumes.
Finally,
when
it
got
to
a
point
where
we
didn't
have
to
compromise,
A,
on
quality
and,
B,
we
found
a
good
partner
that
could
offer
quality
at
scale,
that's
when
we
started
looking
for
outsourced
partners,
and
one
of
those
outsourced
partners
that
did
the
manufacturing
was
actually
one
of
our
largest
competitors.
They
own
one
of
the
largest
competitors
in
our
space.
They
ended
up
buying
us
three
years
later,
but
I
ended
up
shutting
down
all
of
our
printing
and
fulfillments,
sending
all
orders
to
them.
Pablo
17:52
Let
me
ask
you
a
question
a
bit
out
of
left
field.
I
think,
one
of
the
things,
you
obviously
bootstrapped
this
business
until
you
raised
about
three
million,
but
that
was
way
later.
That
was
2018
so
more
than
10
years
into
the
entrepreneurship
journey.
One
of
the
benefits
of
raising
early
on
is
you
get
to
pay
yourself
a
salary.
Maybe
that
salary
is
not
a
100%
market,
but
honestly,
it's
pretty
close.
What
you
give
up
on
salary
is
not
huge.
How
long
did
it
take
you
from
deciding
to
take
this
entrepreneurship
path
until
you
got
to
a
point
where
you
were
like,
oh,
I'm
–
I
actually
didn't
give
anything
up?
From
a
how
much
you're
taking
in
perspective,
you're
just
as
comfortable
making
just
as
much
money
as
you
would've
been
had
you
just
gone
down
that
other
path.
Was
it
quick,
or
did
it
take
a
long
time?
Nazim
18:37
We
were
very,
very
fortunate
because
DNA11
was
such
a
cash
efficient
type
of
business.
For
example,
we'd
sell
an
$800
portrait.
We'd
get
the
money
in
the
bank.
We
would
ship
a
$5
collection
kit
to
you.
Many
of
those
kits
never
ended
up
coming
back
to
us
or
ever
ended
up
getting
fulfilled,
and
it
was
all
prepaid.
There
was
no
inventory,
right?
We
ended
up
not
really
having
to
sacrifice
much
because
we
were
able
to
pay
ourselves
just
with
cash
flow,
and
then,
once
we
got
to
CanvasPop,
the
volumes
got
to
a
point
where
we
were
able
to
raise
quarter
million
debt.
We
had
large
lines
of
credit.
Non-equity,
diluted
type
of
capital
were
opened
up
to
us,
and
then
we're
able
to
put
ourselves
on
decent
salaries.
We
really
didn't
give
up
much.
Nazim's Startup Advice
Pablo
19:27
By
the
way,
I
do
have
to
mention
just
because
it
popped
into
my
head.
Do
you
remember
the
time
Lee
and
I,
my
co-founder
at
Gymtrack,
came
into
your
office
when
you
were
running
CanvasPop?
This
was
what,
2013,
and
we
were
21,
22
at
the
time?
You
remember
that
meeting?
Nazim
19:38
A
hundred
percent.
I
remember
that
very,
very
well.
Pablo
19:43
I
don't
know
how
we
got
introduced
to
Naz.
Hey,
here's
a
successful
entrepreneur
in
Ottawa.
You
should
talk
with
him.
What
I
remember
from
that
meeting,
we
went
in,
and
we
told
you
what
we
were
trying
to
build
at
Gymtrack
and
just
everything
we
were
trying
to
do.
You
were
certainly
nice
about
it,
but
realistically,
these
are
two
business
guys
that
have
no
idea
what
they're
doing.
Your
advice
was
be
so
sick
they
can't
deny
you.
That
was
you
that,
if
you
guys
want
to
raise
money,
you
have
to
be
so
sick
they
can't
deny
you.
That's
what
you
said
to
us.
Funny
enough,
Lee
actually
gifted
me
maybe
a
year
or
so
later
a
thing
for
business
cards
we’re
using
at
the
time
to
hold
your
business
cards
with
that
imprinted
inside
it.
Be
so
sick
they
can't
deny
you.
Anyways,
that
stuck.
I
mean,
what
is
it
now,
10
years
later?
Clearly,
advice
that
resonated.
Nazim
20:33
We’re
still
in
touch.
Lee
and
I
are
still
in
touch.
I
followed
your
guys'
careers,
and
I
think
more
entrepreneurs
and
more
founders
should
always
just
try
to
support
each
other
in
any
way
we
can.
I
think
we
had
a
really
great
tight-knit
of
–
a
group
of
early
founders
at
that
time,
and
yeah,
it
was
a
great
community
back
in
the
day
that
we
were
building.
Yeah,
I
remember
that
time
fondly.
Pablo
20:59
Going
back
to
the
story
and
getting
towards
maybe
the
exit
outcome,
just
walk
me
through
the
growth
from,
let's
say,
2009
until
you
exit
2021.
Was
it
just
steady
30,
40%
per
year,
or
did
you
have
some
exceptional
years
and
then
some
flat
years?
What
did
that
look
like?
Nazim
21:21
It
was
very
quick
growth
initially
from
when
we
first
launched
CanvasPop
on
top
of
DNA11.
Then
it
gets
to
a
point
where
the
type
of
business
that
you
have
starts
coming
in
in
terms
of
dynamics,
and
it
starts
putting
these
types
of
ceilings
on
top
of
you.
You
need
to
figure
out
how
to
break
through
the
ceiling.
Once
we
got
to
about
eight
million
in
revenue,
things
really
started
slowing
down.
I
remember
a
few
years
of
flat
eight
million
in
revenue.
To
make
matters
worse
at
the
time,
we
had
launched
an
app
in
the
GIF
space
within
the
company
at
the
same
time
with
a
little
small
team
internally,
and
that
GIF
app
got
to
a
hundred
thousand
daily
actives
very,
very
quickly.
It
was
the
first
GIF
Keyboard
when
IOS...
Pablo
22:19
This
was
when
GIPHY
was
out,
right,
something
like
that?
Nazim
22:21
Yeah.
GIPHY
was
out,
and
then
iOS
allowed
you
to
swap
your
keyboards
out
back
in
2014.
Steve
McKenzie,
who
is
awesome
designer
and
founder
as
well,
had
this
idea
of
creating
a
GIF
Keyboard,
so
we
ended
up
building
that
internally
with
one
of
our
developers.
A
co-founder,
Adrian,
did
all
the
marketing,
ended
up
taking
off.
Now
I
got
this
two-headed
beast,
this
one
business
that
is….
Pablo
22:41
What
was
it
called?
Nazim
22:41
PopKey.
Pablo
22:46
PopKey,
I
do
remember
that,
yes.
Nazim
22:48
Yeah.
That
took
off
like
a
rocket
very
quickly,
and
we
ended
up
trying
to
build
both
the
same
time.
We
extracted
PopKey
into
its
other
core,
raise
some
money.
That
was
just
two
years
of
absolute
insanity,
and
I
learned
even
more
than
I'd
ever
learned
before,
especially
raising
capital
and
going
after
that
type
of
play.
GIPHY
owned
the
infrastructure
and
GIPHY
was
building
the
platform,
and
all
these
other
apps
had
no
chance.
I
needed
to
go
through
it
to
understand
that,
and
then
that
was
the
time
when
CanvasPop
started
slowing
down
and
flatlining
and
actually
decreasing.
Pablo
23:28
Yeah,
maybe
if
you
could
dig
deeper
there.
One
thing
I've
noticed
about
growth,
there's
something
just
–
that
feels
great
about
growth.
I
mean
that
like
it
–
kind
of
obvious,
but
at
the
same
time,
it's
like,
if
you
go
from
one
to
three
million,
you're
growing
and
it
feels
great.
If
you're
stuck
at
five
million,
you’re
actually
better
than
when
you
were
at
three,
but
if
you're
stuck
there,
it's
not
going
to
feel
that
good
because
you
just
want
that
growth,
right?
Maybe
just
take
me
through
what
that
period
was
like
where
you
were
either
flat
or
declining
and
then,
maybe
most
importantly,
what
you
ended
up
doing
that
worked
to
turn
things,
let's
say,
back
around.
Resetting Focus To Regain Growth
Nazim
24:08
Yeah,
sure.
The
first
thing
we
had
to
do
was
press
reset.
I
ended
up
sunsetting
PopKey,
ended
up
reducing
our
team
significantly
to
–
I
went
from
30
employees
to
8.
Pablo
24:19
Oh,
wow!
Nazim
24:19
It
was
like
a
small
group
of
eight
employees,
and
the
reason
I
did
that
was
I
was
like,
okay,
number
one,
I
got
to
reduce
all
my
[unclear], my overhead, my burn. I need to get laser focused, and I need to just press reset. It was a really sobering time, and what it did was two things. Number one, it made you appreciate that growth was driven by the stuff that you did a year before, a couple of years before, and it was driven by focus and positive action, so on. Then, once the growth starts happening, you start maybe taking it for granted.
Then
we
start
seeing
bigger
and
bigger
opportunities,
and
then
we
lost
focus
looking
back
on
it
in
retrospect.
The
first
thing
was
to
get
focused,
number
one,
and
then,
number
two,
to
get
trust
within
the
small
group
of
employees
we
had.
Then,
number
three,
it
was,
okay,
let's
stabilize
the
existing
thing
that
we
had
that
was
working.
Then
how
are
we
going
to
stimulate
growth?
It
was
a
process
of
a
lot
of
off-site
meetings.
It
was
a
lot
of
let's
get
back
to
what
made
CanvasPop
special,
which
was
innovation;
launching
new,
innovative,
different
products;
differentiating
ourselves
from
the
competition.
We
went
back
to
that
magic
sauce,
really
leveraging
technology
to
be
able
to
create
more
unique
products,
and
it
just
started
taking
one
step
at
a
time
and
putting
that
plan
to
execution.
Then
we
started
seeing
growth
again,
so
as
soon
as
we
start
seeing
growth
again,
at
that
time,
I
was
like,
okay,
I'm
not
going
to
make
the
same
mistake
before.
We're
going
to
go
and
raise
capital
from
institutional
investors,
some
quality
people.
We're
going
to
create
a
board.
We're
going
to
create
governance.
We're
going
to
create
discipline.
I'm
going
to
have
a
board
that
I'm
going
to
report
to
every
quarter,
and
we
are
going
to
make
sure
to
run
this
in
the
most
disciplined
way.
That
was
a
huge,
huge
change.
That
happened
in
2017.
Pablo
26:14
It's
funny.
Most
founders,
at
least
in
the
early
stages,
want,
let's
say,
more
control,
less
oversight,
less
board.
You
actually
went
out
and
sought
a
board.
How
do
you
think
about
that?
What
drove
that??
Nazim
26:26
I
don't
know.
If
we
are
ever
going
to
have
an
exit
in
a
sophisticated
manner,
that
acquirer
is
going
to
open
up
the
curtains,
and
they're
going
to
do
their
due
diligence.
If
everything
is
not
very,
very
tight
with
not
only
your
technology
stack
but
with
your
HR
processes
and
how
you're
running
the
company
in
a
disciplined
way,
all
of
your
financials
are
reported
in
a
specific
way
with
–
in
a
sophisticated
manner,
they're
never
–
you're
never
going
to
pass
a
due
diligence.
At
that
time,
we
were
like,
okay,
I
think
it's
time
to
start
thinking
about
an
exit
and
get
this
company
prepared,
so
for
me,
as
part
of
that
disciplinary
process,
bringing
on
other
investors
that
could
bring
that
discipline
and
that
knowledge
in-house
was
very
important.
Also,
having
a
50/50
co-founder
ownership
is
usually
not
the
best
at
that
point.
You
need
a
third
party
to
come
in
to
break
ties
and
so
on,
and
it
just
formalized
the
hell
out
of
the
business.
In
summer
of
2021,
when
we
went
through
our
due
diligence,
everything
was
just
so
perfect,
clean,
meticulous
that
we
just
blew
through
the
due
diligence,
ended
up
getting
a
great
offer.
Pablo
27:53
You
mentioned
the
50/50
partnership.
Do
you
guys
run
this
as
co-CEO
for
the
first
while?
50/50 Partnership
Nazim
27:58
I
mean,
we
first
started
as
co-founders.
Back
in
2005,
Adrian
had
more
entrepreneurial
experience,
so
he
was
taking
a
lead.
We
were
friends,
so
it
was
really
messy.
No
one
wanted
to
take
the
CEO
role.
This
is
a
lesson
to
all
founders
that
over
time
we
discovered
that
you
need
to
have
one
CEO
at
the
end.
Someone
needs
to
say
this
is
the
direction.
They're
not
choosing,
making
all
the
decisions,
but
the
tricky
decisions
that
are
the
2%
of
decisions
that
really
make
a
difference,
it
ends
up
on
the
CEO
plate.
Everybody
in
the
company
needs
to
know,
well,
that
person
had
the
final
say.
It
took
us
years
to
get
to
that
point,
but
once
we
took
the
venture,
it
was
pretty
obvious
that
I
was
going
to
be
CEO.
He
was
going
to
take
care
of
some
of
the
marketing
activities.
We
finally
made
that
formal
decision,
but
bringing
outside
capital
onboard
made
us
make
that
decision.
Looking
back
before,
it
was
a
lot
of
immaturity
and
–
not
to
make
that
decision
sooner,
but
I’m
glad
we
finally
made
it
because
it
gave
a
lot
of
clarity
within
the
business.
Pablo
29:15
It’s
funny
you
mentioned
it,
right?
Lee
and
I
did
the
exact
same
thing
at
the
beginning.
We
were
actually
formally
co-CEO,
and
it
was
amazing
until
it
was
terrible.
That's
really
the
best
way
to
describe.
At
the
beginning,
it's
both
of
us.
We're
talking
through
everything.
There's
no
staff.
There's
no
employees
or
maybe
there's
one.
Maybe
there's
two.
The
number
of
decisions,
the
velocity
of
decisions,
how
many
people
are
impacted
by
decisions,
all
that
stuff
is
more
manageable,
and
it
just
makes
sense
to
just
debate
things,
hash
things
out,
and
agree
on
something.
Then
things
start
to
grow
up,
and
you
have,
in
our
case,
30,
35
different,
employees,
a
bunch
of
different
things
going
on.
Literally,
it's
just
impossible
to
agree
on
everything,
and
so
now
what
you
have
is
a
bad
system
for
decision-making,
exactly
as
you
point
out,
where
every
decision
gets
way
over
debated.
It
takes
way
too
long
to
make
decisions.
You're
in
a
world
of
unknown,
so
even
if
you
debate
something,
it
doesn't
mean
you're
actually
that
much
closer
to
the
right
answer.
At
some
point,
you're
spinning
in
circles,
and
then
everybody
else
doesn't
know
who's
the
ultimate
decision-maker.
You
have
a
cultural
problem
and
an
actual
decision-making
problem,
so
there's
a
reason
why,
I
don't
know,
99%
of
companies
have
just
one
CEO.
Some
things
some
things
are
just
best
to
copy
rather
than
try
and
reinvent
the
wheel.
Nazim
30:33
Yeah,
absolutely.
Then
it
formalizes
the
relationship,
especially
if,
your
co-founder,
you
have
a
long
friendship
history
with
them,
so
it
formalizes
it.
Then
I
think
it
was
2018,
and
then
Adrian
realized
that
it
was
time
for
him
to
move
on
from
the
company.
That
also
created
a
lot
of
clarity
where
I
firmly
had
the
CEO
role.
He
was
like,
okay,
it's
ready
for
me
to
exit
myself
and
let
me
bring
it
to
the
next
level.
It
was
very
a
formal
process,
and
it
was
able
to
be
done
in
a
way
where
there
was
a
framework.
It
was
not
too
emotionally
charged,
right?
The
governance
and
the
clarity
is
very
important
Pablo
31:17
As
we
get
closer
and
closer
to
this
exit,
just
going
back
to
the
storyline,
you
refocus.
You
rebalance.
You
press
reset,
and
then
you
start
putting
things
into
place
that
should
drive
growth.
My
guess
is,
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong,
that
it
wasn't
one
big
thing
but
a
bunch
of
little
things.
To
the
extent
that's
true,
do
you
remember
some
of
the
more
meaningful
things
that
impacted
your
return
to
growth
and
got
you
from
ultimately,
I
guess,
8
to
15
million,
right,
which
is
a
pretty
big
jump?
Discipline and Execution to Grow
Nazim
31:46
Focus,
that
was
the
first
step.
Second
was,
okay,
we've
got
the
governance
piece.
We
got
the
discipline.
We've
got
quarterly
targets.
We
put
in
OKRs,
so
now
the
company
understands
the
execution
plan.
We
have
the
right
metrics
in
place
to
see
if
we're
on
track
or
off
track,
so
we've
got
that
process
really,
really
tight.
We
started
seeing
the
core
business,
existing
business
started
to
grow
again
just
by
discipline
and
execution,
and
then
we
brought
in
capital
so
that
we
could
have
a
little
bit
of
freedom
to
start
the
innovation
process.
Once
you
stabilize
the
core
business,
we're
like,
okay,
now
we
need
to
innovate
again.
Then
we
created
a
small,
little
innovation
team
within
the
business,
but
this
time
it
wasn't,
hey,
let's
come
up
with
a
different
app,
like
a
GIF
app
and
go
totally
off
direction.
It
was
let's
create
unique
technologies
that
could
fuel
CanvasPop
to
have
unique
products
in
the
marketplace.
It
was
my
co-founder
now
for
my
new
startup,
Mike
Montgomery,
led
design.
Paul
Spencer,
my
CTO
of
my
new
startup,
he
led
engineering
and
then
Zak
James,
who
was
dealing
with
all
the
AI
stuff.
They
made
a
small,
little
Navy
SEAL
team,
and
they
started
developing
all
these
amazing
technologies
that
were
implementing
our
new
products
in
CanvasPop.
That
ended
up
opening
up
all
these
new
revenue
streams,
gave
us
new
SEO
terms
to
start
racking
for
–
ranking
for,
and
then
it
really
started
elevating
sales
and
creating
new
channels
and
everything.
That
discipline
and
the
team
inside
were
executing
in
military
fashion,
and
it
was
all
those
series
of
things
over
the
course
of
years
put
into
play
that
got
us
from
8
million
to
15
million.
By
the
time
the
–
our
number
one
competitor,
a
half
million-dollar
company
owned
by
H.I.G
Capital,
were
doing
all
of
our
printing.
They
saw
our
volume
go
up
consistently
year
after
year,
and
then
they
started
knocking
on
the
door
because
they
wanted
to
buy
a
consumer
application
to
put
on
top
of
their
infrastructure
under
printing
infrastructure.
They
opened
up
our
financials
in
they’re…
Pablo
33:45
Just
to
back
up
there,
they
were
handling
your
printing?
Is
that
what
you
said?
Nazim
33:47
Yeah.
Pablo
33:47
Okay,
got
it.
That’s
how
they
came
–
that's
how
the
partnership
started.
Acquisition
Nazim
33:53
Yeah.
When
they
shut
down
all
the
facilities
in
2018,
we
put
all
of
our
–
they
took
care
of
all
fulfillment
printing,
but
they
were
owned
by
a
private
equity
firm.
They
also
owned
our
number
one
competitor,
so
it
was
really
weird.
The
funny
thing
is,
in
2018,
when
I
was
looking
for
partners,
I
ended
up
getting
in
contact
with
the
CEO
of
that
company,
Andrew
Cousin.
There's
a
lesson
to
be
told
to
reach
out
to
your
competition
that
are
much
bigger
for
you
because
my
competition
ended
up
purchasing
us
at
the
end.
We
built
a
relationship
and
built
the
trust
over
several
year,
and
then,
finally,
it
just
made
sense.
They
saw
our
volume.
They
saw
our
numbers.
They're
like,
okay,
if
we
just
buy
you
for
X
dollars,
then
we'll
increase
profit
by
this
much
because
we're
taking
care
of
all
the
manufacturing.
We'll
take
your
profit,
so
it
just
is
–
was
math
at
the
end
of
the
day
at
how
much
we
are
worth.
Building
relationships
in
the
industry,
even
if
they
are
your
competitors,
is
actually
a
good
thing,
and
I
didn't
realize
that
in
my
younger
years.
Pablo
34:49
Was
that
by
design?
You
did
mention,
when
you
raised
this
round,
you
did
start
thinking
about
maybe
at
some
point
you
want
to
exit.
Did
you
think,
okay,
these
are
–
this
is
one
potential
acquirer,
or
was
that
much
later
in
the
journey
that
they
just
came
knocking
and
you
were
surprised
by
it?
Nazim
35:02
Yeah.
I
thought
at
the
time
that
they
were
a
potential
acquirer,
and
they
started
rolling
up
several
of
the
companies
in
our
space.
Then,
the
fact
that
they
were
owned
by
H.I.G
Capital,
they
had
several
competitors
that
were
not
as
well
funded.
I
had
something
to
offer,
which
is
our
volume,
so
they
could
drive
their
revenues.
I
really
focused
on
the
player
that
was
owned
by
the
large
private
equity
firm
because
I
–
and
were
doing
rollups
and
acquisitions.
I
said
let's
align
myself
with
this
group
because
eventually
this
could
end
up
turning
into
something
more.
I
made
that
relationship
about
a
year
before
pushing
all
the
volume
over
to
them,
and
that
conversation,
the
CEO
at
the
time
gave
me
something
to
focus
on.
He
said,
“If
you
have
a
company
growing
20%
top
line
in
our
space
and
then
leaving
20%
net
profit
after
everything,
then
you've
got
something
special.”
I
actually
focused
all
of
our
metrics
to
get
those
two
goals,
and
then
part
of
that
process
was
outsourcing
our
manufacturing,
increasing
our
gross
margin
to
keep
getting
to
those
metrics.
Then
it
was
obvious
that
I
was
going
to
call
Andrew
and
the
guys
at
Circle
Graphics
to
be
our
partner.
Pablo
36:18
What
did
that
feel
like?
First
of
all,
just
negotiating
the
price,
getting
to
something
super
interesting,
$30
million
all
cash
for
a
company
that
wasn't
fully
bootstrapped
but
you
still
owned
a
serious
amount
–
it's
not
like
you
own
5%.
Then
getting
that
across
the
line
and
getting
the
wire
coming
in,
walk
me
through
all
that.
I
mean,
that
just
must
be
such
a
–
stressful
but
then,
ultimately,
magical
moment.
The Negotiations for Being Acquired
Nazim
36:41
Oh
man,
Pablo,
we're
talking
at
that
time
17
years,
and
then,
during
the
entire
time,
we
sold
over
$100
million
worth
of
art
over
the
course
of
all
those
years,
right?
We
built
something
great,
but
it
was
a
long
haul.
It
was
a
long
haul.
You
can
never
sell
something
on
the
way
down.
The
only
time
you're
going
to
get
an
offer
for
anything
is
it
–
it's
when
things
are
flying
up
into
the
right.
When
I
was
on
my
deathbed
after
PopKey,
I
actually
tried
to
–
I
started
looking
for
acquirers
when
growth
was
flat,
and
I
was
getting
one
to
$2
million
offers
for
the
whole
effing
business.
I'm
sitting
there
like,
wow,
after
all
those
years.
Then
I
just
cover
the
debt,
and
then
I
got
another
million
to
distribute.
This
is
brutal.
When
you
take
that
off
the
table
and
you
start
cleaning
up
the
thing
that
you
have
and
then
we
started
turning
the
business
around,
by
2021,
it
was
flying,
high
margin,
super
profitable,
all
this
innovation
coming
out,
new
products,
growth
is
going
up
direction.
Then
that's
the
time
where
you
either
got
to
raise
money
and
keep
going
the
next
level,
or
you
have
options,
optionality.
I
remember
speaking
to
the
CEO
of
our
manufacturing
company,
Circle
Graphics,
and
we
just
used
to
jam
every
few
months.
I
told
him,
“Hey,
we
have
this
innovation
team
internally.
We
came
up
with
some
really
interesting
technology,
and
I
think
I
can
have
some
really
interesting
products
using
this
tech.
I'm
thinking
of
maybe
doubling
down
on
that
part
of
the
business
and
creating
some
new
purely
digital
products.”
Then
he
said,
“Well,
you
could
just
focus
on
that
and
sell
CanvasPop.”
I
didn't
even
know
that
was
–
it
wasn't
even
part
of
the
conversation.
As
soon
as
he
said
that,
I
was
like,
huh,
interesting.
It's
like,
well,
let's
explore
that.
It
was
very
natural
and
organic,
and
by
that
time,
we
were
friendly,
right?
Then
we
did
a
mutual
NDA.
Then
we
started
sharing
some
financials.
One
part
is
they
knew
what
the
volume
was
or
growth
volume
on
their
end,
but
they
didn't
know
what
our
financials
were
because
we
could
be
blowing
all
the
money
on
marketing
and
being
very
unprofitable.
When
they
looked
at
the
financials
at
first
glance,
they
were
like,
okay,
these
are
looking
very,
very
good
because
we
focused
on
innovation.
It
wasn't
a
race
to
the
bottom.
We
are
highly
profitable.
They
had
all
the
metrics
of
all
these
other
companies
out
there,
so
they
knew
that
they
found
a
diamond
the
way
we
were
building
products.
Then
it
went
from
there,
and
they
put
in
some
initial
numbers
together.
Then
they
went
through
that
first
term
sheet,
but
then
you
got
to
go
through
due
diligence.
That
due
diligence
was
we
tried
to
get
it
done
in
six
weeks,
but
it
ended
up
taking
two
months.
It
was
actually
a
really
positive
experience.
At
that
point,
everything
was
so
clean
and
so
perfect
that
we
blew
through
the
process.
Now,
that
last
call,
when
all
the
lawyers
are
on
the
call
and
then
they
all
approve
the
acquisition,
it's
just
really
interesting
process,
and
it
was
during
COVID.
I
never
shook
hands
with
Andrew.
I
never
went
down,
and
he
said,
“This
is
a
–
one
of
the
unique
times.”
I'm
doing
this
all
through
Zoom,
and
then
he
had
a
few
words
to
say.
Then
I
had
a
few
words
to
say,
and
at
that
moment,
you
hang
up.
Then
the
money
all
gets
wired
to
everyone.
Pablo
40:14
Incredible.
Nazim
40:14
When
I
hung
up
–
and
I
owned
35%
of
the
company
at
that
point,
right?
Seventeen
years,
everything,
I
hung
up,
and
I
felt
like
I
was
on
the
battlefield.
Was
it
a
billion-dollar
exit?
No.
Was
it
a
100
X
for
my
investors?
No,
but
it
was
a
four
X
for
all
my
investors
within
three
and
a
half
years.
It
created
a
ton
of
trust
with
us.
I
finally
got
some
cash
off
the
table.
When
the
money
came
out,
funny
thing
is
everybody
got
their
money
in
their
account
within
hours,
and
my
check
was
the
only
one
–
my
wire
was
the
only
one
that
got
stuck.
It
ended
up
going
into
some
ether,
and
I
knew
what
it
was.
Not
to
get
into
the
details,
but
it
was
my
name
is
Nazim.
I
mean,
I
won't
say
anything,
but
it
was
across
border,
very
large
eight-figure
check
into
a
personal
account
that
never
had
that
much
money
before.
It
disappeared,
and
no
one
could
find
it
for
10
days.
Obviously,
there
was
some
heavy
due
diligence
happening
like
who
is
he?
What’s
this
all
about?
Anyway,
to
make
a
long
story
short,
it
finally
showed
up,
and
then
I
just
thanked
my
wife
for
dealing
with
me
for
all
those
year
and
the
line
–
and
signing
on
the
line
of
credit
and
getting
me
through
all
those
moments
and
at
the
same
time,
I
raised
$3
million
for
a
new
startup
from
all
just
the
investors
because
I
built
that
trust,
and
then
I
was
off.
I
took
three
days
off
and
I
was
off
[unclear]
because
I
looked
at
it
as
okay,
the
job's
not
done.
I
went
on
to
build
a
really
big
company,
but
I
looked
at
it
as
the
next
milestone.
Man,
it
was
a
great
feeling.
Pablo
41:30
How
much
time
from
that
first
conversation
where
you
opened
this
idea
of
selling
until
Wire
lands
in
your
account?
Nazim
41:30
I
think
the
whole
process
took
about
two
and
a
half
months
because
once
a
conversation
happened,
very
quickly,
within
a
couple
of
weeks,
we
got
to
an
initial
term
sheet.
Then
it
went
through
two
months
of
due
diligence.
Of
course,
like
I
mentioned,
it
was
three
years
of
relationship-building,
then
really
getting
comfortable
with
us
as
a
brand
and
so
on.
So
it
always
starts
much,
much
earlier.
Pablo
41:30
Did
you
manage
to
keep
yourself
grounded
during
those,
let's
say,
three
months,
or
were
you
counting
dollars?
It's
hard
not
to.
You
got
this
big,
life-changing
amount
of
dollars
coming
to
your
bank
account.
I
remember
when
I
--
I've
told
the
story
many
times
--
almost
got
acquired.
I
was
much
younger
than
you
were
at
the
time,
so
probably
much
dumber.
But
combine
stuff
in
my
head
but
wow,
blah,
blah,
blah.
What
was
that
like?
Nazim
41:30
I
think
during
at
that
moment,
I
think
it
happened
to
me
at
the
right
age
at
that
point.
I'm
45
years
old.
I've
got
two
kids
at
that
point
where
were
9
and
11.
I
was
still
sobered
up
by
that
point
that
it
was
a
very
different
focus.
It
was
get
this
over
the
line,
do
good
by
my
investors,
do
good
by
my
employees.
Okay,
what's
next?
What
am
I
building
next?
So
it
was
a
little
bit
of
a
different
thing
than
if
i
had
done
it
in
my
20s,
which
I
probably
wouldn't
have
had
the
maturity
to
get
it
there.
Then
as
soon
as
the
money
came
in,
it
was
really
paying
off
mortgages
and
then
talking
to
wealth
advisors
and
doing
all
the
nerdy
stuff
but
had
a
little
bit
of
fun.
I
won't
get
into
it,
but
I
had
a
little
fun
for
the
first
few
months
with
family.
I
got
some
major,
fun
purchases.
My
brain
was
like
okay,
what
can
I
build
now
that
I
don't
have
a
noose
around
my
neck
of
mortgages
and
always
on
the
edge?
I
could
take
some
more
risk
and
swing
bigger.
That's
what
the
freedom
was.
That's
the
best
feeling
on
earth.
Now
I'm
a
year
and
a
half
into
the
new
startup
and
crazy
first
year.
That
will
be
the
next
show,
but
we're
starting
to
see
product
market
fit
now,
so
it's
exciting
times
again.
Just
went
right
back
into
the
fire.
Okay,
what
can
I
build
now?
Pablo
41:30
Okay,
let's
stop
it
there.
I'll
ask
the
last
two
questions
that
we
always
end
on.
Looking
back
now
at
DNA11
or
CanvasPop,
when
was
the
first
time
you
felt
like
you
had
true
product
market
fit?
Nazim
41:30
For
DNA11,
it
was
the
first
news
article
where
USA
Today
wrote
an
article
on
it,
drove
a
significant
amount
of
traffic
on
the
website,
and
the
conversion
completely
matched
the
conversion
that
we're
seeing
when
we
had
low
volumes
and
we
started
seeing
sales
after
that
daily.
Network
effects
started
growing
in
terms
of
our
existing
customers
sharing
with
their
friends.
It
was
at
that
point
that
I
knew
okay,
this
is
something
that
is
still
niche
but
we
can
at
least
scale.
For
CanvasPop,
it
was
we're
building
DNA11,
and
we
had
all
these
printers
going.
Then
two
things
happened;
one,
my
friend
was
working
for
Sleiman's
at
the
time,
and
he
came
to
me
and
he
said,
"Hey,
I
have
$30,000
budget
for
artwork
all
throughout
all
of
these
bars
all
across
Canada.
Can
you
make
these
Sleiman's
art
portraits
for
me?"
Here
I
am
selling
DNA
portraits
and
then
in
one
go,
I
get
a
$30,000
check.
The
second
thing
that
happened
to
me
is
everyone
started
coming
and
asking,
can
I
get
my
photos
printed
as
artwork?
Then
at
that
point,
we're
like
okay,
now
there's
a
demand.
Launch
the
website
so
we
can
do
it
at
scale.
Then
from
day
one,
we
had
DNA11
customers
we
seeded
with,
and
then
we
started
seeing
sales
immediately,
so
you
know.
Pablo
41:30
Then
the
last
question,
now
you
started
a
new
company
called
Remix.
What's
one
of
the
biggest
--
taking
everything
you've
learned
over
the
last
15-plus
years,
what's
one
of
the
biggest
lessons
or
pieces
of
advice
that
you've
ingrained
in
yourself
as
you
start
this
new
venture?
Nazim
41:30
Number
one,
be
ready
for
a
20-year
commitment.
It's
a
marathon,
not
a
sprint.
Number
two,
collaboration
over
competition.
You
don't
do
it
alone.
You
look
for
ways
to
collaborate
with
other
entities
that
can
help
you
keep
getting
to
the
next
level
if
you
can
bring
the
valley
also.
Number
three,
focus,
focus,
focus,
focus
as
much
as
you
possibly
can
on
one
problem
and
solve
that
problem
the
best
you
can,
but
it
could
be
in
different
ways;
really
laser-focus
on
that
problem.
Then
finally,
last
but
not
least,
don't
take
any
sort
of
finaicial
transactions,
sale
online,
getting
your
first
customers
for
granted.
That
is
magic
when
that
happens.
Get
even
more
focused
and
really
double
down
as
to
what
drove
that
transaction
so
you
can
do
more
of
it.
That's
it.
Pablo
41:30
Perfect.
Nas,
thanks
so
much
for
taking
us
through
all
that.
That
was
awesome.
I
think
founders
are
going
to
love
it.
Nazim
41:30
Thanks,
Pablo.
Can't
wait
to
come
back
in
a
couple
of
years
for
the
next
one.
Pablo
41:30
If
you
listened
to
this
episode
and
this
show
and
you
like
it,
I
have
a
huge
favor
to
ask
of
you.
Well,
it's
actually
a
really
small
favor
but
has
huge
impact.
Whichever
app
you're
listening
to
this
app
on,
take
it
out.
Go
to
Product
Market
Fit
Show
and
leave
a
review,
please.
It's
going
to
help
--
it's
not
just
going
to
help
me,
to
be
clear.
It's
going
to
help
other
founders
discover
this
show
becuase
the
algorithms,
whether
it's
Spotify,
whether
it's
Apple,
whether
it's
any
other
podcast
player,
one
of
the
big
things
they
look
at
is
frequency
of
reviews.
It's
quantity
of
reviews
and
the
reality
is,
if
all
of
you
listening
right
now
left
reviews,
we
would
have
thousands
of
reviews.
So
please,
take
literally
a
minute,
even
if
you're
just
writing,
"Great
podcast,"
or
"I
love
this
podcast,"
whatever
it
is,
just
write
a
few
words.
Obviously,
the
longer,
the
better.
The
more
detailed,
the
better,
but
write
anything.
Leave
five
stars
and
you
will
be
helping
me
but
most
importantly,
many
other
founders
just
like
you
discover
this
show.
Thank
you.