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Episode 42June 29, 2026
EP 43 - Render - V1
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The full conversation.
Cold Open And Five-Star Ask
SPEAKER_00
0:00
You
don't
really
have
product
market
fit
until
you're
growing
naturally.
And
that
usually
happens
when
your
users
are
spreading
the
word.
You
really
have
to
find
founder
market
fit.
I
think
that's
crucially
important
if
you're
really
in
it
for
the
long
run.
Because
if
you're
successful,
you're
going
to
be
in
it
for
the
long
run.
So
you
better
like
what
you're
doing.
Otherwise,
you're
kind
of
stuck.
Pablo Srugo
0:22
How
long
from
zero
to
10
million
ARR?
Like
how
long
did
that
take?
SPEAKER_00
0:25
Oh,
it
took
a
while.
Three
years.
Yeah.
I
mean,
from
the
founding
of
the
company,
certainly
almost
four
years
to
get
to
10
million
AR.
And
like
VCs
wouldn't
fund
a
company
like
that
these
days.
That's
product
market
fit.
Product
market
fit.
Product
market
fit.
I
called
it
the
product
market
fit
question.
Product
market
fit.
Product
market
fit.
Product
market
fit.
Pablo Srugo
0:47
Product
market
fit.
SPEAKER_00
0:48
I
mean
the
name
of
the
show
is
Product
Market
Fit.
Pablo Srugo
0:50
Do
you
think
the
Product
Market
Fit
show
has
product
market
fit?
Because
if
you
do,
then
there's
something
you
just
have
to
do.
You
have
to
take
up
your
phone.
You
have
to
leave
the
show
five
stars.
It
lets
us
reach
more
founders
and
it
lets
us
get
better
guests.
Thank
you.
What Product Market Fit Feels Like
Pablo Srugo
1:04
Anrug,
welcome
to
the
show,
man.
Thank
you.
I'm
really
happy
to
be
here.
So
uh
you're
on
quite
a
ride.
I
mean,
you
were
employee
number
eight
at
Stripe,
which
is
a
pretty
crazy
accomplishment
on
its
own.
And
then
you
uh
started
render
a
few
years
ago,
kind
of
2018-2019,
and
you've
raised
$250
million.
You
just
raised
$100
million
at
a
$1.5
billion
valuation.
So
it's
been
quite
the
hockey
stick
ride.
And
we're
gonna
talk,
you
did
a
lot
of
things
differently.
So
we're
gonna
talk
a
lot
about
how
you
you
made
every
piece
happen.
But
let's
start
with
the
early
stage
climax
moment,
right?
Which
is
product
market
fit.
Tell
me,
when
did
you
feel
like
you'd
found
true
product
market
fit?
SPEAKER_00
1:44
Yeah,
for
render,
there
was
definitely
a
sense
of
people
saying
amazing
things
about
the
product
and
then
just
wanting
more.
And
before
we
had
launched,
everything
was
fine.
We
could
ship
things
at
our
own
pace.
There
were
no
customers
asking
us
for
things.
And
we
took
our
time,
we
got
the
product
to
a
point
that
we
were
proud
of.
And
then
when
we
launched,
we
suddenly
started
getting
all
these
pulls
from
customers
saying,
Hey,
I
love
this,
but
I
really
want
this
other
thing.
I
love
this
other
thing,
but
now
I
want
this
other
thing.
And
it
felt
very
much
like
we
were
just
trying
to
keep
up.
And
that
to
me
is
always
a
great
sign
of
product
market
fit
when
your
product
doesn't
have
all
the
features,
but
what
you
have
is
valuable
enough
for
people
to
truly
invest
their
time
in
it
and
to
take
the
time
to
ask
you
for
more
things.
Because
the
worst
thing
that
can
happen
is
people
don't
care
about
your
product,
right?
And
then
they
just
move
on
and
they
don't
need
new
features.
But
when
you
build
something
that
is
incomplete
that
people
are
willing
to
try
to
use
to
pay
you
for,
and
they
want
it
to
get
better.
For
us,
that
happened
shortly
after
we
launched
in
uh
as
part
of
TechCrunch
Disrupt
in
2019.
TechCrunch
has
this
annual
competition,
which
is
also
shown
in
the
HBO
show,
Silicon
Valley.
And
we
ended
up
competing
and
winning
that
show
that
year.
Uh,
not
the
show,
the
competition.
That
led
to
a
lot
of
new
users
coming
in,
and
all
of
these
people
wanted
more
things.
They
continued
to
be
users,
but
they
wanted
more
things
because
the
platform
was
pretty
early
back
then.
But
that
was
a
first
instance
of
like,
okay,
I
think
we're
really
onto
something
here.
Pablo Srugo
3:34
Let
me
dive
deeper
on
that.
Like,
I
would
agree
that
what
you're
saying
is
like
a
necessary
condition
for
product
market
fit.
The
question
to
you
is
when
do
you
know
that
it's
sufficient?
And
you
know,
I'll
give
you
an
example.
I
was
talking
to
a
startup
actually
earlier
today
that
I
would
argue
doesn't
yet
have
true
product
market
fit.
They
don't
have
that
like
hyper
growth
that
tends
to
follow
from
this.
They
do
have
users,
they
do
have
people
that
like
the
product.
And
so,
I
mean,
there's
a
lot
of
times
you
put
out
products
and
nobody
really
cares.
Obviously,
that's
the
worst.
But
there's
a
lot
of
people
that
have
a
product
that
they'll
say,
yeah,
there's
an
amount
of
users
that
do
like
it,
they
they
use
it,
they
love
it,
and
yet
they
never
get
hyper
growth.
They
never
get
the
true
outcomes
of
product
market
fit.
For
you,
what's
the
difference
between
that
and
kind
of
what
you
are
feeling?
Word Of Mouth As The Real Test
SPEAKER_00
4:14
I
think
people
have
to
love
it
enough
to
tell
other
people
about
it.
So
you
have
to
have
this
viral
word
of
mouth
growth.
It
doesn't
have
to
be
viral,
it
has
to
be
word
of
mouth.
And
so
every
person
who
uses
it
is
like,
why
isn't
my
friend
using
it?
Or
why
am
I
not
sending
it
to
this
other
person
who
could
also
use
it?
And
this
doesn't
happen
with
all
domains,
right?
For
a
lot
of
products,
you
typically
don't
have
other
people
who
need
the
product.
So
for
render,
though,
it
was
very
clear
because
fundamentally
we
allow
application
developers
to
host
their
applications
online.
And
when
you
think
about
it,
application
developers
love
trying
new
tools.
And
when
they
find
something
they
really
like,
they
love
to
tell
other
people
about
it.
And
it
might
not
be
one-to-one,
they
might
write
a
blog
post
about
it,
they
might
write
on
hacker
news
about
it.
And
so
you
have
to
create
natural
growth.
You
can't
just
rely
on
ads
and
feed
people
into
the
funnel.
All
of
that
is
useful
and
necessary
as
well.
But
you
don't
really
have
product
market
fit
until
you're
growing
naturally.
And
that
usually
happens
when
your
users
are
spreading
the
word.
Pablo Srugo
5:28
And
what
would
you
say
having
been
through
it,
lived
through
it,
is
the
number
one
driver
of
word
of
mouth?
Because
I
agree,
if
you
get
word
of
mouth,
it's
a
huge
tailwind
for,
well,
as
frankly,
as
long
as
you
have
it.
It
is
a
massive
strategic,
competitive
edge,
whatever
you
want
to
call
it.
But
what
do
you
think
is
the
main
driver
of
getting
that?
SPEAKER_00
5:47
I
think
it's
a
combination
of
all
the
different
things
that
make
your
product
sufficiently
differentiated
and
sufficiently
valuable
for
the
right
audience.
So
it
can't
be
everything
to
everyone.
You
really
have
to
pick
who
you're
building
for.
And
then
you
have
to
make
sure
that
it's
different
enough
from
what
already
exists
out
there,
because
you
know,
you
know,
you
might
as
well
use
the
other
product.
What's
special
about
yours?
And
then
different
in
the
right
ways
that
creates
value
for
your
customers.
So
you
can't
expect
different
results
if
you're
simply
building
what
the
other
folks
are
building.
So
you
have
to
think
about
what
your
difference
is,
whether
it's
developer
experience
in
our
case,
or
it's
some
combination
of
pricing
and
how
all
the
systems,
how
all
your
different
services
connect
to
each
other.
It's
the
set
of
features
that
you
provide
at
that
price
point.
A
lot
of
those
things
have
to
be
collectively
different.
So
people
are
saying,
okay,
well,
you
know,
I've
tried
all
these
other
things,
but
this
is
the
thing
that
works
best
for
me.
And
it's
really
important
to
identify
who
that
customer
is
because
until
you
do
that,
you
can't
actually
build
the
differentiated
product
that
that
customer
needs.
So
I
would
say
a
lot
of
startups
end
up
making
this
mistake
early
on
of
trying
to
build
everything
for
everyone.
And
I
know
that
everyone
talks
about
this
mistake,
but
you
have
to
make
tough
choices
and
you
have
to
start
with
a
segment
that
you
think
you
can
build
the
best
product
for
and
the
most
differentiated
product
Time To Value And Fast Deploys
SPEAKER_00
7:24
for.
Pablo Srugo
7:24
Based
on
many
of
the
founders
that
I've
interviewed
on
the
show,
I've
got
a
bit
of
a
theory,
and
frankly,
from
some
of
the
founders
that
have
told
me
themselves,
like
that
time
to
value
itself
is
a
big
indicator,
leading
indicator
of
word
of
mouth.
I'm
curious
for
your
product.
Is
that
true?
Do
you
get
value
quickly?
Like,
where
does
a
developer
see
the
value?
How
do
they
see
the
value?
SPEAKER_00
7:43
Yeah.
So
we
optimize
for
people
getting
to
running
a
live
application
as
quickly
as
possible.
So
all
you
have
to
do
is
connect
your
GitHub
repo
and
render
spins
up
a
server
for
you
with
your
URL,
all
the
certificates
taken
care
of,
all
the
settings.
But
you
have
to
do
basically
nothing
to
get
a
simple
server
up
and
running
other
than
connect
your
Git
repo.
And
that
to
us
is
the
fastest
way
in
many
ways
to
get
a
server
up
and
running,
which
is
why
if
you
go
to
our
website
today,
our
hero
image
still
says
the
fastest
path
to
production.
Pablo Srugo
8:20
What
was
the
before
and
after?
Like
things
have
obviously
changed
a
lot,
but
when
you
launched
this
in
like
2019,
2020,
what
was
the
was
the
current
state
of
affair
you
got
to
do
all
that
manually,
or
like
what
were
people
used
to
relative
to
what
you
offered?
SPEAKER_00
8:31
Oh,
I
think
people
were
really
used
to
having
to
configure
a
bunch
of
things.
Yeah.
I
mean,
it
depends
on
what
you
were
using,
but
like
AWS
was
and
kind
of
remains
a
nightmare
if
you
want
to
spin
up
a
simple
server.
And
then
there
were
some
tools
that
worked
for
the
front
end.
I
think
Netlify
and
Vercel
at
the
time
were
good
for
the
front
end.
But
there
was
nothing
that
lets
you
spin
up
this
combination
of
a
simple
server
really
quickly
along
with
a
database
and
also
a
let's
say
a
Redis
instance
or
a
background
worker,
all
of
that
together,
especially
at
a
reasonable
price
point
and
with
modern
features,
like
things
like
private
networking
built
in,
things
like
HTTP3,
HTTP
2
protocols
built
in.
So
there
were
some
other
tools,
older
things
that
had
been
around
for
a
while,
but
they
were
kind
of
stuck
in
the
past.
And
so
modern
developers
really
responded
to
what
render
had
to
offer,
and
they
still
do,
and
that's
still
driving
our
word
of
mouth.
I
mean,
we're
signing
up
hundreds
and
hundreds
of
thousands
of
developers
every
month.
And
that's
all
word
of
mouth.
We're
not
driving
that
through
ads.
Pablo Srugo
9:39
And
to
be
clear,
even
back
then,
that
would
mean
you
go
from
doing
that
manually,
which
is
not
just
takes
a
long
time,
but
is
just
like
annoying
stuff
that's
preventing
you
from
getting
your
app
to
production,
which
is
what
a
developer,
whether
doing
it
for
themselves
or
somewhere
else,
like
that's
what
they
want
to
do
with
the
thing
they've
built.
And
now
you
can
just
you
connect
your
repo,
it's
live,
presumably
in
minutes.
Like,
is
it
that
quick?
Or
was
it
that
quick?
SPEAKER_00
10:00
Yeah,
yeah.
It's
it's
it's
less
than
a
couple
of
minutes
in
a
lot
of
cases.
And
I
think
the
main
thing
that
render
gives
you
when
I
think
about
it,
isn't
just
the
ease
of
getting
started.
It's
also
the
reliability,
security,
stability
that
you
need
as
your
application
scales.
So
there's
a
bunch
of
platforms
out
there
that'll
make
it
easy
to
get
started.
And
when
you
need
features,
when
you're
getting
more
users,
when
you're
getting
production
scaling,
then
they
are
either
not
reliable
or
they
don't
have
the
features,
or
something
else
happens
and
that
forces
you
to
migrate
away
to
something
like
AWS,
and
then
you
have
to
build
everything
yourself.
The
render
promise
is
that
you
don't
have
to,
that
we
continue
to
build
capabilities
into
our
systems.
So
you
can
start
out
at
paying
us
$7
a
month,
but
then
you
can
also
become
a
company
that
is
so
big
that
you're
paying
us
millions
and
millions
of
dollars
every
year,
which
companies
do
now.
Pablo Srugo
11:00
That
makes
sense.
And
you
know,
I'm
I'm
driving
at
the
time
to
value
thing
because
I
think
what
you're
talking
about
now
is
what
affects
usage
and
retention
and
expansion
and
all
that
also
critical
thing.
And
you
you
mentioned
earlier
the
difference
between
virality
and
word
of
mouth,
right?
Like
virality,
social
network,
you
need
other
people
on
that
product
to
make
it
better
for
yourself.
Word
of
mouth,
you
don't
really
get
anything,
you're
not
doing
it
for
the
you
know,
the
referral
bonus
points
or
whatever,
generally
speaking.
You're
just
doing
it
because
you
you
want
to
be
the
first
to
know.
You
want
to
tell
your
friends,
you
want
to
help
you,
whatever
it
is,
but
it
it
isn't
like
a
clear
transaction.
So
when
do
you
do
it?
You
do
it
when
you're
so
wowed
by
the
product
so
quickly,
and
you
expect
the
person
you
refer,
you
tell
about
this
product,
they're
gonna
be
wowed
quickly.
Like
if
you
know
they're
gonna
have
to
onboard
for
three
weeks
or
two
weeks
or
even
four
hours,
uh,
you're
like,
I
yeah,
you
maybe
say,
you
know,
try
this
thing,
but
it's
gonna
be
a
bit
of
work.
You
know,
like
you
you
don't
want
to
be
the
guy
that
whereas
if
you
know,
hey,
you're
gonna
do
this
thing
and
right
away
you're
gonna
see
value,
you
might
tell
10
people,
guys,
you
have
to
try
this
thing.
And
that's
you
know,
that's
just
one
thing
the
founder
can
always
think
about
is
whatever
your
longer
term
value
is,
how
do
you
get
them
to,
if
you
really
want
word
of
mouth?
It's
not
gonna
come
from
the
referral
incentives
almost
never.
I
mean,
Dropbox
maybe,
but
rarely,
right?
It's
it's
gonna
come
from
getting
somebody
to
that
woman
quick
that
they
organically
just
want
to
do
it.
They
want
to
tell
their
friends
because
the
the
social
cost
is
low.
SPEAKER_00
12:21
Yeah.
However,
there
are
counterexamples
where
uh
time
to
value
was
actually
really
high,
uh,
but
word
of
mouth
was
awesome.
And
you
know,
the
canonical
example
here
is
superhuman,
the
mail
app,
where
you
actually
had
to
go
through
an
interview
before
you
got
access
to
it.
And
I
I
don't
think
you
have
to
do
that
anymore.
And
the
app
has
been
acquired
or
merged
with
someone
else.
Anyway,
but
the
point
was
everyone
was
raving
about
superhuman
at
one
point,
but
then
you
to
get
in,
you
had
to
get
on
a
call
with
someone
and
spend
30
minutes
to
actually
get
access
to
superhuman.
So
that's
a
very
different
kind
of
setup.
Pablo Srugo
13:03
Very
counterintuitive,
yes,
that's
true.
I
mean,
for
every
startup
rule,
there's
there's
a
lot
of
exceptions
to
it.
Founder Market Fit And Picking A Problem
Pablo Srugo
13:09
So
now
let's
let's
go
now
that
we
know
kind
of
where
where
that
moment
was
where
you
where
you
felt
like
things
were
working,
you
know,
we'd
love
to
go
through
the
story
a
little
bit,
especially
the
before.
I
mean,
why
do
you
decide
to
start
a
company
and
what
what
was
kind
of
the
original,
the
idea?
What's
the
origin
story
here?
SPEAKER_00
13:26
So
having
been
that
early
at
Stripe,
and
you
know,
I
stayed
there
for
almost
five
years,
I
was
at
a
point
in
my
career
where,
you
know,
I
didn't
really
have
to
do
anything.
I
didn't
have
to
work.
Stripe
had
done
really
well.
And
so
I
asked
myself,
how
can
I
best
spend
the
rest
of
my
life?
And
it
wasn't
just
me.
My
wife
and
I
both
sort
of
asked
this
question
of
us
together.
And
I
think
the
answer
was
we
would
like
to
contribute
back
to
the
world
in
a
way
that
we're
excited
by.
And
for
me,
building
things
and
building
teams
and
organizations
was
and
remains
incredibly
exciting
in
the
service
of
solving
a
large
problem.
And
I
spent
almost
a
year
and
a
half
thinking
through
fairly
deeply
which
problems
would
appeal
to
me
enough
so
I
could
spend
ideally
the
rest
of
my
career
on
them.
And
I
looked
at
healthcare,
I
looked
at
real-time
infrastructure.
Pablo Srugo
14:26
I'd
love
to
go
deep
on
this
year
and
a
half
because
it's
often
skipped
and
it's
exceptionally
important
because
then
a
lot
of
things
come
out
of
that.
Like
where
you
start
is
the
end
point
of
that
year.
So
we'd
love
to
kind
of
go
through
that
in
a
good
amount
of
detail,
just
how
you
thought
about
it,
how
you
broke
it
down,
why
you
looked
the
space
that
you
looked
at,
and
so
on.
SPEAKER_00
14:45
Yeah.
So
one
of
the
ways
in
which
I
started
exploring
these
domains
was
okay,
well,
what
are
the
big
problems
out
there
right
now?
And
what
can
I
do
to
help?
Right.
Like
it
has
to
be
the
intersection
of
my
talents
and
skills
and
interests
and
what
the
problem
needs
to
be
solved.
And
you
know,
by
some
measures,
solving
world
peace
is
perhaps
one
of
the
biggest
problems
there
is,
but
I'm
not
the
right
person.
I
just
didn't
think
I
was
the
right
person
to
do
that
given
everything
that
I'd
done.
And
it
wasn't
interesting
in
a
way
that
I
would,
I
think,
find
like
personally
fulfilling
on
a
day-to-day
basis,
even
when
things
are
not
going
well.
And
so
that's
what
you
have
to
think
about.
Okay,
are
you
working
on
something
that
you
are
excited
by
and
will
continue
to
work
on
even
when
things
are
not
going
well?
And
are
you
going
to
get
up
every
day
for
years?
Like
in
the
best
case,
many
decades,
uh,
but
in
the
worst
case,
at
least
a
few
years,
uh,
assuming
you
raise
funding
for
enough
of
those
years.
It
doesn't
matter
how
successful
they
are
on
the
outside.
Pretty
much
every
company
is
chaos
on
the
inside
when
they're
growing.
Lots
of
chaos
all
the
time.
I
saw
this
at
Stripe,
I
see
it
at
Render.
You
ask
any
hyper-growth
company
right
now,
there's
tons
of
chaos.
Pablo Srugo
16:08
I
love
how
from
the
outside,
from
the
headlines,
you
always
just
think
it's
like
a
smooth,
especially
if
you
haven't
done
it
or
you're
just
starting
like
smooth
up
into
the
right,
I
would
love
to
be
that,
and
you
would
love
to
be
that.
But
when
you're
in
it,
it
feels
very
different.
And
sometimes
when
you
grow
so
fast,
your
runways
get
tight,
and
you
know,
the
the
difference
between
making
it
really
big
and
actually
just
failing
might
be
closer
than
you
think.
It's
it's
a
pretty
crazy
world
inside
there.
SPEAKER_00
16:29
Oh,
yeah.
When
you
look
at
all
these
companies
that
eventually
make
it,
there
are
several
times
during
their
journeys
when
things
could
have
gone
very
differently
and
they
would
have
shut
down.
So
going
back
to
what
I
was
doing
in
the
year
and
a
half,
I
was
really
trying
to
find
that
problem,
the
domain
that
was
big
enough,
ambitious
enough.
Uh,
because
if
it's
not
big
or
ambitious,
then
you
don't
have
to
spend
a
lot
of
time
on
it,
right?
Like
you
you
build
it
and
you
you're
done,
you
sell
the
company,
whatever.
And
if
it
is
big
enough,
ambitious
enough,
then
actually
spending
more
time
on
it
can
get
you
outsized
rewards
because
your
work
compounds.
And
so
every
new
thing,
for
example,
that
we
add
to
render,
now
it's
there.
And
now
it's
there
for
the
next
decade
of
or
the
next
several
decades.
Everyone
who
uses
render
will
have
every
new
feature
we
add,
right?
Like
it's
something
that
we
keep
building,
and
it's
there's
a
lot
to
build
because
also
the
way
people
develop
applications
keeps
changing.
And
how
do
we
help
them
regardless
of
how
they're
building
their
apps?
Earlier
it
was
traditional
apps,
these
days
it's
AI
apps,
and
we
want
to
continue
to
enable
the
platform
to
support
application
developers
no
matter
what
it
is
that
they're
building.
And
not
just
application
developers,
these
days
it's
also
agents.
How
do
we
make
the
platform
work
really
well
with
the
coding
agents
that
every
developer
is
using
so
they
can
do
whatever
it
is
that
they're
trying
to
do
much
faster?
But
anyway,
so
I
was
going
through
this.
Um,
I
looked
at
healthcare
for
a
while,
learned
everything
that
I
could
about
healthcare,
and
then
realized
that
I
was
not
going
to
help
solve
healthcare
through
technology.
And
I
wasn't
really
the
kind
of
person
who
was
happy
to
have
like
three-year
deal
cycles
with
large
hospitals.
I
just
wanted
people
to
start
using
the
product
immediately
and
get
feedback
and
iterate
on
it
and
like
continue
to
build
great
products
and
win
on
the
basis
of
that.
Healthcare
is
not
that.
Pablo Srugo
18:27
I
also
think,
by
the
way,
just
to
pause
on
that,
like,
I
think
that
that's
a
pretty
classic
failure
mode
of
some
of
the
more
ambitious
founders,
which
is
you
obviously
you
start
with
the
biggest
problems.
And
I
think
somewhere
where
you
can
add
value
is
a
pretty
classic
thing.
But
I
do
think
people
forget
a
lot
of
times,
or
I've
seen
this
before,
technology
often
is
not
the
solution.
When
you
really
dive
deep,
you
realize,
oh,
there
are
other
problems
that
are
tech
might
address
this
stuff
on
the
edges.
It's
not
going
to
fix
that.
And
so
you're
tackling
a
big
problem,
but
only
the
small
little
pieces
of
it,
and
it's
a
mismatch.
SPEAKER_00
18:57
Exactly.
So
I
sadly
stopped
spending
time
on
healthcare
after
a
few
months.
And
then
I
looked
at
a
few
other
domains,
but
then
another
thing
I
looked
at
became
interesting.
This
was
very
early
when
deep
learning
was
just
starting
to
become
a
thing.
And
there
were
people
online
who
were
trying
to
get
their
deep
learning
setups
on
AWS
when
there
was
just
one
GPU
type
available
in
the
cloud
and
AWS
offered
it.
But
you
needed
to
set
up
your
NVIDIA
libraries
and
all
the
other
libraries
on
top
in
a
way
that
was
very
finicky.
And
so,
just
especially
if
you
were
a
data
scientist
trying
to
do
this,
it
was
pretty
much
impossible
for
you
to
do
it
on
your
own.
And
I
was
taking
a
course
on
deep
learning
online,
and
the
person
who
was
teaching
the
course,
he
had
like
a
lecture
that
spanned
two
or
three
weeks
of
work
to
get
this
GPU-backed
Jupyter
notebook
online.
So
the
data
scientists
could
actually
work
on
the
things
that
they
wanted
to
work
on.
And
I
thought
that
was
a
big
waste
of
time
for
everyone,
obviously.
And
so
I
ended
up
building
something
that
gave
everyone
a
single-click
Jupyter
notebook
in
the
cloud
backed
by
a
GPU.
Pablo Srugo
20:12
This
was
just
as
part
of
the
course,
like
you
did
it
for
your
the
classmates
sort
of
thing,
or
you
did
this
as
a
product?
SPEAKER_00
20:17
I
mean,
I
started
building
it
for
them,
but
I
built
it
as
an
independent
product.
Got
it.
It
actually
took
off.
Again,
through
word
of
mouth,
because
it
was
so
easy
to
use.
I
quickly
got
to
like
10,000
data
scientists
on
the
platform.
Wow.
But
I
realized
after
spending
some
time
on
it,
that
I
care
more
about
the
needs
of
application
developers
than
those
of
data
scientists.
And
so
I
could
have
continued
to
focus
on
data
science
infrastructure,
or
just,
you
know,
eventually
that
would
have
become
AI
infrastructure
and
so
on.
For
me,
it
felt
very
clear
that
the
broader
problem
of
just
getting
anything
online
was
still
unsolved
in
a
lot
of
ways.
Pablo Srugo
21:03
Was
that
more
personal
or
was
that
more
market
size
driven,
the
decision
to
focus
on
application
versus
data
science?
SPEAKER_00
21:10
I
think
it
was
more
personal
because
I'd
never
been
a
data
scientist
myself.
And
I
knew
deeply
what
the
issues
were
around
application
development.
And
yes,
the
market
size
may
have
been
bigger,
but
who
knows?
Because
these
days,
the
market
size
for
AI
infrastructure.
Pablo Srugo
21:30
Yeah,
it's
gone
pretty
big.
SPEAKER_00
21:32
Exactly.
So
so
again,
it
you
really
have
to
find
founder
market
fit.
I
think
that's
crucially
important
if
you're
really
in
it
for
the
long
run.
Because
if
you're
successful,
you're
going
to
be
in
it
for
the
long
run.
So
you
better
like
what
you're
doing.
Otherwise,
you're
kind
of
stuck.
So
I
did
all
these
things.
I
kept
getting
drawn
to
infrastructure
and
I
kept
getting
drawn
to
productivity
and
especially
developer
productivity.
And
that
to
me
was
a
realization
of
Like,
okay,
well,
I
keep
coming
back
to
this.
I
guess
I
need
to
solve
this
problem
of
application
developers
putting
their
apps
online.
And
I
realized
it
was
a
pretty
big
task.
It
was
very
ambitious
over
the
long
term.
I
was
going
up
against
the
hyperscalers.
I
was
going
to
go
up
in
a
very
crowded
market,
but
it
was
a
very
large
market.
And
it
wasn't
serving
application
developers
well.
So
there
are
very
large
markets
where
some
people
are
served
really
well,
but
there's
a
whole
underserved
segment
in
that
market
that
is
being
served
somehow
suboptimally.
What
was
happening
and
what
still
happens
a
lot
with
the
hyperscalers
is
in
every
company
you
end
up
building
some
sort
of
DevOps
team
that
manages
the
nitty-gritties
of
the
hyperscalers.
But
all
they
do
is
give
you
a
sort
of
poorer
approximation
of
render.
Um
so
the
application
engineers
don't
have
to
worry
about
infrastructure.
Pablo Srugo
22:57
I'm
really
worried
because
listen,
like
you've
been
listening
for
like
what,
10,
20,
30
minutes
now.
Clearly
you
like
it.
And
the
thing
is,
the
next
episode
is
way
better
and
you're
gonna
miss
it.
You're
gonna
miss
it
because
you're
not
following
the
show.
Why Hyperscalers Don’t Build This
Pablo Srugo
23:10
So
take
your
phone
out
and
hit
that
follow
button.
I
have
a
big
question
on
this
because
some
of
these
problems,
like
however
you
get
to
them,
may
be
non-obvious.
But
then
a
problem
like
this,
like
look,
I'm
just
trying
to
pull
my
way
back
to
2019,
right?
And
you
come
to
me
and
you
say,
you
know,
I've
got
this
idea
and
I
want
to
make
application
developers
go
to
production
with
like
one
click.
It's
kind
of
one
of
these
ideas
where
you
hear
it,
you're
like,
well,
yeah,
of
course.
You
know,
if
you
could
do
that,
like
no-brainer,
right?
My
natural
question
is
you
mentioned
the
hyperscalers.
Don't
they
want
people
to
spin
up
applications
as
fast
as
possible,
start
using
compute,
and
maybe
some
of
those
grow
and
they
use
more
compute?
Like,
why
wouldn't
they
have
invested
in
making
this
process
as
smooth
as
possible?
SPEAKER_00
23:49
So
at
the
time
I
had
some
theories,
and
I
think
I
know
the
space
better
now.
And
it
all
comes
down
to
organizational
DNA
and
organizational
incentives
and
where
the
money
is
coming
from
for
these
people.
And
for
AWS
and
GCP
and
Azure,
all
the
money
is
in
massive
enterprise
contracts
with
companies
that
have
massive
DevOps
teams.
So
guess
who
they're
building
for?
They're
building
for
DevOps
engineers.
And
they've
tried,
they've
tried
to
create
products
for
application
developers,
but
they
probably
don't
put
the
right
people
on
it.
They
probably
put
the
right
people
on
it,
but
these
people
don't
get
the
resources
that
they
need.
Uh,
it's
not
an
organizational
imperative.
And
they
always
have
these
low-level
products,
right?
And
so
even
when
they
build
the
higher
level
products,
these
products
don't
solve
all
the
problems
because
you
can
always
go
tell
the
user,
well,
if
it
doesn't
do
this,
then
just
use
Kubernetes
because
you
can
always
use
Kubernetes.
And
for
render,
that
was
never
an
option.
We
said,
look,
if
you
have
to
use
Kubernetes
for
something,
that's
a
failure.
That's
a
thing
that
render
should
fix.
Even
though
we
can
offer
managed
Kubernetes,
the
best
managed
Kubernetes
in
the
world,
to
anyone,
given
everything
that
we've
done
over
the
last
several
years,
we
don't
want
to.
We
want
to
give
people
the
power
and
the
scalability
and
the
flexibility
of
what
they
would
get
from
something
like
Kubernetes,
but
at
the
application
layer.
So
they
don't
have
to
think
about
what's
so
all
the
configuration
that's
needed,
because
that's
not
part
of
what
they're
trying
to
do.
They
just
want
to
get
their
applications
online.
And
so
it's
very
cultural
is
the
short
answer.
And
it's
not
like
they
haven't
tried,
but
I
think
for
them
the
market
isn't
large
enough.
Pablo Srugo
25:40
It's
a
great
answer,
and
I
think
a
very
true
answer.
And
for
some
reason,
an
answer
that
oftentimes,
unless
it
comes
from
like,
you
know,
a
proven
exited
founder,
then
it's
whatever.
But
a
lot
of
times,
you
know,
these
kind
of
why
wouldn't
Google
do
it?
Why
wouldn't
ChatGPT
do
it
these
days?
Why
wouldn't
OpenAI
do
it,
Anthropic
do
it,
whatever?
Like,
and
the
answer
is
just
because
like
they
could,
they
100%
could.
You
know,
a
lot
of
times,
oh,
it's
gonna
take
them
long.
They
could
obviously
do
it,
they
just
won't
because
like
you
can
only
have
so
many
high
priority
things
that
get
the
resources,
that
get
the
mind
share.
You
only
have
so
many,
even
these
big
companies,
like
true
leaders
that
can
really
divert
massive
resources.
There's
only
so
many,
and
they
they
have
to
go
a
certain
way.
And
so
if
you're
taking
them
on
an
area
that
is
not
the
top
importance,
you're
not
really
taking
on
AWS,
you're
taking
on
like
this
small
team
with
a
limited
budget
with
like
the
you
know
50th
best
PM
on
it
at
AWS.
And
that
is
uh
that's
actually
doable.
SPEAKER_00
26:35
Absolutely.
So,
yeah,
so
we're
not
trying
to
build
out
massive
data
centers
and
you
know
spend
80
billion
dollars
on
buying
more
GPUs
and
megawatts
of
electricity.
That's
not
who
we
are.
We
can't
do
that.
Uh,
that's
what
AWS
is
really
good
at,
and
that's
where
they're
competing
with
Google
and
Microsoft
and
all
the
others
right
now.
And
so
our
goal
then
is
to
continue
to
focus
on
application
developers
and
like
I
said
earlier,
increasingly
agents
that
developers
are
using,
and
just
focus
on
helping
them
run
their
applications
in
production
with
ease,
with
control,
flexibility,
scalability,
and
reliability.
MVP To TechCrunch Disrupt Launch
Pablo Srugo
27:16
So
now
we've
got
kind
of
the
idea
and
how
that
came
about.
Walk
me
through
launching
the
product,
you
know,
the
first
users,
and
then
I
don't
know
if
you
did
a
beta
or
how
you
did
it,
but
that
whole
structure
of
from
you
know
idea
to
MVP
to
like
really
launching.
What
was
that
like?
SPEAKER_00
27:29
Yeah,
well,
first
you
have
to
hire
people.
So
I'm
an
engineer.
I
built
a
lot
of
the
early
stuff
myself
and
continue
to
build
the
platform
even
after
we
had
a
team.
Did
you
raise
once
you
had
the
idea
or
did
you
raise
later?
Pablo Srugo
27:40
How
did
you
structure
that
site?
SPEAKER_00
27:41
No,
I
raised
after
I
had
a
working
version,
and
then
I
went
and
hired
uh
our
first
engineer
who's
still
at
the
company.
And
then
we
built
out
a
team
of
total
four
people,
and
we
said,
okay,
this
is
it.
This
is
a
team
that
we're
going
to
use
to
launch
the
product.
So
we
had
a
designer
and
three
engineers,
and
that
was
it,
including
me.
And
we
worked
on
the
product
for
well
over
a
year,
almost,
I
guess,
two
years,
got
it
to
a
point
where
it
had
a
lot
of
the
requisite
features
that
you
would
expect
from
something
like
this.
I
was
still
pretty
underfeatured
at
the
time,
but
that's
when
we
got
to
TechCrunch
Disrupt
in
October
of
2019.
And
that
was
when
we
sort
of
really
launched
it
to
the
world.
And
we
got
a
lot
of
signups,
a
lot
of
attention.
A
lot
of
it
fell
away
because
we
didn't
have
a
bunch
of
features.
And
that's
fine.
Pablo Srugo
28:36
And
how
did
you
do
that?
Like,
was
it
besides
tech
you
went
TechCrunch
Disrupt?
You
know,
you
you
ended
up
winning
that,
that
gets
you
PR.
Did
you
do
a
bunch
of
other
things
as
well?
Or
was
that
really
the
only
kind
of
launch
move?
SPEAKER_00
28:47
I
think
that
was
the
biggest
launch
move
you
can
have
as
a
startup.
And
so
then
we
relied
on
just
word
of
mouth.
And
in
the
very
beginning,
actually,
we
just
enrolled
our
friends.
I
went
and
spoke
to
everyone
I
could,
and
I
was
like,
you
need
to
move
your
site
to
this.
And
often
I
just
did
it
for
them.
That's
how
you
do
it
in
the
beginning,
right?
Pablo Srugo
29:06
Yeah.
How
do
you
know
talk
to
me
about
that?
Because
this
is
like
really,
really
important
at
a
certain
point.
You
know,
like
if
you've
already
got
an
app
and
it's
already
in
production,
the
valve
pals
maybe
not
as
clear.
Like
you
have
to
find
there's
a
point
in
time
where
it's
like,
holy
shit,
I
really
need
this.
And
then
you
do
the
work
and
you
got
it,
and
you're
like,
yeah,
okay,
I
guess
how
did
you
work
that?
Like,
that's
not
that
simple.
SPEAKER_00
29:24
No,
just
like,
look,
this
is
the
future.
You're
using
an
antiquated
product,
and
this
is
gonna
be
better
for
you.
Pablo Srugo
29:30
Like
hand-to-hand
combat.
Like
you
would
just
convince
them
you
you
should
just
switch.
SPEAKER_00
29:33
Yeah.
Pablo Srugo
29:34
Is
that
where
the
credibility
comes
in?
Like
that's
you
had
a
relationship,
they
had
credibility,
they're
like,
okay.
SPEAKER_00
29:40
That
was
part
of
it,
certainly.
But
then
also
I
think
that
our
product
was
meaningfully
better
in
certain
ways.
And
so
I
think
it
was
a
combination.
And
yeah,
I
I
think
developers
often
want
to
use
new
things,
and
that
always
plays
to
our
favor,
or
it
did
back
then.
And
I
wish
we
had
more
users
early
on,
but
I
I
think
the
users
we
had
were
really
helpful
because
I
could
get
real
feedback
from
them.
And
some
of
them
put
very
critical
things
on
the
platform.
And,
you
know,
looking
back,
if
I
were
them,
I
would
think
twice,
knowing
everything
I
knew
about
render.
But
you
know,
the
Pete
Buttigieg
campaign
ran
all
of
their
infrastructure
on
render
in
20,
I
think
it
was
2019.
And
they
did
not
have
the
smoothest
of
experiences,
but
it
certainly
told
us
how
to
scale
to
national
level
traffic.
Pablo Srugo
30:32
You
Getting To $10M ARR The Hard Way
Pablo Srugo
30:33
know,
let's
go
deep
on
that
because
you,
if
I
understand
correctly,
you
got
the
10
million
AR
with
no
marketing
spend
and
no
freemium.
Like
you
literally,
you
had
a
free
trial
and
then
you
have
to,
you
know,
convert
to
paid.
I'm
thinking
about
this
from
the
perspective
of
a
founder.
One
of
the
key
things
that
we've
hopefully
established
so
far
is
nothing
works
unless
you
have
a
product
that
drives
a
lot
of
very
clear
value,
hopefully
as
fast
as
possible,
because
that
is
the
core
that
drives
word
of
mouth.
But
what
else
did
you
do
or
what
did
you
wrong,
right,
on
that
path
to
10
million
AR?
Because,
you
know,
not
spending
on
marketing
and
not
having
freemium,
like
that's
a
very
unique
place
to
be
in.
SPEAKER_00
31:10
I
mean,
honestly,
I
made
a
mistake
and
I
think
we
should
have
had
a
free
tier
sooner.
Everyone
else
had
a
free
tier,
and
we
decided
not
to
have
one
because
we
thought
that
we
really
wanted
a
certain
kind
of
persona
where
people
would
come
to
us
for
real
production
applications,
and
they
would
get
enough
in
their
first
month
to
try
us
out.
But
that
was
severely
curtailing
our
total
signups
because
a
lot
of
people
would
never
try
something,
even
with
a
trial,
if
they
have
to
pay
anything
at
all.
And
so
we
introduced
our
free
tier
after
we
raised
our
series
A.
Pablo Srugo
31:52
How
long
from
zero
to
10
million
AR?
Like
how
how
long
did
that
take?
SPEAKER_00
31:55
Oh,
it
took
a
while.
We
reached
10
million
around
maybe
the
end
of
2021
or
the
beginning
of
2022.
And
you
launched
2019,
so
like
two
to
three
years?
Three
years,
yeah.
I
mean,
from
the
founding
of
the
company,
certainly
almost
four
years
to
get
to
10
million
ARR.
And
like
VCs
wouldn't
fund
a
company
like
that
these
days.
Pablo Srugo
32:20
Yeah,
these
days,
but
these
days
everything's
cute.
You
don't
want
you
can't
you
can't
compare
it
to
these
days.
In
normal
days,
even
in
those
days,
I
mean,
you
know,
from
launch
to
10
million
in
in
three
years,
I
think
was
because
you
know,
we
used
to
talk
about
you
hit
a
million,
then
you
triple,
you
know,
triple,
double,
double,
that's
kind
of
gone.
But
you're
more
or
less
on
that
path.
SPEAKER_00
32:36
Aaron
Powell
The
other
issue
was
that
we
hadn't
quite
focused
on
building
efficient
infrastructure
from
the
beginning,
because
we
really
just
wanted
to
get
applications
on
render.
And
then
when
we
started
offering
a
free
tier,
our
burn
increased
significantly.
And
then
we
also
realized
that
we
had
to
focus
a
lot
more
on
making
our
infrastructure
more
efficient.
So
we
were
just
spending
less
on
the
cloud
and
not
giving
away
a
dollar
for
pennies.
So
a
lot
of
our
work
in
2022
and
some
part
of
2023
was
less
on
building
features
and
more,
and
it
was
still
a
small
team,
but
was
less
on
features
and
more
on
just
making
the
system
more
efficient
and
having
our
cloud
costs
be
more
aligned
to
our
revenue.
Pablo Srugo
33:26
But
you
know,
one
of
the
trade-offs
that
you
must
have
done,
I'm
curious
on
your
thoughts
on
it,
are
like
you've
put
this
product
out,
people
love
it,
you
get
organic
word
of
mouth.
You
can
always
drive
more
growth
through
not
just
freemium,
but
through
spend.
I
mean,
you
could
spend
into
it,
but
you
always
have
this
trade-off
of
do
I
focus
on
spending,
getting
more
people
more
awareness,
more
whether
it's
PR,
payment,
whatever
it
is,
there's
always
a
way
to
drive,
you
know,
spend
and
get
more
growth.
Or
do
I
just
focus
on
investing
that
time
and
resources
into
my
users
and
building
the
product
and
the
features?
There's
always
this
trade-off.
Like
it
seems
like
you
focused
a
lot
on
the
latter.
And
I
assume
that
was
by
design
strategic,
but
maybe
tell
me
more
about
the
thinking
there.
SPEAKER_00
34:02
Yeah.
So
the
product
just
still
needed
a
lot
of
work
to
fulfill
everything
or
most
of
the
things
that
our
customers
wanted
from
it.
And
when
you're
building
a
full
platform,
you
can't
just
offer
half
a
platform
and
make
people
happy,
right?
Like
they
need
so
much
out
of
the
cloud.
Like
imagine
replacing
AWS
with
render.
There's
a
lot
that
you
have
to
build.
At
the
same
time,
we
also
weren't
necessarily
positive
margins
on
every
user
we
were
bringing
on.
So
we
need
to
fix
that
to
reduce
our
burn
so
we
could
actually
spend
money
on
marketing
that
would
lead
to
positive
revenue
as
opposed
to
increasing
our
burn
rate.
Every
new
user
was
actually
increasing
our
burn
rate
at
some
point.
And
we
had
to
get
out
of
that
before
we
invested
in
marketing.
It's
another
point.
Pablo Srugo
34:54
We
talked
earlier
about
the
difference
between
how
some
of
these
hyper-growth
companies
are
so
close
to
failure
sometimes.
And
this
is
another
classic
example.
Like,
you
know,
you
might
offer
a
service
that
you
know
could
be
profitable,
but
it's
not
profitable.
And
actually,
the
faster
you
grow,
the
more
you
burn,
right?
Do
you
remember
like,
you
know,
PayPal
early
days
are
like
there's,
I
mean,
there's
going
to
be
a
lot
of
Uber
or
whatever.
There's
a
lot
of
examples
of
this.
It's
more
common
than
you
think.
But
there's
always
this
trade-off
of
do
you
optimize
for
the
margins
or
do
you
optimize
for
the
growth
in
the
user
experience?
And
you
at
some
point
you
have
to
make
that
shift.
But
you
know,
it's
it's
this
dance.
It's
this
dance
because
if
you
if
you
overdo
it
on
one
side,
you
won't
get
the
growth.
You
overdo
it
here,
you
run
out
of
money.
So
you
you
gotta
you
gotta
play
with
that
as
you
go.
SPEAKER_00
35:34
Yeah,
exactly.
And
so
we
actually
had
to
raise
prices
at
the
end
of
2022.
And
it
was
not
a
very
popular
decision
even
within
the
company.
But
I
knew
that
if
we
didn't
do
it,
then
it
would
mean
that
we're
just
not
running
a
sustainable
business
and
it
would
not
be
the
right
long-term
thing
to
do.
So
we
raised
prices
in
January
of
2023,
and
uh
surprisingly,
we
did
not
see
a
ton
of
churn,
but
our
growth
did
slow
down.
So
that
was
a
trade-off
that
we
had
to
make
at
the
time.
Pablo Srugo
36:04
I
was
gonna
ask
about
you
know
team
size,
like
it's
you
know,
you're
four
people
when
you
launched,
so
you're
very
lean.
When
you
hit
10
million
ARR,
like
you
know,
end
of
21,
early
22,
more
or
less,
how
many
people
were
you?
We
were
probably
25,
30
people,
something
like
that.
And
then
the
other
thing
I
wanted
to
talk
on
because
something
else
that
you
did
differently,
which
is
you've
got
a
lot
of
users.
I
mean,
today
you
have
I
think
six
six
million
developers,
is
that
right?
SPEAKER_00
36:24
Yeah,
more
than
six
million
folks
on
the
platform.
Pricing, Burn, And Cloud Cost Reality
Pablo Srugo
36:27
You
know,
back
then
uh
you
you
had
less,
but
you
probably
had
you
know
tens
of
thousands,
hundreds
of
thousands
of
developers,
and
you
for
a
long
time
had
no
support
organization.
You
didn't
have
really
a
customer
success
or
or
support.
You
had
your
engineers
kind
of
fulfill
this
function.
Tell
me
more
about
how
you
structured
that,
why
you
did
that.
SPEAKER_00
36:44
Yeah.
So
in
the
beginning,
it
was
actually
really
helpful
for
engineers
to
hear,
for
all
of
us,
including
me,
to
really
hear
directly
from
our
customers
who
were
also
engineers.
And
in
many
cases,
we
were
able
to
fix
the
problem
right
away.
And
that
really
quick
feedback
loop
made
folks
really
happy,
even
though
they
had
run
into
a
problem.
And
it
made
them
champions.
And
I
think
that
was
really
important
for
us
to
do
and
it
it
made
a
lot
of
people
long-term
happy
users
of
vendor.
And
we
we
kept
doing
it
until
it
felt
like
we
just
had
too
many
users
who
needed
to
talk
to
someone.
Pablo Srugo
37:22
And
when
was
that
more
or
less?
Like
how
and
how
many
employees
or
or
AR
did
you
did
you
start
really
hiring
like
a
support
team?
SPEAKER_00
37:28
I
think
we
must
have
been
around,
yeah,
25
or
30
people.
Okay,
around
10
millionaire.
Wow.
Something
like
that.
And
then
we
hired
some
support
folks
who
uh
this
was
like
right
after
our
CSA,
I
guess.
And
we
started
building
out
the
support
team.
But
even
the
support
team
was,
again,
very
small.
And
even
now
it's
very
small.
With
six
million
plus
developers
on
the
platform,
we're
able
to
manage
support
with
less
than
10
people.
Pablo Srugo
37:55
How
did
you
structure
that?
Like
tell
me
that
that
road
to
10
million
and
and
your
engineers
are
the
ones
doing
support.
Like
how
did
you
set
that
up
to
make
it
work?
SPEAKER_00
38:03
It
was
a
rotation.
So
in
the
beginning,
we
were
thinking
about
maybe
daily
rotations,
but
then
we
quickly
realized
that
you
know
the
context
switch
is
just
so
disruptive
that
it
would
be
better
to
have
an
engineer
do
support
for
like
an
entire
week
and
and
then
do
you
know
as
much
as
possible,
and
then
the
next
person
would
take
over.
So
you
would
effectively
say,
This
is
my
support
week.
I'm
not
doing
anything
else
this
week.
I'm
not
coding.
So
you
in
many
ways
you
would
be
out
an
engineer
at
all
times.
Pablo Srugo
38:34
There's
the
the
example
you
gave
of
wowing
customers
by
being
able
to
change
something
very
quickly,
which
I
could
see
then
not
just
driving
retention,
but
even
word
of
mouth.
But
how
did
you
see
that
internally
as
you're
thinking
about
the
product
roadmap
and
you're
having,
you
know,
the
the
regular
meetings
that
you
have
on
product
roadmap?
How
did
this
exposure,
this
because
every
engineer
would
have
rotated
through
this,
and
then
you
have
these
discussions
about,
okay,
Engineer-Led Support As A Growth Lever
Pablo Srugo
38:55
should
we
build
this,
should
we
build
that?
How
do
you
feel
like
that
kind
of
fed
into
those
meetings?
SPEAKER_00
38:59
Yeah,
it
really
helped.
It
really
helped
to
hear
directly
from
customers
and
build
true
empathy.
And
when
you're
doing
support
regularly,
you
kind
of
develop
back
then
we
didn't
have
AI
classifying
issues.
So,
you
know,
we
did
just
did
it
manually.
And
you
kind
of
develop
intuition
for
the
things
that
keep
coming
up,
and
that
drives
the
priority
and
importance
of
your
roadmap
and
which
ones
you
take
on
first.
Pablo Srugo
39:26
Yeah,
I
have
to
imagine,
especially
for
product
like
growth
type
product,
like
you
like
your,
I
mean,
the
product
is
your
growth
engine,
it's
always
important.
I
mean,
great
product's
always
important,
but
you
know,
frankly,
depending
on
your
your
sales
motion,
how
you
go
to
market,
who,
you
know,
is
the
user,
the
buyer,
like
all
these
different
things,
it
can
matter
more
or
less.
I
mean,
but
when
your
product,
when
you're
doing
product
like
growth,
you're
not
even
spending
on
marketing,
your
product
is
the
growth
engine,
it's
you
know,
the
o
the
only
thing
that
matters.
And
so,
you
know,
I
just
think
about
like
when
I
used
to
have
those
kind
of
product
roadmap
type
discussions
internally,
and
and
even
when
I
look
at
the
the
companies
I
work
with,
I
mean,
you
know,
the
CEO,
the
salesperson,
they've
got
this
edge,
and
and
the
salesperson's
often
not
even
in
those
meetings.
So
it's
like,
but
you
know,
the
CEO
in
the
early,
early
days
is
almost
the
only
bridge,
you
know,
and
you're
hearing
the
engineers
and
what
they
want
to
do,
and
the
designers,
what
they
want
to
do,
and
and
the
marketers,
maybe,
and
you're
the
only
person
that
can
kind
of
bring
that
voice
of
customer.
But
you
can
imagine
a
world
where
you're
having
that
discussion
and
everybody
at
the
table
has
a
firsthand
opinion,
right,
of
reality,
how
much
better
those
discussions
are
and
and
you
know,
the
outcome
of
that
should
really
show
up
in
the
product,
not
just
what
features
built,
how
you
built
them,
everything
about
it.
Absolutely.
SPEAKER_00
40:32
Yeah.
And
it
did.
And
even
after
we
hired
support
engineers,
we
we
don't
have
like
level
one
support
where
folks
are
not
technical.
We
only
hired
people
who
were
able
to
understand
coding
and
were
able
to
like
actually
even
code,
but
they
weren't
coding
all
the
time.
They
were
mostly
answering
technical
support
questions
and
helping
customers
with
sometimes
maybe
even
with
their
applications.
And
so
we
made
sure
that
the
people
who
were
answering
customer
support
requests
had
enough
technical
grounding
to
then
give
the
right
kind
of
feedback
to
the
product
team,
to
the
engineers.
And
so
they
would
bring
these
things
back
to
the
team
with
a
filtered
lens.
And
they
would
actually
have
really
good
suggestions
on
how
to
fix
a
problem,
even
because
they'd
seen
customers
go
through
different
versions
of
the
problem.
And
so
they
they
could
actually
sometimes
come
suggest
a
solution
that
would
serve
multiple
people
at
the
same
time.
So
again,
it
came
down
to
like
who
you
were
hiring
and
what
kind
of
profile
you
were
hiring
for.
And
I
think
we
definitely
made
the
right
decision
to
hire
support
engineers
as
opposed
to
first
line
support.
AI Apps, Agents, Workflows, Sandboxes
Pablo Srugo
41:45
And
then
maybe
the
last
question,
because
you're
a
pre-gen
AI
company
that
is
still,
you
know,
doing
really
well,
kind
of
post-gen
AI.
Like,
you
know,
there's
three
buckets.
Like
there's
the
ones
that
are
clearly,
I've
got
a
company,
portfolio
company
that
they
were
always
using
AI,
and
then
when
AI
got
better,
they
just
exploded.
Like
it
just
went,
it
took
them
up,
it
was
a
crazy
way
for
them.
There's
other
like
classic
B2B
SaaS
companies
like
you
know,
the
SaaS
Apocalypse
that
are
clearly
suffering,
and
there's
some
that
have
no
impact.
Like
where
AI
just
didn't
really
change
fundamentally
their
business.
What
camp
would
you
say
you're
in?
And
and
then
how
have
you
kind
of
adapted
to
this,
to
this
AI
world,
like
if
if
at
all,
like
if
it's
even
been
a
big
change
for
you?
SPEAKER_00
42:19
Oh,
yeah,
it's
been
massive
for
us.
Uh,
we're
definitely
in
the
first
camp.
And
that's
because
fundamentally,
the
number
of
applications
being
created
has
ballooned,
exploded.
And
people
are
able
to
build
things
now
that
they
always
wanted
to
build,
but
didn't
have
the
time
for,
the
resources
for.
And
I'm
not
even
talking
about
people
who
don't
know
coding.
I'm
talking
about
people
who
know
coding,
who
had
all
these
pet
projects
and
who
wanted
to
build
these
things
and
now
they're
able
to.
And
it's
they're
able
to
do
many
of
them.
And
the
same
thing
is
happening
within
companies,
where
companies
wanted
to
build
these
tools
and
now
they're
able
to.
So
so
much
more
software
is
being
created,
and
a
lot
of
it
needs
to
be
hosted
in
a
way
that
is
largely
self-serve,
because
the
DevOps
teams
within
these
companies
either
don't
exist
because
these
are
earlier
stage
companies,
or
they're
so
stretched
by
all
the
engineers
writing
more
software,
all
the
engineers
creating
more
pull
requests,
and
the
CI
systems
are
no
longer
working.
And
there's
only
so
many
new
applications
that
as
a
DevOps
team,
you
are
equipped
to
put
in
production.
Because
in
the
old
days,
you
barely
put
like
one
application
in
production
over
a
period
of
a
quarter,
if
that,
right?
And
now
you're
being
asked
to
do
everything.
And
so
what
we're
seeing
is
more
and
more
people,
more
and
more
companies
are
turning
towards
platforms,
self-serve
platforms
like
render
instead
of
their
DevOps
teams
and
saying,
look,
we
just
want
all
our
builders
to
have
access
to
self-serve
solutions
that
are
also
enterprise
friendly,
that
are
also
giving
us
a
level
of
control,
a
level
of
observability,
compliance,
security.
And
then
there's
just
a
bunch
of
builders
who
love.
Of
what
we
do
and
who
rely
on
us
to
keep
their
applications,
side
projects,
whatever
it
is,
online.
And
so
we've
seen
as
of
the
end
of
2024,
we
just
started
seeing
a
lot
of
traction
and
many,
many,
many
more
applications
being
deployed
to
render.
And
then
that
continued
through
2025.
And
then
we
saw
a
huge
spike,
bigger
than
anything
we'd
seen
before
at
the
beginning
of
this
year.
Because
a
lot
of
people
found
that,
you
know,
the
latest
version
of
Cloud
Code
and
Codex.
Pablo Srugo
44:33
Oh,
yeah.
When
you
when
you
can
walk
your
dog
and
talk
to
Cloud
Code
and
have
it
build
stuff
for
you,
it's
you're
gonna
build
a
lot
more
stuff.
SPEAKER_00
44:39
Yeah.
And
so
our
revenue
has
just
changed.
It's
like
even
at
a
much
higher
scale
of
revenue,
we're
growing
much
faster
than
we
did
before,
which
is
great.
And
then
one
other
thing
has
changed,
which
is
the
kind
of
applications
that
people
are
building
is
changing.
And
so
they
need
new
primitives.
And
they
need
things
like
render
workflows,
which
is
a
way
for
you
to
run
agents
that
need
to
go
through
a
series
of
steps.
And
you
need
to
make
sure
that
each
step
can
be
retried,
that
you
have
concurrency
limits,
and
then
you
can
sort
of
observe
each
step,
and
you
can
have
a
parent
task
and
a
bunch
of
child
tasks.
And
so
we
built
that
product.
It's
going
to
be
in
GA
by
the
time
this
goes
live.
And
then
the
next
thing
we're
building
is
sandboxes.
Because
again,
you
have
a
lot
of
code
that
is
machine
generated
and
you
want
to
run
it
in
a
contained
isolated
environment.
And
you
want
to
do
that
at
scale.
And
guess
what
we've
been
doing?
We've
been
running
untrusted
code.
Because
from
our
perspective,
code
has
always
been
untrusted
because
we
don't
know
what
the
customer
wrote.
And
so
we've
been
doing
this
for
ages
at
a
scale
that
is
higher
than
any
sandbox
providers
right
now.
And
so
we
think
that
will
be
our
sandbox
products
are
going
to
be
really
powerful
and
scalable
for
what
the
industry
needs
right
now.
But
more
generally,
we
are
expanding
render
to
serve
the
needs
of
people
who
are
building
AI
apps
and
agents.
Because
again,
it
goes
back
to
serving
the
needs
of
application
developers.
And
if
they
need
us
to
build
more
primitives
for
helping
them
build
these
agents
and
deploy
them
faster,
then
that's
what
we're
focused
on.
That
is
actually
what
we're
doing
Ambition As The Founder Advantage
SPEAKER_00
46:14
right
now.
Pablo Srugo
46:14
Perfect.
Well,
let's
stop
there.
Let
me
ask
the
last
question
we
always
end
on.
What
would
be
like
your
number
one
piece
of
advice
for
an
early
stage
founder
that's
just
in
that
early
phase
of
finding
product
market
fit?
SPEAKER_00
46:25
I
would
say
something
that
I
may
have
said
earlier
in
the
interview,
which
is
I
think
all
startup
problems,
all
industries
are
hard
and
somewhat
equally
hard.
So
go
for
the
most
ambitious
version
of
what
you're
trying
to
do
because
it's
not
materially
that
much
harder
than
the
less
ambitious
version.
And
the
more
ambitious
version
is
actually
going
to
help
you
hire
more
interesting
people,
people
who
want
to
solve
harder
problems.
It's
probably
going
to
help
you
with
fundraising
because
the
market
might
be
bigger
and
it'll
just
be
more
interesting.
Perfect.
Pablo Srugo
47:00
Thanks
so
much,
man.
SPEAKER_00
47:01
Really
appreciate
it.
Of
course.
Thank
you.
Thank
you
for
having
me.
This
is
great.
Pablo Srugo
47:04
So
Final Share-The-Show CTA
Pablo Srugo
47:05
picture
this
it's
months
from
now,
years
from
now,
and
one
of
your
founder
friends,
or
really
close
founder
friends
of
yours,
guess
what?
Their
startup
went
bankrupt.
And
it
turns
out,
if
you
had
just
shared
the
product
market
fit
show
with
them,
they
would
have
learned
everything
they
needed
to
to
find
product
market
fit
and
to
create
a
huge
success.
But
instead,
their
startup
has
completely
failed.
You
have
blood
on
your
hands.
Don't
let
that
happen.
You
don't
want
to
live
like
that.
It
is
terrible.
So
do
what
you
need
to
do.
Tell
them
about
the
show.
Send
it
to
them.
Put
it
on
WhatsApp.
Put
it
on
Slack.
Put
it
where
you
need
to
put
it.
Just
make
sure
they
know
about
it
and
they
check
it
out.